Abstract
In contrast to other prominent models of belief change, models based on epistemic entrenchment have up to now been applicable only in the context of very strong packages of requirements for belief revision. This paper decomposes the axiomatization of entrenchment into independent modules. Among other things it is shown how belief revision satisfying only the ‘basic’ postulates of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson can be represented in terms of entrenchment.
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Rott, H. Basic Entrenchment. Studia Logica 73, 257–280 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022988014704
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022988014704