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Notes
The role of the inference relation between the premise and the conclusion is certainly considered by the author, who, however, stresses that a pragma-dialectical regulation of argumentative discourse must also take into account all other argumentatively relevant speech acts of this discourse, somehow hinting that these speech acts risk to be neglected: “This view of argumentative discussion process implies that a pragma-dialectical regulation of argumentative discourse in a procedure that fosters the resolution of differences of opinion on the merits cannot be limited to the inference relation between the premises (interpreted as ‘concessions’ of the other party) and the conclusion of the reasoning involved, but must cover all speech acts performed in the discourse that are pertinent to the resolution process” (p. 33).
Footnote 45 remarks that “if endoxa also include normative commitments, the differences regarding endoxa between certain groups of people point to their representing different subcultures (or even cultures)”.
More precisely: “Tindale (p. 157) leans to Crosswhite (1996, p. 115), who conveniently assumes that what we mean by the judgments of a universal audience are the principles of reason as seen in logical principles and rules, so that it is logic in the end that gives us “real universalizability”” (p. 118).
Interestingly, by speaking of ‘raison d’être’, not only communicative activities but also institutions are conceived of in teleological terms.
In relation to footnote 20 (p. 139) it should be remarked that the notion of domain as “sphere” (like the legal or commercial domain) to which a certain activity pertains cannot be wholly identified with the notion of interaction field as it is defined in Rigotti and Rocci (2006), which rather focuses on the actual social environment, coinciding with a precise institutional entity (like a certain state, a certain hospital or a certain corporation). The domains are the classes to which the interaction fields belong.
The usefulness of rhetoric is explained by Aristotle with the fact that things that are true and things that are just are by nature stronger than—get the better of—their opposites, so that, if decisions are not made in the due way, the defeat can only depend on the speakers and theirs is the blame (Ross ed., 1959: 1355a 21–24).
Interestingly, the reasonableness of the other party, who is challenged to critically verify the reasons brought in support of the standpoint, is the first emerging aspect of the connection of argumentation with reasonableness. Indeed the involvement of the other party’s reason represents one of the constitutive conditions of argumentation: a difference of opinion is not truly resolved if the acceptance takes place without the scrutiny of the other’s reason even if the argument is itself valid. In other words, the uncritical acceptance of a perfectly reasonable argument is unreasonable. However, the relevance of the other party’s reasonableness does not necessarily entail (as claimed by Lumer 2010) any form of consensualism: the truth of the premises of an argument is not created by their acceptance, but their acceptance is requested for a sound and reasonable argumentative interaction: “Granting that ‘conventional validity’ based on intersubjective agreement is indeed a prerequisite for reaching a conclusive judgment concerning the acceptability of argumentative moves, I would like to emphasize that, because of its overriding importance, determining their ‘problem solving validity should come first’” (p. 137). The ‘coming first’ of the problem solving validity is not always upheld throughout the monograph; see pp. 220–221, in particular footnote 17.
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Rigotti, E. Frans H. van Eemeren: Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse. Extending the Pragma-Dialectical Theory of Argumentation. Argumentation 25, 261–270 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9202-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9202-2