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Epistemic Boundedness and The Universality of Thought

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Abstract

Fodor argues that our minds must have epistemic limitations because there must be endogenous constraints on the class of concepts we can acquire. However, his argument for the existence of these endogenous constraints is falsified by the phenomenon of the deferential acquisition of concepts. If we allow for the acquisition of concepts through deferring to experts and scientific instruments, then our conceptual capacity will be without endogenous constraints, and there will be no reason to think that our minds are epistemically bounded.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, 37th and O Streets, NW Washigton, DC, 20007, USA

    Matthew Rellihan

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  1. Matthew Rellihan
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Rellihan, M. Epistemic Boundedness and The Universality of Thought. Philos Stud 125, 219–250 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7804-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7804-3

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