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Autonomy Within Subservient Careers

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Abstract

While there is much literature on autonomy and the conditions for its attainment, there is less on how those conditions reflect on agents’ ordinary careers. Most people’s careers involve a great deal of subservient activity that would prevent the kind of control over agents’ actions that autonomy would seem to require. Yet, it would seem strange to deny autonomy to every agent who regularly follows orders at work—to do so would make autonomy a futile ideal. Most contemporary autonomy accounts provide purely theoretical analysis without reference to any practical goal that autonomy could serve. These accounts are likely to resolve this issue in one direction: either almost entirely including or excluding subservient workers from autonomy. Either solution would fail to distinguish agents who sufficiently control their lives, in spite of limited subservience, according to their own standards, from agents for whom subservience precludes a fulfilling life. I suggest the solution lies in a return to goal-oriented autonomy accounts, which can use the goal to distinguish when subservience overwhelms autonomy from when subservience and autonomy can coexist. I present an account that anchors autonomy in the happiness that it provides for agents who sufficiently control their lives as determined by their more important prudential standards. On this account, agents in subservient careers can be autonomous if they determine how to make their careers consistent with their happiness.

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Notes

  1. See discussions on the various possible meanings of “autonomy,” such as Arpaly 2004: 117–30 and McKenna 2005: 206–7.

  2. For another subjective standard view, see Hill 1991: 21–4. Hill is interested in subjective standards for non-moral ways in which agents respect themselves, such as commitments to keep a clean house or to avoid obscene movies.

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Acknowledgements

I am incredibly grateful for comments from Barbara Herman, Calvin Normore, Jon Cogburn, Aaron Lercher, Matt Drabek, Mona Rocha, the two anonymous reviewers at this journal, and audiences at the Mid-South Philosophy Conference and the Alabama Philosophical Society.

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Correspondence to James Rocha.

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Rocha, J. Autonomy Within Subservient Careers. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 14, 313–328 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9251-x

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