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Species in three and four dimensions

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Abstract

There is an interesting parallel between two debates in different domains of contemporary analytic philosophy. One is the endurantism–perdurantism, or three-dimensionalism vs. four-dimensionalism, debate in analytic metaphysics. The other is the debate on the species problem in philosophy of biology. In this paper I attempt to cross-fertilize these debates with the aim of exploiting some of the potential that the two debates have to advance each other. I address two issues. First, I explore what the case of species implies regarding the feasibility of particular positions in the endurantism– perdurantism debate. I argue that the case of species casts doubt on the recent claim that three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism are equivalent descriptions of the same underlying reality. Second, and conversely, I examine whether the metaphysical worry about three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism can help us to better understand the nature of biological species. I show that analyzing the thesis that species are individuals against the background of the endurantism–perdurantism debate allows us to explicate two different ways in which this thesis can be interpreted.

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  1. Center for Philosophy and Ethics of Science (ZEWW), Leibniz University of Hannover, Im Moore 21, 30167, Hannover, Germany

    Thomas A. C. Reydon

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Correspondence to Thomas A. C. Reydon.

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Reydon, T.A.C. Species in three and four dimensions. Synthese 164, 161–184 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9221-6

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