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Notes
Narveson asserts that “There is no rational profile of incomes that is what the difference principle prescribes, but what we gather is that Reiman—along with the rest of us I should think—would like to see that the ‘poorer’ people in society are doing pretty decently, however that is to be understood” (Narveson 2014: 74). On the difference principle and its requirement of maximizing the share of the least advantaged, see Rawls (1999: 72), inter alia.
Bear in mind that this is about designing a just distribution, not about distributing goods to and among existing people.
References
Marx, Karl. 1967. Capital. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, translators. New York: International Publishers.
Narveson, Jan. 2014. Reiman on labor, value, and the difference principle. The Journal of Ethics 18: 47–74.
Rawls, John. 1999. A theory of justice, Revised ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Reiman, Jeffrey. 2012. As free and as just as possible: The theory of Marxian liberalism. London: Wiley.
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Reiman, J. Reply to Narveson, “Reiman on Labor, Value and the Difference Principle”. J Ethics 18, 229–237 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-014-9170-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-014-9170-5