Abstract
In a series of works, Peter Carruthers has argued for the denial of the title proposition. Here, I defend that proposition by offering direct support drawn from relevant sciences and by undercutting Carruthers‘ argument. In doing the latter, I distinguish an intrinsic theory of consciousness from Carruthers‘ relational theory of consciousness. This relational theory has two readings, one of which makes essential appeal to evolutionary theory. I argue that neither reading offers a successful view.
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Robinson, W.S. Some Nonhuman Animals Can Have Pains in a Morally Relevant Sense. Biology & Philosophy 12, 51–71 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017933132500
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017933132500