Abstract
This paper responds to Dan Hutto’s paper, ‘Narrative Self-Shaping: a Modest Proposal’. Hutto there attacks the “strong” narrativism defended in my recent book, ‘Self, Value and Narrative’ and in recent work by Marya Schechtman. I rebut Hutto’s argument that non-narrative forms of evaluative self-shaping can plausibly be conceived, and defend the notion of implicit narrative against his criticisms. I conclude by briefly indicating some difficulties that arise for the “modest” form of narrativism that Hutto defends.
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Notes
Indeed, though I have contrasted a complex, morally relevant feeling like jealousy with a simple sensation, one cannot, as Wittgenstein pointed out, even keep a diary about the recurrence of a simple sensation without a great deal of contextual stage setting being presupposed. (See Wittgenstein (1958) Secs 257–8) I am surprised that Hutto, who is generally very sympathetic to Wittgenstein (See, e.g. Hutto 2003), should have used an example obviously meant to recall Wittgenstein’s famous putative private diarist, while using it to make a point that seems deeply anti-Wittgensteinian in spirit.
MacIntyre (2007) 206
I don’t have to explicitly say to myself: “this tune started tum-te-tum and I expect it will go on te-te-teee!” in order to hear a note as part of a continuing melody. But that is how I do hear it—not just as this note sounding now.
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Rudd, A. “Strong” narrativity—a response to Hutto. Phenom Cogn Sci 15, 43–49 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9357-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9357-z