Scepticism, relativism and the argument from the criterion

Abstract

This article explores the relationship between epistemic relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism. It is argued that a fundamental argument for contemporary epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. Pyrrhonian scepticism is compared and contrasted with Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Humean scepticism about induction. Epistemic relativism is characterized as relativism due to the variation of epistemic norms, and is contrasted with other forms of cognitive relativism, such as truth relativism, conceptual relativism and ontological relativism. An argument from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion to epistemic relativism is presented, and is contrasted with three other arguments for epistemic relativism. It is argued that the argument from the criterion is the most fundamental argument for epistemic relativism. Finally, it is noted how the argument of the present paper fits with the author’s previous suggestion that a particularist response to the Pyrrhonian sceptic may be combined with a naturalistic view of epistemic warrant to meet the challenge of epistemic relativism.

Introduction

Philosophical treatment of relativism stands to gain from reflection on scepticism. Though epistemic relativism and scepticism are distinct doctrines, they rest on common ground. In light of this, I propose an approach to relativism that draws upon a response to the sceptic. This requires consideration of the relationship between relativism and scepticism.

Epistemic relativism and scepticism constitute opposing epistemological tendencies. The epistemic relativist holds that knowledge and justified belief depend upon epistemic norms which vary with cultural or historical context. By contrast, the sceptic either denies that knowledge and justified belief are possible or else suspends judgement with respect to the possibility of knowledge and justified belief. Thus, the relativist allows that we may have knowledge or justified belief while the sceptic either denies this or withholds judgement.

But while epistemic relativism and scepticism represent opposing tendencies, they are not to be treated in isolation from each other. According to the epistemic relativist, there is no objective, context-independent justification for epistemic norms. Epistemic justification depends upon culturally variant norms, rather than unchanging or objective standards. I wish to show that the rationale for this claim derives ultimately from a sceptical source.

On my analysis, the principal argument for epistemic relativism derives from an argument that has played a central role in the sceptical tradition. This is the argument from circularity and the regress of justifications which is commonly known as the problem of the criterion. As shown by the ancient Pyrrhonian sceptics, the attempt to justify an epistemic norm leads to an infinite regress of justifications which may only be terminated by circular appeal to the original norm itself or by dogmatic adoption of the norm without justification. Because no epistemic norm may be provided with an acceptable justification, no such norm may be better justified than any other. Thus, epistemic norms employed in one community are as well justified as the norms employed in any other community, even if the norms vary between the communities. Justification depends, upon, and varies with, the ultimately unjustified norms which happen to be accepted in particular communities.

In this way, an argument with sceptical lineage may be employed on behalf of epistemic relativism, despite the opposition between scepticism and relativism. While this may seem to be a mere curiosity, I wish to show that it has important implications for the treatment of relativism. For, to the extent that epistemic relativism depends upon a sceptical line of argument, anti-sceptical resources may be deployed against the relativist. It will be convenient to have a shorthand way of referring to the argument from the problem of the criterion to epistemic relativism. I will refer to it as the argument from the criterion.

I have attempted to motivate this approach to epistemic relativism in two previous publications. In Sankey (2010), I sought to show how an anti-sceptical strategy may be employed against the relativist. I presented a naturalistic response to relativism that draws upon Roderick Chisholm’s particularist response to the problem of the criterion. I then sought to establish the relevance of this strategy to contemporary epistemic relativism. In Sankey (2011), I demonstrated the widespread use of arguments that are either identical to or closely analogous to the problem of the criterion in recent discussions of epistemic relativism within the history and philosophy of science.

In this paper, I wish to explore the relationship between scepticism and epistemic relativism in further detail. I wish to argue, or at least to strongly suggest, that the argument from the problem of the criterion to epistemic relativism is one of the primary, perhaps even the most fundamental, arguments for epistemic relativism. Because of this, my proposal to respond to the epistemic relativist on the basis of a response to the problem of the criterion is not a response to one form of epistemic relativism among others. It is a response to epistemic relativism itself.

In Section 2, I provide an overview of epistemological scepticism. I contrast Pyrrhonian scepticism with other forms of scepticism, and present the problem of the criterion. I turn to epistemic relativism in Section 3. I contrast epistemic relativism with other forms of cognitive relativism. I then characterize epistemic relativism due to variation of epistemic norms, and contrast it with other forms of epistemic relativism. In Section 4, I turn to the argument for epistemic relativism. First, I present the argument for epistemic relativism based on the problem of the criterion. Then I consider an alternative argument for epistemic relativism, and suggest that it reduces to the argument from the criterion. In Section 5, I consider two further arguments for epistemic relativism, and suggest that while they are distinct arguments they are less fundamental than the argument from the criterion. Finally, in Section 6, I conclude with a brief sketch of the response to the epistemic relativist that I favour. I also indicate additional issues which remain to be addressed in further development of this position.