Summary
A combination of process and counterfactual theories of causation is proposed with the aim of preserving the strengths of each of the approaches while avoiding their shortcomings. The basis for the combination, or hybrid, view is the need, common to both accounts, of imposing a stability requirement on the causal relation.
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Rueger, A. Connection and Influence: A Process Theory of Causation. J Gen Philos Sci 37, 77–97 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-006-0481-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-006-0481-5