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Relevant logics and their semantics remain viable and undamaged by Lewis's equivocation charge

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Routley, R., Meyer, R.K. Relevant logics and their semantics remain viable and undamaged by Lewis's equivocation charge. Topoi 2, 205–215 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00142494

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