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I.1
I.2
I.3
I.4
Introduction
Companion Animal Ethics
Why We Use The Terms ‘Companion Animals’ and ‘Owners’?
The Structure of This Book
1
2
4
7
I.1 Introduction
Companion animals can be a source of pleasure, fun, exercise, comfort, fascination
and consolation. Choosing to live with animal companions can be life enriching, even
when it comes with some expense and inconvenience. Most of those who live with
animal companions believe this to be a two-way relationship: as well as being fed and
cared for, the animal companions also derive pleasure, satisfaction and comfort from
living with people.
This seems, therefore, to be a win–win situation: what is good for people is also good
for the animals; the animals are cared for, and they help to create human happiness. Put
like this, there does not seem to be much need for a book on companion animal ethics.
But things are not that simple. For instance, it is not always clear what is good for animal
companions, and what is good for animals may be in conlict with what is good for the
people with whom they live. Animal companions can also be the source of very different
human responses than pleasure and consolation, such as anxiety, fear or distress. So,
there is a need for ethical relection regarding our relationship with companion animals.
In this short introductory chapter, we irst elaborate on why we think there is a need
for ethical relection about companion animals and then explain our ethical approach. In
the following section, we will try to explain what we mean by ‘companion’ animals and
Companion Animal Ethics, First Edition. Peter Sandøe, Sandra Corr and Clare Palmer.
© Universities Federation for Animal Welfare 2016.
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why we have chosen to focus on them, rather than on the wider group of pet animals.
Finally, we will briely outline the structure of the book.
I.2 Companion Animal Ethics
Even those who are well informed about veterinary and animal science and who have
kept animals as companions for many years are sometimes unsure about what is in the
best interests of their animals. Those without such knowledge and experience may be
even more uncertain. For example, someone may be doubtful as to whether neutering is
in the best interests of their male dog or whether their cat should be let out to roam. To
complicate matters, popular ideas about companion animals’ interests may not relect
the indings of current behavioural and veterinary research.
People may also ind it dificult to balance potentially conlicting concerns for the
well-being of their animals. If a dog or a cat is seriously ill, for example, due to a malignant type of cancer, an owner may ind it dificult to weigh the interest of the animal in
living (and their own desire for the animal to remain alive) against a concern to prevent
their companion from suffering. This may lead to a dilemma between continuing veterinary treatment and euthanasing the animal. The owner may ask the vet for advice,
but she or he may have similar doubts.
In other cases, different people may have strong and conlicting views about the
signiicance of companion animals and how we should treat them. These conlicting
views are often rooted in different ideas about animals’ moral status, whether there is
something special about companion animal species and what we do and do not owe
to them. For example, some people consider painlessly killing stray and feral cats and
dogs to be ethically unproblematic. Others claim that healthy dogs and cats have a
right to life, whether owned or not. Similarly, some people see no moral problem in
docking dogs’ tails to make their appearance meet breed standards, whereas others ind
tail docking a morally unacceptable violation of the dog’s bodily integrity.
Thus, living with companion animals gives rise to uncertainties about what is in
the animals’ best interests, moral dilemmas in weighing different human and animal
well-being concerns and ethical disagreements concerning the moral signiicance and
appropriate treatment of companion animals. These uncertainties, dilemmas and disagreements are the subject of this book (Figure I.1).
Despite the millions of cats, dogs and other animals kept as companions around the
world, the ethical aspects of this unique relationship have not previously been the subject
of a comprehensive ethical analysis. As a result, although the ideas of animal welfare
and the approaches to ethics that we discuss here are well established, the present book
breaks new ground. In particular, previous work on animal ethics has tended to focus
on higher-level theoretical questions, rather than on the more practical ethical issues
that arise from our day-to-day engagement with the animals in our homes.
We believe that thinking through some of these everyday ethical issues – issues that can
be incredibly important in individual animal lives, as well as our own human lives – is
a critical step in developing and applying animal ethics. Partly because much of this
material is new and cannot be taken for granted, and also for practical reasons of space,
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Figure I.1 A 1-year-old cross-breed dog being carried in a ‘Pooch Pouch’. In an accompanying
article, the owner claimed that the dog loves it and it keeps him safe on the busy streets of New York;
but critics claim the pouch is a ‘fashion statement’, which causes distress to the animals. (Alberto
Reyes/Wenn)
we have been selective in terms of the topics and frameworks we discuss. Consequently,
there are omissions and places where we are, of necessity, somewhat brief. However,
we hope that what is included will provide a useful resource and a starting point for
future work.
This book, unlike many in the ield of animal ethics, does not advocate any particular ethical position, beyond the widely accepted idea that the lives and experiences of
sentient animals should count for something in our ethical decision making. We take
a pluralist perspective, presenting a variety of approaches to human and animal welfare, to animal ethics and to particular ethical problems raised by companion animals.
Although we, as the authors of this book, have our own (often divergent) views, we
have attempted to present the arguments in a balanced way, though there may be places
where we have not always succeeded in putting our sympathies to one side. We hope
to show that at least some disputes about our ethical relations with companion animals
may low from different understandings of animal welfare or different approaches to
ethics, but that – considered from those perspectives – they are at least comprehensible
and rational.
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This book draws on a wide range of supporting scientiic material, particularly from
psychology and veterinary, behavioural and social sciences. In order to ensure that this
book is as informative and up to date as possible, we invited experts in relevant ields
to join us in co-authoring several chapters, to improve the quality and accuracy of the
empirical material we discuss.
I.3 Why We Use The Terms ‘Companion Animals’ and ‘Owners’?
Humans use animals in various ways, mostly linked to tangible outputs or services,
such as for food or fur, riding, guarding or modelling human diseases. However, some
animals are kept in people’s homes where they appear to serve a less clearly deined
purpose – typically these animals are referred to as ‘pets’.
As Grier (2006: p. 8) comments, the term ‘pet’ has ‘a complex history and obscure
origins’. In the sixteenth century, ‘pet’ was used to describe both people who were
indulged or treated as favourites and tamed animals kept for pleasure or companionship
(Grier 2006: p. 9). In some cases, the term ‘favourite’ was also used for animals kept
for human company.
Recently, however, the term ‘pet’ has become controversial, on the grounds that it
fails to respect animals’ own dignity or integrity. For instance, Linzey and Cohn (2011)
argue that calling animals ‘pets’ is derogatory and insulting and that we should instead
use the term ‘companion animals’. The Companion Animal Welfare Council in the
United Kingdom takes a similar perspective (CAWC, n.d.). Grier (2006: p. 10), on the
other hand, while acknowledging these opinions, continues to use the term ‘pet’ on
the grounds that ‘it is in wide use’ and that people have a ‘practical understanding of
its meaning’.
In thinking about this book, we recognised the arguments on both sides: while ‘pet’ is
the most widely used and understood term, we also accept that it may have demeaning
connotations. However, we were persuaded by another set of arguments – that ‘pet’ and
‘companion animal’ are not straightforwardly interchangeable terms, but rather that
we should think of ‘companion animals’ as a subset of those animals commonly called
‘pets’. We take the term ‘pet’ to encompass a very broad range of animals alongside
whom people choose to live and consider ‘companion animals’ to be a subset of ‘pets’,
with whom we have a special interactive bond.
Let us consider this more systematically. Although the term ‘pet’ can be used in different ways, some features seem to be widely accepted as characterising the human/pet
relationship. Grier (2006: p. 10) draws on Keith Thomas’ characterisation of pets in
England between 1400 and 1800: pets were distinguished by being allowed in the house,
being given individual names and never being eaten. This is a useful starting point,
although some animals widely regarded as pets, for example, ish in a tank, may well
not be given individual names. Varner (2002) drawing on Barnbaum (1998) suggests a
further set of characterisations, with which it is worth engaging.
First, Varner suggests, we expect a pet’s owner to regard it affectionately. He seems
right that this is normally the case – a ‘pet’ is not usually an object of hate, fear or disgust
to its owner (in the way that, say, an invading cockroach may be regarded). Still, it would
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presumably be possible to keep a pet – say, a snake or a stick insect – because one is
fascinated by it or curious about it, rather than because one felt affection for it.
Second, Varner suggests, a pet should live in or close to the home (this was also part of
Thomas’ characterisation of a pet). To rule out plants, Varner adds that for something
to be a pet, it should be mobile, and thus, either voluntarily choose to remain in the
home or be prevented from leaving. We decided to restrict our deinition of ‘pet’ still
further, to animals that actually live in the home, thereby ruling out horses.
We recognise that some readers will see the exclusion of horses as a signiicant omission from the book. While some people do regard horses as pets or companion animals,
and they can be kept near to (though very rarely in) one’s home, they also to a very
large degree have other roles. Firstly, for many people, horses are primarily kept for
sport. Secondly, the keeping of horses is still in many respects linked to an agricultural
context. For example, in many places, even in industrial Western nations, often the very
same horses that are kept by private individuals are eventually slaughtered and used for
human or animal food. So, although there is much to be said about horses and ethics,
we will not say it here.
Third, Varner proposes, a pet must be the kind of being that lives a life different in
kind from the owner, in terms of its capacities, occupations and so on; this rules out
keeping another human as a pet.
Fourth, a pet should have interests – its life can go better or worse for it; it has a
welfare or a good of its own – and it should depend in signiicant ways on its owner
to help fulil those interests. So, a pet cannot be a robot, such as a Tamagotchi, which
cannot, for instance, have ‘poor welfare’.
Although this characterisation of a pet rules out plants, pests, human beings and
robots, it includes most animals voluntarily kept by people in their homes: mammals,
birds, ish, reptiles, amphibians, insects and arachnids. While keeping such animals as
pets certainly does raise ethical issues, the focus of this book is narrower: we are interested in animals kept primarily as companions. Even if one has affection for one’s pet
tarantula, it is, as Varner (2002) notes, a stretch to call it a companion. Insects and ish,
likewise, may be kept for many reasons, but rarely primarily for their companionship.
As argued by Varner (2002: p. 452), while a companion animal has all the characteristics
shared by pets, it has additional characteristics that make it more than a pet.
However, this raises questions about what we mean by ‘companionship’. Likewise,
there is no generally accepted deinition of ‘companion animal’. The US-based animal
welfare organisation, the ASPCA (n.d.) somewhat circularly deines companion animals
as ‘domesticated or domestic-bred animals whose physical, emotional, behavioural
and social needs can be readily met as companions in the home, or in close daily
relationship with humans’.
What seems critical to this deinition is the emphasis on relationship and reciprocal
engagement. Varner (2002) takes the term ‘companion’ to imply a ‘signiicant degree
of social interaction’ between the owner(s) and the animal. Although somewhat vague,
this involves humans and animals recognising and responding to one another as speciic
individuals (rather than, for instance, a ish swimming to the top of the tank to pick up
food thrown in by anyone). For humans, companionship normally includes seeking out
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the company of the particular animal for comfort, consolation, play and so on, and this
is likely to be reciprocal in the case of companion animals.
We take this kind of reciprocal engagement to be the hallmark of human/animal
companionship, and as the vast majority of the animals with whom we have such mutual
relations are dogs and cats, they are the main focus of this book. However, other animals
may be companions, and these are discussed in Chapter 15.
Some readers may think it an omission that we do not discuss in detail the relations
between humans and working animals kept in the home, such as guide dogs, guard dogs
and some hunting dogs. Although much of what we say about dogs kept as companions
also applies to working dogs, we concluded that they raise special ethical questions
beyond the scope of this book. For similar reasons, we decided to exclude companion
animals used for various forms of animal-assisted therapy.
Another important terminological question relates to what we should call those
people who live with and look after companion animals. Again, the terms used here
have recently become controversial. Linzey and Cohn (2011) reject the term ‘owners’
in favour of ‘carers’. ‘The Guardian Campaign’ run by the international animal rights
and rescue organisation, In Defense of Animals (IDA), promotes a switch to the
language of guardianship from the language of ownership. IDA (n.d.) argues that
‘since other animals, whether domesticated or wild, are living beings, they ought not
to have owners, only guardians, friends, caretakers, protectors, family or respectful
observers’. The popularity of the term ‘guardian’ is slowly growing in the United States
at least; a few US cities and Rhode Island have now incorporated the term into their
animal-related ordinances.
While we have no objections to either ‘carer’ or ‘guardian’ and are sympathetic to
the arguments, we were reluctant to use terms not currently in widespread use. Legally
speaking, companion animals are the property of the people who look after them. While
many of those who defend animal rights, in particular, ind the idea of companion animals as property offensive and immoral, changing the terminology does not change the
legal situation. So, we decided to use the more traditional term, ‘owners’, in this book.
We also recognise that relations people have with their animal companions, and the
kinds of animals they keep as companions, vary signiicantly across cultures. In some
cultures, for instance, dogs are regarded as belonging to an entire human community
and are fed by a number of different households. For example, this often seems to be
the case for unowned street dogs in India, which are also legally protected (see, for
instance, Srinivasan 2013). Some cultures tame and keep members of local wild species
as companions – for instance, long-tailed macaques on Angaur Island in Polynesia.
These relationships, while clearly important, raise their own ethical issues. We did not
want to deal supericially with such issues, nor to attempt to tackle them without suficient cultural knowledge. So, we decided to limit the scope of this book to the keeping
of animal companions in what we (very roughly) call the industrialised West, focusing
on Europe, Australasia and North America. This is where all the authors are located,
and Companion Animal Ethics relects this location.
Finally, we decided not to make either serious cruelty towards or neglect of companion animals a focus of this book (although we do say a little about this in Chapters 3 and
4). Serious cruelty and neglect of companion animals are, virtually universally, ethically
condemned and, in many places, are already illegal. We wanted instead to discuss the
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ongoing ethical uncertainties, dilemmas and disagreements about living with companion
animals, rather than issues about which everyone already agrees and to which we could
make little new ethical contribution.
I.4 The Structure of This Book
The book begins with three chapters that establish the context and background for
thinking about ethics and companion animals. Chapter 1 provides a brief history of the
development of human relations to companion animals. Chapter 2 outlines the development of the veterinary and other animal-related professions with a focus on how
these professions inluence and deal with ethical issues relating to companion animals,
and Chapter 3 explores the nature of the human–companion animal bond, including
the ways in which humans are psychologically attached to companion animals, and the
effects of keeping companion animals on human health. The next two chapters examine
two essential concerns for companion animal ethics: ideas of animal welfare (Chapter 4)
and different approaches to thinking about ethics (Chapter 5). Chapters 6–13 then consider particular ethical issues raised by breeding and rearing, pedigree selective breeding,
diet, training and behaviour, convenience surgeries and neutering. We also consider ethical issues raised by unwanted animal companions, including the euthanasia of healthy
animals; and by the veterinary treatment of sick animals. Chapter 14 considers how to
deal with broader negative impacts of animal companions in terms of zoonoses, environmental effects and the use of resources. Chapter 15 considers special ethical issues
raised by companion animals other than cats and dogs. Finally, in Chapter 16, we speculate on the future of the companion animal sector in terms of ethics, law, policy and
the market.
References
ASPCA (n.d.) Deinition of companion animal. The American Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals. [Online] Available from: http://www.aspca.org/about-us/aspca
-policy-and-position-statements/deinition-of-companion-animal [Accessed 9 July 2014].
Barnbaum, D. (1998) Why Tamagotchis are not pets. Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy
for Children 13 (4), 41–43.
CAWC (n.d.) Companion: what are companion animals? Companion Animal Welfare Council. [Online] Available from: http://www.cawc.org.uk/companion-animals [Accessed 9 July
2014].
Grier, K. (2006) Pets in America: a history. Durham, NC, The University of North Carolina
Press.
IDA (n.d.) The guardian campaign. In Defense of Animals. [Online] Available from:
http://www.idausa.org/campaigns/the-guardian-campaign/ [Accessed 30 May 2014].
Linzey, A. & Cohn, P. (2011) Terms of discourse. Journal of Animal Ethics 1 (1), vii–ix.
Srinivasan, K. (2013) The biopolitics of animal being and welfare: dog control and care in
the UK and India. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 38 (1), 106–119.
Varner, G. (2002) Pets, companion animals and domesticated partners. In: Benatar, D. (ed.)
Ethics for everyday. New York, McGraw-Hill, pp. 450–475.
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