Abstract
The paper argues that future knowledge will in substantial measure be inscrutable for us today, with the principal exception of facts about the past. The paper considers the reasons for this circumstance and examines its wider implications for the condition of human knowledge.
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Notes
That contingent future developments are by nature cognitively intractable, even for God, was a favored theme among the medieval scholastics. On this issue see Adams (1987), chap. 27.
On this theme see Rescher (2000).
As one commentator has wisely written: “But prediction in the field of pure science is another matter. The scientist sets forth over an uncharted sea and the scribe, left behind on the dock is asked what he may find at the other side of the waters. If the scribe knew, the scientist would not have to make his voyage” (Anonymous [1920]).
Quoted in Daedalus, vol. 107 (1978), p. 24.
Whitehead (1969).
See Kuhn (1970), for an interesting development of the normal/revolutionary distinction.
Peirce (1934), sect. 7.144. See also Peirce’s important 1898 paper on “Methods for Attaining Truth,” in ibid., sects. 5.574 ff.
Rescher (1979a) deals with these matters.
Note that this is independent of the question “Would we ever want to do so?” Do we ever want to answer all those predictive questions about ourselves and our environment, or are we more comfortable in the condition in which “ignorance is bliss”?
See Jeffrey (1940).
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Rescher, N. The problem of future knowledge. Mind Soc 11, 149–163 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-012-0099-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-012-0099-8