Journal of the History of Philosophy

Notes and Discussions BERGSON'S METAPHYSICAL INTUITION AND SCIENCE In the following discussion, I will try to indicate the ways in which Mario Bunge in his book, Intuition and Science, 1 has misunderstood Bergson's thought and how, consequently, he has radically misrepresented some very crucial tenets of Bergson's metaphysical position. There are several major points which Bunge makes which constitute the brunt of his case against the metaphysical intuition of Bergson. The first of these is that Bergson's metaphysical intuition "plays no role in science." The second is that the intuitionist seeks final certainty and ultimate foundations. Third, Bunge claims that Bergson offers no proof that intuitive knowing is higher than reason. In regard to the first point, the development of Bunge's criticism leans heavily on the erroneous assumption that Bergson was eager to put his metaphysics to work in the vineyards of practical science. If this assumption were true, it would not be at all difficult to agree with Bunge that "to assign a scientific task to an intuitionist --who, if he is sincere, expects it all from an inner vision--would be as reasonable as assigning it to a gypsy or to a medium." 2 But the assumption is entirely false. When he assumes that Bergson was anxious to directly apply his metaphysical intuition to the solution of scientific problems Bunge misrepresents Bergson's own obiectives as a philosopher. Bergson wrote: The duty of philosophyshould be ... to examinethe livingwithout any reservationas to practical utility.... Its own specialobject is to speculate,that is to say, to see; its attitude toward the livingshouldnot be that of sciencewhichaimsonlyat action2 If Bergson, or for that matter any metaphysician, is to be clearly understood, the beginning of that understanding must discard the anticipation of any making. Let the standard of our understanding be seeing for nothing rather than seeing for making as practical life and science require of us. In this way we remain faithful to seeing precisely what the philosopher sees. Bunge's faulty understanding of Bergson's philosophical objectives accounts for his ungrounded fear of the Bergsonian intuitionist becoming greatly involved in the fact and matter of science. It is practically certain that Bergson would not have been inclined to accept the "scientific task" which Bunge seems to dangle before him. Bergson's interest in science focused mainly upon its method of knowing. How the scientist sees was his concern--not what he sees. This distinction is crucial to the correct understanding of Bergson's metaphysical position. MarioBunge,Intuition and Science (EnglewoodCliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962). ~lbid., p. 119. Henri Bergson,Creative Evolution (New York: The Modern Library, 1944),p. 215. [1591 160 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The task of the philosopheris then clearlydefined.He takesfacts and lawsfromthe scientist's hands.... To this knowledgehe adds a critique of the faculty of knowing..,but the matter of knowledgehe regardsas the affairofscienceand not of philosophy. ~ Bergson fixed his metaphysical attention on the scientific mode of knowing. The chief object of that attention was intuition and the significance it had in the operation of the scientific mind.5 "To expect it all" from intuition is far from Bergson's notion of its capability. He described intuition at one point as the "impulsion" that enables the philosopher, artist, and scientist to forge ahead and progress in his work; an impulsion which, when one turns around to seize it, slips away.6Once this instantaneous "impetus" is received, its utility ceases as the work propelled by the impulsion unfolds and develops until circumstances conjure up the need for a new impetus.7 Bergson makes unequivocally clear that only when the scientist has first gained command and mastery of the facts and subject matter involved in his work can intuition aid in the further development of that work.s Like the artist, "one must know the technique of an art in order to enter its spirit." 9 In asserting that Bergson's metaphysical intuition plays no role in science Bunge compounds his misrepresentation by indulging in self-contradiction. "In technology as in science," writes Bunge, "the initial spark of intuition may trigger a chain reaction among pre-existent items of knowledge." lo That statement and those...