Notes
All page references are to Clark (2008) unless otherwise noted.
Rupert (2009b) proposes a formal measure of systemic integration, one that measures the degree of one sort of interdependence among various mechanisms—internal or external—that produce intelligent behavior. As a provocative side note, I wonder whether Clark, in his discussion of the quantification of embodiment (p. 215), has hit on better measures, but ones that are still likely to yield internalist results.
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Rupert, R.D. Cognitive systems and the supersized mind. Philos Stud 152, 427–436 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9600-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9600-6