Abstract
This paper revisits one of the key ideas developed in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In particular, it explores the methodological form of incommensurability which may be found in the original edition of Structure. It is argued that such methodological incommensurability leads to a form of epistemic relativism. In later work, Kuhn moved away from the original idea of methodological incommensurability with his idea of a set of epistemic values that provides a basis for rational theory choice, but do not constitute an algorithm for such choice. The paper also explores the sceptical basis for the epistemic relativism of the original view that Kuhn proposes in Structure. It suggests that the main sceptical rationale for such relativism may be avoided by a particularist and naturalist conception of epistemic normativity. When this approach is combined with the appeal to external methodological standards endorsed by the later Kuhn and his critics, the epistemic relativism of Structure may be completely repudiated.
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Notes
The distinction between semantic and methodological forms of incommensurability was introduced in the Introduction to Hoyningen-Huene and Sankey (2001, xiii–xv) to provide a basis for discussion of the topic of incommensurability.
In addition to justified belief, the epistemic relativist may also wish to say that knowledge is relative to operative norms. But talk of knowledge raises the question of truth, since knowledge requires truth. I do not wish to enter into the question of relativism about truth in this paper. So I will set the issue of knowledge to one side, and focus instead on relativism about justified belief.
For example, Feyerabend’s view that all rules of method may be justifiably violated (e.g. 1993, p. 14) accords well with Kuhn’s later view that criteria of theory choice function as values rather than as rules. A defeasible rule of method seems akin to a value which guides choice, and which may be overlooked in favour of another value.
It might be objected that semantic, methodological and perceptual aspects of incommensurability should not be treated in isolation from each other, since Kuhn presents them as co-occurring. But, for one thing, Kuhn later came to treat semantic incommensurability in isolation from the other aspects which he originally associated with incommensurability. For another thing, the arguments for meaning variance, theory-dependence of perception and methodological change are distinct arguments, which draw on different sets of considerations and give rise to different implications. In my judgement, the different aspects of incommensurability are best treated as logically and conceptually distinct issues.
A number of influential interpretations of Kuhn emphasize the anti-rationalistic implications of the absence of shared standards. See, for example, Lakatos (1978, pp. 90–91), Scheffler (1967, p. 78ff), Shapere (1984, p. 51) and Siegel (1987, pp. 51–54). For an opposing interpretation, see Doppelt (1982).
At this point in the discussion, it is important to bear in mind that we are considering methodological incommensurability in isolation from semantic incommensurability. A certain tension may arise between semantic incommensurability and the epistemic relativist idea that the same belief may be accepted and denied within competing paradigms. For if paradigms are radically incommensurable in the semantic sense, then it is not possible for there to be agreement or disagreement with respect to any particular claims about the world. So it is not possible for scientists in competing paradigms to accept opposing beliefs.
Scheffler does not in fact use the expression ‘external standard’. Instead he speaks of ‘second-order’ standards or standards used at the ‘second level’. However, I prefer to speak instead of external standards or extra-paradigmatic standards. Speaking of second-order standards is potentially ambiguous, since it can be understood to refer to meta-standards used to judge standards as well as standards used to judge paradigms. In context, it is clear that Scheffler has the latter in mind. To avoid the ambiguity I shall speak either of external or extraparadigmatic standards.
I shall set to one side the interpretative question of whether Kuhn’s response to the criticism constitutes a clarification of the view presented in Structure or the development of a new position that was not contained therein. Hoyningen-Huene suggests some elements of Kuhn’s later view occur in Structure, e.g. aesthetic factors that attract scientists to a new paradigm (Kuhn 1996, pp. 155–156). For discussion, see Hoyningen-Huene (1993, pp. 240 ff). However, he also admits that Kuhn tends to speak of “arguments” rather than “values” at relevant sections of Structure (1993, p. 149, fn. 115).
For further discussion of the subjective component involved in the weighting and interpretation of value, see Laudan (1996, p. 14). Martin Carrier explicitly considers the subjective components in the application of values to be an instance of methodological incommensurability (Carrier 2008, p. 276).
The question may be raised whether Kuhn’s view that there is a set of non-algorithmic values is a relativistic view. I do not regard the view that there is a set of non-algorithmic values as intrinsically relativistic, despite the fact that the view allows for the possibility of rational divergence of opinion between scientists who appeal to the same set of values. Nor does the possibility that there may be multiple sets of adequate values seem to me necessarily to entail a relativistic view. The issue of relativism is not joined until the question of the justification of such values is raised. If it is possible to provide an objective rationale for the values (even multiple sets of values), relativism is avoided. But if the ultimate basis for the values is an arbitrary decision, irrational commitment or social convention, then relativism is the result.
Apart from the remarks in Structure which we are about to consider, Kuhn addressed the issue on at least two other occasions. At one point, he offered an apparently inductive argument from the success of science as described by his model that scientists ought to do what his model says that they in fact do (1970, p. 237). Later he offered a semantic view on which the rationality of science is grounded in the meaning of the term ‘science’ (2000, p. 214). For discussion, see Nola and Sankey (2007, pp. 285–297).
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Sankey, H. Methodological Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism. Topoi 32, 33–41 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-012-9139-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-012-9139-6