Skip to main content
Log in

A reply to Cling’s “The epistemic regress problem”

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Andrew Cling presents a new version of the epistemic regress problem, and argues that intuitionist foundationalism, social contextualism, holistic coherentism, and infinitism fail to solve it. Cling’s discussion is quite instructive, and deserving of careful consideration. But, I argue, Cling’s discussion is not in all respects decisive. I argue that Cling’s dilemma argument against holistic coherentism fails.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. All references to Cling are to Cling (2008).

  2. When is it that P 1 implies P 0, by standing in a (relevant) logical or quasi-logical relation to P 0? Cling mentions three possible answers: when P 1 entails or inductively implies P 0; when the probability of P 0 given P 1 is sufficiently high; when P 1 stands in an irreducibly epistemic relationship to P 0 such that P 1 would justify P 0 (p. 402). (When Cling gives the second possible answer, he writes: “the probability of P 1 given P 0 is sufficiently high” (p. 402). I take it that, since the question is of when it is that P 1 implies P 0, not of when it is that P 0 implies P 1, what Cling means to say is: the probability of P 0 given P 1 is sufficiently high.)

  3. For any P i in σ such that P i has a successor, the successor of P i is P i+1.

  4. This construal of the notion of an S-ordered sequence differs from Cling’s initial construal (p. 402) in making no use of the notion of relevant accessibility. I take it, though, that, as Cling understands the notion of relevant accessibility, if every member of σ is supported, for S (at t), by its successor, if it has one, then the members of σ are relevantly accessible to S (at t).

  5. When Cling initially defines the notion of an infinite endless regress of reasons (p. 403), he does not refer to the other kind of endless regress of reasons as “circular.” But Cling adopts this terminology elsewhere in the paper.

  6. The claim is not that σS is a circular endless regress of reasons, or that σT is an infinite endless regress of reasons. Perhaps neither σS nor σT is S-ordered. The claim is simply that σS has infinitely many filled places but not infinitely many components, and σT has infinitely many filled places and infinitely many components.

  7. The names and wording of these theses are Cling’s (pp. 404–405). I clarify (2) below.

  8. Cling does not claim that there is no solution to the epistemic regress problem. Cling’s claim is more modest (though still quite strong): Each of intuitionist foundationalism, social contextualism, holistic coherentism, and infinitism fails to solve the epistemic regress problem. Cf. Cling (2009).

  9. Cling’s formal expressions of (1) and (3) are, respectively, “(∀x)(∀y)(Sxy → (∃z)Syz)” and “(∃x)(∃y)Sxy.” Cf. Cling (2009).

  10. I find it plausible that holistic coherentists as such are committed to Justification Requires Support and Reasons are Supported. Regardless, my interest is in answers to the epistemic regress problem on which Justification Requires Support and Reasons are Supported are correct.

  11. The situation with respect to holistic coherentism and the first main sub-argument is very much analogous to the situation with respect to holistic infinitism and the second main sub-argument. Perhaps, then, what I argue (below) on behalf holistic coherentism (against the first main sub-argument) can be argued, mutatis mutandis, on behalf of holistic infinitism (against the second main sub-argument). Peter Klein’s “warrant-emergent” infinitism (2005) is a form of holistic infinitism about warrant. Klein’s theory could be transformed into a holistic infinitist theory of justification, or a holistic infinitist theory of support.

  12. (4) is a component of (HC), and (4) entails Reasons are Supported. (If (4) is correct, then when P is supported, P is supported by its successor in σC, and P’s successor in σC, in turn, is supported by its successor in σC, and so on. Thus (4) entails Reasons are Supported.) Some Proposition is Supported is a component of (HC). (Note: (4) does not entail Some Proposition is Supported. (4) can be true even if (i) and (ii) are never satisfied.) (HC), thus, is correct only if Reasons are Supported and Some Proposition is Supported are correct. Since, as Cling holds, Reasons are Supported and Some Proposition is Supported together entail that No Proposition is Supported only by Endless Regresses is false, it follows that if (HC) is correct, then No Proposition is Supported only by Endless Regresses is false.

  13. Cling construes support as a two-place relation (p. 403), and notes that: “In case the evidence that is available for a proposition consists of more than one proposition, we may represent it as the conjunction of the relevant propositions or as the set of those propositions” (p. 403, n. 3, emphasis mine). If a proposition can be supported by a set of propositions, then, likewise, a proposition can be implied by a set of propositions.

  14. One way to do this would be to construe I-ordered sequences of propositions as sequences of ordered pairs, where the first member of a pair is a proposition, the second member of a pair is a proposition or a set of propositions, and the first member of a pair is implied by the second member of the pair. A circular I-ordered sequence would be a sequence with just finitely many pairs, and where each proposition involved in the sequence is the first member of some pair. Then, the sequence <(P 0, {P 1, P 2}), (P 1, {P 0, P 2}), (P 2, {P 0, P 1})> would be a circular I-ordered sequence.

  15. It would be true that holistic coherentism requires that supported propositions be supported by supported propositions, as in a case where (according to holistic coherentism) P 0 is supported by, hence is implied by, {P 1, P 2}, P 1 is supported by, hence is implied by, {P 0, P 2}, and P 2 is supported by, hence is implied by, {P 0, P 1}. But it would not follow that holistic coherentism requires circular I-ordered sequences of propositions, and so would not follow that holistic coherentism requires circular S-ordered sequences of propositions, that is, circular endless regresses.

  16. (b), though, would remain the same.

  17. For general discussion of the elements of coherence, see BonJour (1985, Chap. 5, Sect. 5.3). For discussion of probabilistic conceptions of coherence, see Olsson (2005, Chap. 6, Sects. 6.1 and 6.2).

  18. See Lycan (1996) and Olsson (1997).

  19. Strictly speaking, on (HC), part of what makes it the case that Q supports P is the fact that there is a circular I-ordered sequence of propositions σC such that P and Q are members of σC, Q is P’s successor in σC, and S believes each of the propositions in σC and no other propositions.

  20. I am assuming, as seems plausible, that S’s belief system can be coherent even if S does not believe that his belief system is coherent.

  21. Hereafter I will speak simply of Cling’s argument for No Proposition is Supported only by Endless Regresses, and not refer explicitly to “the first main sub-argument” thereof.

  22. Two comments are in order. First, as I understand Cling, a proposition P is supported for a subject S (that is, S has a reason to believe P) just in case P is not arbitrary from S’s point of view. Cling clarifies the notion of a proposition’s being arbitrary from a subject’s point of view on p. 406. Second, Cling sometimes speaks of a sequence of propositions as being arbitrary from a subject’s point of view. I take it that when Cling speaks in this fashion, he means just that the propositions in the sequence are arbitrary from the subject’s point of view.

  23. If (HC) is correct, S has no reasons in addition to the members of σC. Hence, if (HC) is correct, S has no independent reason to believe some member of σC.

  24. It might be wondered whether I have misread Cling. Consider the following passage (from the first full paragraph on p. 407): “To be S-ordered, σC must satisfy some additional condition. If this condition is not arbitrary from the believer’s own point of view it must include having an independent reason P 1′ to believe some member of σC, that is, it must include having a reason that does not itself depend on σC” (emphasis mine). It might seem that this passage involves a claim (an implicit claim) not included in my presentation of Cling’s argument for No Proposition is Supported only by Endless Regresses—viz., the claim that the further condition in question must itself not be arbitrary from the subject’s point of view. I have no idea, though, what it would mean to say that a condition, as opposed to a proposition, is not arbitrary from a subject’s point of view. And Cling himself never specifies how to understand the notion of a condition’s not being arbitrary from a subject’s point of view. So I read Cling as saying: If the further condition in question is to make it such that the members of σC are not arbitrary from the subject’s point of view, then that condition must include an independent reason to believe some member of σC. This is just the claim: The further condition in question must (to make it such that the members of σC are not arbitrary from the subject’s point of view) include an independent reason to believe some member of σC.

  25. Below I discuss two additional varieties of holistic coherentism.

  26. Or set of propositions S believes.

  27. It is not uncommon for coherentists to invoke content requirements. See, e.g., Blanshard (1939, Chap. 26, Sect. 19), BonJour (1985, Chaps. 6–7), Brink (1989, Chap. 5, Sects. 5–7), and Lehrer (2000, Chaps. 6–7).

  28. Of course, there are well known objections to views such as (HC) and (HC*), e.g., the “Alternative Systems Objection.” For discussion and references, see Kvanvig (2007). Cling makes no explicit appeal to any such objection. So I presume the basis for Cling’s position on the need for an independent reason lies elsewhere. Below I discuss a view, “(HC**),” which, arguably, fares quite well against the various standard objections to views such as (HC) and (HC*).

  29. It might seem that Cling should be read as arguing: “A circular I-ordered sequence of propositions is not S-ordered per se. If a circular I-ordered sequence of propositions is not S-ordered per se, then if S has no independent reason to believe some member of σC, then the members of σC are arbitrary from S’s point of view. Therefore, if S has no independent reason to believe some member of σC, then the members of σC are arbitrary from S’s point of view.” On this reading, Cling gives an argument for his position on the need for an independent reason. But the argument is inadequate. Since (HC) and (HC*) entail the falsity of the second premise, and since (HC) and (HC*) are at least somewhat plausible, it follows that Cling needs to provide an argument for the second premise. Cling, though, does not provide an argument for the second premise.

  30. Cling’s argument for No Proposition is Supported only by Endless Regresses needs (7), a claim about all situations, because No Proposition is Supported only by Endless Regresses is itself a claim about all situations. Note: If No Proposition is Supported only by Endless Regresses covered only some situations, then even if No Proposition is Supported only by Endless Regresses were correct, and even if Reasons are Supported, understood as a claim about all situations, were correct, it might still be that Some Proposition is Supported is correct. All that would follow (from the correctness of No Proposition is Supported only by Endless Regresses and Reasons are Supported) is that in the limited situations covered by No Proposition is Supported only by Endless Regresses, no proposition is supported. This would leave it open that in some of the situations not covered by No Proposition is Supported only by Endless Regresses, some proposition is supported.

  31. If (HC) is correct, it follows that if S is in a situation of no beliefs, and S has no independent reason to believe some member of σC, then, by (4), no propositions are supported for S, hence all propositions are arbitrary from S’s point of view, hence the members of σC are arbitrary from S’s point of view. Note: If (HC) is correct, it follows that if S is in a situation of no beliefs, then S has no independent reason to believe some member of σCS has no reasons whatsoever.

  32. For relevant discussion, see Goldman (1980) and Pryor (2005).

  33. Or, more commonly, a theory of justification.

  34. The conclusion of Argument from No Beliefs* leaves it open that (HC) is correct. In fact, if (HC) is correct, the conclusion of Argument from No Beliefs* is correct. If, though (HC) is correct (7) is false. So, the conclusion of Argument from No Beliefs* leaves it open that (7) is false.

  35. But even if it were shown that (i) and (ii) in (4) are not sufficient for support, and that (i) and (ii) in (5) are not sufficient for support, it would not follow that Cling is right about the need for an independent reason. It would still need to be shown (inter alia) that (i), (ii), and (iii) in (8), below, are not sufficient for support.

  36. Doxastic holistic coherentists deny that perceptual experiences can serve as reasons for beliefs, but do not deny that perceptual experiences can cause beliefs. For defense of the thesis that only beliefs can serve as reasons for beliefs, see, e.g., BonJour (1985, Chap. 4) and Davidson (2000). For helpful discussion and references, see Pryor (2005).

  37. I noted above (third paragraph of this section) that (HC) can be refined in certain respects. (HC**) can be refined in those same respects. Also (HC**) can be modified so that, like (HC*), it is required that S have beliefs about the ways in which she is reliably connected to the world.

  38. How, in σC*, are the separate contributions of S’s beliefs and perceptual experiences to be represented? One way to do this would be to designate the members of σC* as “doxastic” or “perceptual-experiential” as appropriate. If p serves as the propositional content of a belief, this could be represented as “p d.” If p serves as the propositional content of a perceptual experience, this could be represented as “p p-e.” Then, if p served as the propositional content of both a belief and a perceptual experience, both p d and p p-e would have a place in σC*.

  39. If (HC**) is correct, then (i), (ii), and (iii) in (8) are sufficient for support. It is thus not required that S have an independent reason (a reason not in σC*) to believe some member of σC*.

  40. One of the main objections to views such as (HC) and (HC*) is the “Isolation Objection.” This objection (at least in one of its versions) charges that holistic coherentism implies that a subject’s perceptual experiences are irrelevant, epistemically, to what propositions are supported for her, and that, because of this, holistic coherentism is open to counterexample. (Strictly speaking, the objection is typically put in terms of justification.) See, e.g., Feldman (2003, pp. 68–70). (HC**) is not open to this objection. Nor are certain other forms of nondoxastic holistic coherentism. For further discussion of nondoxastic holistic coherentism, see Cohen (2002), Horgan and Potrc (2010), Kvanvig (1995), and Kvanvig and Riggs (1992).

  41. For defense of the view that perceptual experiences have propositional content, see, e.g., Searle (1983, Chap. 2). For an introduction to the relevant literature, see Siegel (2010).

References

  • Blanshard, B. (1939). The nature of thought. London: George Allen and Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • BonJour, L. (1976). The coherence theory of empirical knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 30, 281–312.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • BonJour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brink, D. (1989). Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Cling, A. (2008). The epistemic regress problem. Philosophical Studies, 140, 401–421.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cling, A. (2009). Reasons, regresses, and tragedy: The epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. American Philosophical Quarterly, 46, 333–346.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, S. (2002). Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV, 309–329.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (2000). A coherence theory of truth and knowledge. In E. Sosa & J. Kim (Eds.), Epistemology: An anthology (pp. 154–163). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, R. (2003). Epistemology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (1980). The internalist conception of justification. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, 27–52.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Horgan, T., & Potrc, M. (2010). The epistemic relevance of morphological content. Acta Analytica, 25, 155–173.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein, P. (2005). Infinitism is the solution to the regress problem. In M. Steup & E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (pp. 131–140). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kvanvig, J. (1995). Coherentists’ distractions. Philosophical Topics, 23, 257–275.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kvanvig, J. (2007). Coherentist theories of epistemic justification. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (published September 2007). http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/. Accessed 3 Jan 2011.

  • Kvanvig, J., & Riggs, W. (1992). Can a coherence theory appeal to appearance states? Philosophical Studies, 67, 197–217.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lehrer, K. (2000). Theory of knowledge. Boulder, CO: Westview.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W. (1996). Plantinga and coherentisms. In J. Kvanvig (Ed.), Warrant in contemporary epistemology: Essays in honor of Plantinga’s theory of knowledge (pp. 3–23). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olsson, E. (1997). Coherence and the modularity of mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75, 404–411.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Olsson, E. (2005). Against coherence. Oxford, UK: Clarendon.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pryor, J. (2005). There is immediate justification. In M. Steup & E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (pp. 181–202). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Siegel, S. (2010). The contents of perception. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (published July 2010). http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-contents/. Accessed 3 Jan 2011.

Download references

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Andrew Cling, Michael Roche, and Joshua Smith for very helpful questions and comments on prior versions of this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to William A. Roche.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Roche, W.A. A reply to Cling’s “The epistemic regress problem”. Philos Stud 159, 263–276 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9701-x

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9701-x

Keywords

Navigation