Aaron Rizzieri
LaGuardia Community College/CUNY, Humanities, Faculty Member
Moral reasons take precedence over non-moral reasons either by outweighing non-moral practical reasons, or by excluding such reasons. Several prominent defenders of the moral argument for theism have incorporated the outweighing thesis.... more
Moral reasons take precedence over non-moral reasons either by outweighing non-moral practical reasons, or by excluding such reasons. Several prominent defenders of the moral argument for theism have incorporated the outweighing thesis. They claim we have categorically binding moral duties only if we always have most reason to be ethical. Furthermore, we always have most reason to be ethical only if theism is true. On the contrary, I argue that the excluding reasons thesis is correct and that this undermines a key premise in moral arguments developed by C. Stephen Evans, C. Stephen Layman, and William Lane Craig.
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Our focus in this chapter is on defending a justification norm for practical reasoning (treat p as a reason for action only if you are justified that p) against the William James–inspired claim that there are widespread circumstances in... more
Our focus in this chapter is on defending a justification norm for practical reasoning (treat p as a reason for action only if you are justified that p) against the William James–inspired claim that there are widespread circumstances in which it is proper for a subject s to believe and act as if God exists even though s lacks sufficient (i.e. knowledge-level) evidence that God exists. However, my end is not to undermine religious commitment. Rather, it is to reveal why acting on one’s mere hope that God exists is an epistemically, morally, and prudentially superior path for a mature and reflective person with strong religious inclinations whose evidence renders the probability of God’s existence either counterbalanced or inscrutable.
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Now that we have mapped out Plantinga’s account of warranted theistic and Christian beliefs, and have detailed several objections, we are in a good position to posit an alternative deontologically grounded evidentialist concept of... more
Now that we have mapped out Plantinga’s account of warranted theistic and Christian beliefs, and have detailed several objections, we are in a good position to posit an alternative deontologically grounded evidentialist concept of justification which is more plausible in light of the EAFI and other considerations which favor an internalist account of justification, at least for action-guiding beliefs. These other considerations include Laurence Bonjour’s clairvoyance argument and Cohen’s new evil-demon argument that we have been discussing (Bonjour 1980; Cohen 1984). Religious beliefs such as “God exists,” “Christianity is true,” or “God has commanded X” are indeed action-guiding for the practicing believer; similarly, belief in the denials of these propositions is also action-guiding for many atheistic people.1 This accounts for the enduring importance and controversy which surrounds such beliefs.
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We have argued a normal adult typically has access to both the content and efficacy of the grounds of her action-guiding beliefs. As those familiar with the contemporary epistemology literature are aware, this access requirement can be... more
We have argued a normal adult typically has access to both the content and efficacy of the grounds of her action-guiding beliefs. As those familiar with the contemporary epistemology literature are aware, this access requirement can be cashed out in a number of ways depending on one’s overall theory of internal justification.
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In this chapter I want to discuss whether or not a variety of principles of encroachment support a robust internal justification requirement on knowledge of action-guiding beliefs. A broad variety of religiously significant propositions... more
In this chapter I want to discuss whether or not a variety of principles of encroachment support a robust internal justification requirement on knowledge of action-guiding beliefs. A broad variety of religiously significant propositions are action-guiding, hence the relevance of this chapter to religious epistemology. This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section II, I lay out an argument I have named “the encroachment argument for internalism” (EAFI for now). The conclusion of the EAFI is that there are a pair of nonstandard access requirements on a normal subject s’s justification for her action-guiding beliefs. In Sections III and IV, I defend each of the two premises of EAFI and briefly describe how my deontologically grounded internalism is able to handle objections to such accounts based on the fact we have limited voluntary control over what we believe (Alston 1988; Plantinga 1993a).
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I spent Chapter 1 defending several principles of encroachment which will continue to be of interest to us as this book proceeds. In this chapter we will focus on two of those principles. These are Fantl and McGrath’s KA principle and its... more
I spent Chapter 1 defending several principles of encroachment which will continue to be of interest to us as this book proceeds. In this chapter we will focus on two of those principles. These are Fantl and McGrath’s KA principle and its epistemic counterpart, EA: KA: S knows that p only if s is rational to act as if that p. EA: S is justified that p only if s is rational to act as if that p.
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Research Interests:
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Abstract It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S's knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is,... more
Abstract It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S's knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as pragmatic encroachment. I then ...
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Research Interests:
UMI, ProQuest ® Dissertations & Theses. The world's most comprehensive collection of dissertations and theses. Learn more... ProQuest, The role of justification in animal and reflective knowledge. by Rizzieri, Aaron G., Ph.D.,... more
UMI, ProQuest ® Dissertations & Theses. The world's most comprehensive collection of dissertations and theses. Learn more... ProQuest, The role of justification in animal and reflective knowledge. by Rizzieri, Aaron G., Ph.D., ARIZONA ...
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The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of... more
The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of religious ignorance promotes responsible acts of assertion, epistemic humility, and non–dogmatic doxastic attitudes towards the content of one’s own faith. Such conformity also facilitates the formation of the religious personality in a healthy direction in other ways. I explore these ideas in relation to the Christian faith tradition, but my reflections generalize.
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I present three versions of the argument from divine hiddenness that are grounded in moral considerations regarding how a just deity would act and auxiliary commitments that theists often have. First, I argue that the problem of... more
I present three versions of the argument from divine hiddenness that are grounded in moral considerations regarding how a just deity would act and auxiliary commitments that theists often have. First, I argue that the problem of hiddenness is made worse if one also holds that many will suffer in the afterlife due to not achieving a proper orientation towards God and the demands of morality in this life. Second, I argue that if any version of the moral argument for theism is successful, then God has a very good reason to not remain hidden. Third, I argue that a just God would not allow people to do evil in her name.
Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice engages several recent and important discussions in the mainstream epistemological literature surrounding 'pragmatic encroachment'. It has been argued that what is at stake for... more
Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice engages several recent and important discussions in the mainstream epistemological literature surrounding 'pragmatic encroachment'. It has been argued that what is at stake for a person in regards to acting as if a proposition is true can raise the levels of epistemic support required to know that proposition. Do the high stakes involved in accepting or rejecting religious beliefs raise the standards for knowledge that 'God exists', 'Jesus rose from the dead' and other propositions? Professor Rizzieri also examines whether or not knowledge and justification norms of belief and action undermine the pragmatic grounds for religious belief suggested by William James. Rizzieri argues that such norms favor an attitude of hope, as opposed to belief, under conditions of uncertainty. Finally, Rizzieri argues the connections between knowledge and rational action undermine radically externalist accounts of religious knowledge and proposes an alternative account of the justification of religious beliefs
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Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice engages several recent and important discussions in the mainstream epistemological literature surrounding 'pragmatic encroachment'. It has been argued that what is at stake for... more
Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice engages several recent and important discussions in the mainstream epistemological literature surrounding 'pragmatic encroachment'. It has been argued that what is at stake for a person in regards to acting as if a proposition is true can raise the levels of epistemic support required to know that proposition. Do the high stakes involved in accepting or rejecting religious beliefs raise the standards for knowledge that 'God exists', 'Jesus rose from the dead' and other propositions? Professor Rizzieri also examines whether or not knowledge and justification norms of belief and action undermine the pragmatic grounds for religious belief suggested by William James. Rizzieri argues that such norms favor an attitude of hope, as opposed to belief, under conditions of uncertainty. Finally, Rizzieri argues the connections between knowledge and rational action undermine radically externalist accounts of religious knowledge and proposes an alternative account of the justification of religious beliefs
Research Interests:
The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of... more
The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of religious ignorance promotes responsible acts of assertion, epistemic humility, and non–dogmatic doxastic attitudes towards the content of one's own faith. Such conformity also facilitates the formation of the religious personality in a healthy direction in other ways. I explore these ideas in relation to the Christian faith tradition, but my reflections generalize.
Research Interests:
The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of... more
The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of religious ignorance promotes responsible acts of assertion, epistemic humility, and non-dogmatic doxastic attitudes towards the content of one’s own faith. Such conformity also facilitates the formation of the religious personality in a healthy direction. I explore these ideas in relation to the Christian faith tradition, but my reflections should generalize.
Research Interests:
Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice engages several recent and important discussions in the mainstream epistemological literature surrounding 'pragmatic encroachment'. It has been argued that what is at stake for a... more
Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice engages several recent and important discussions in the mainstream epistemological literature surrounding 'pragmatic encroachment'. It has been argued that what is at stake for a person in regards to acting as if a proposition is true can raise the levels of epistemic support required to know that proposition. Do the high stakes involved in accepting or rejecting religious beliefs raise the standards for knowledge that 'God exists', 'Jesus rose from the dead' and other propositions? Professor Rizzieri also examines whether or not knowledge and justification norms of belief and action undermine the pragmatic grounds for religious belief suggested by William James. Rizzieri argues that such norms favor an attitude of hope, as opposed to belief, under conditions of uncertainty. Finally, Rizzieri argues the connections between knowledge and rational action undermine radically externalist accounts of religious knowledge and proposes an alternative account of the justification of religious beliefs
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I argue that embryonic stem cell research is fair to the embryo, even on the assumption that the embryo has attained full personhood and an attendant right to life at conception. This is because the only feasible alternatives open to the... more
I argue that embryonic stem cell research is fair to the embryo, even on the assumption that the embryo has attained full personhood and an attendant right to life at conception. This is because the only feasible alternatives open to the embryo are to exist briefly in an unconscious state and be killed or to not exist at all. Hence, one is neither depriving the embryo of an enduring life it would otherwise have had nor is one causing the embryo pain. I also argue that a rational agent in a situation relevantly similar to that of the embryo would consent to such research, and I use this insight to ground two justice-based arguments in favor of this research.
It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is... more
It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.”
Timothy Williamson has argued that one proposition e can serve as evidence for a hypothesis h for a subject s under two conditions. The first condition is that the proposition e must be known, and the second condition is that the... more
Timothy Williamson has argued that one proposition e can serve as evidence for a hypothesis h for a subject s under two conditions. The first condition is that the proposition e must be known, and the second condition is that the probability of h on e must be greater than the probability of h alone.
It is my purpose to challenge this first constraint on evidence ((E=K) for now). In section one, I argue by counterexample that (E=K) forces an implausible separation between what it means for a belief to be rational, justified, and properly guided in its formation on the one hand, and evidentially supported on the other. These arguments are similar in spirit to arguments that evidentialists and other epistemic internalists have used against reliabilist views of justification.
It is my purpose to challenge this first constraint on evidence ((E=K) for now). In section one, I argue by counterexample that (E=K) forces an implausible separation between what it means for a belief to be rational, justified, and properly guided in its formation on the one hand, and evidentially supported on the other. These arguments are similar in spirit to arguments that evidentialists and other epistemic internalists have used against reliabilist views of justification.