Regular ArticleConjoint Dissociations Reveal Involuntary “Perceptual” Priming from Generating at Study
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A unitary signal-detection model of implicit and explicit memory
2008, Trends in Cognitive SciencesCitation Excerpt :For example, changes in modality between study and test can produce larger reductions for priming than for recognition, whereas generating versus reading an item at study can improve recognition, but impair priming (see Ref. [3]). Particularly compelling is the demonstration of such crossed double dissociations in parallel with associations between priming and recognition tasks (e.g. Ref. [14]) – so-called ‘reversed associations’ [15]. The model has not yet been applied directly to these dissociations; however, they could be explicable by a simple extension of the model to two or more distributions of memory strengths.
Does priming with awareness reflect explicit contamination? An approach with a response-time measure in word-stem completion
2005, Consciousness and CognitionMeasuring automatic retrieval: A comparison of implicit memory, process dissociation, and speeded response procedures
2005, Acta PsychologicaCitation Excerpt :The longer RTs in the explicit group than in the baseline group confirm that conscious retrieval takes longer to complete than automatic retrieval (Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1995, 1998). The RTs in the speeded response group were equivalent to those in the baseline group and faster than those in the explicit group, indicating that the speeded response group did not switch to a conscious retrieval strategy when presented stems of previously studied items (Richardson-Klavehn, Clarke, & Gardiner, 1999; Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1998). The RT data from all three experiments reported here lead to exactly the same conclusion.
Implicit memory: Intention and awareness revisited
2001, Trends in Cognitive SciencesComponent Processes of Conceptual Priming and Associative Cued Recall: The Roles of Preexisting Representation and Depth of Processing
2007, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition
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