Abstract
Beginning with Descartes' caution not “imprudently” to “take some other object in place of myself”, I consider first the problems of self-identification confronted by variousamnesiacs, both ordinary and Cartesian. Noting thatcogitationes as such do not individuate, I proceed to examine conclusions drawn from certain sorts of “body-switching” thought experiments. This, in turn, gives rise to a general critique of “psychological connectedness” or “unity of consciousness” as a candidate criterion of personal identity. I conclude that our ability to apply any notion of personal identity is parasitic upon the existence of a conceptual apparatus for individuating, identifying, and reidentifying objects. Finally, I argue that, if ‘person’ is a proper sortal predicate to begin with, Descartes'res cogitans cannot be understood as a species of the (metaphysical) genusres, distinct fromres extensa and only problematically in “interaction” with it. Cartesian dualism is a multiply untenable doctrine.
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Rosenberg, J.F. On not knowing what or who one is: Reflections on the intelligibility of dualism. Topoi 7, 57–63 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00776209
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00776209