Emma Rooksby
Abstract
Computer ethicists have for some years been troubled by the issue of how to assign moral responsibility for disastrous events involving erroneous information generated by expert information systems. Recently, Jeroen van den Hoven has argued that agents working with expert information systems satisfy the conditions for what he calls epistemic enslavement. Epistemically enslaved agents do not, he argues, have moral responsibility for accidents for which they bear causal responsibility. In this article, I develop two objections to van den Hoven's argument for epistemic enslavement of agents working with expert information systems.
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