Scepticism, relativism and the argument from the criterion
Introduction
Philosophical treatment of relativism stands to gain from reflection on scepticism. Though epistemic relativism and scepticism are distinct doctrines, they rest on common ground. In light of this, I propose an approach to relativism that draws upon a response to the sceptic. This requires consideration of the relationship between relativism and scepticism.
Epistemic relativism and scepticism constitute opposing epistemological tendencies. The epistemic relativist holds that knowledge and justified belief depend upon epistemic norms which vary with cultural or historical context. By contrast, the sceptic either denies that knowledge and justified belief are possible or else suspends judgement with respect to the possibility of knowledge and justified belief. Thus, the relativist allows that we may have knowledge or justified belief while the sceptic either denies this or withholds judgement.
But while epistemic relativism and scepticism represent opposing tendencies, they are not to be treated in isolation from each other. According to the epistemic relativist, there is no objective, context-independent justification for epistemic norms. Epistemic justification depends upon culturally variant norms, rather than unchanging or objective standards. I wish to show that the rationale for this claim derives ultimately from a sceptical source.
On my analysis, the principal argument for epistemic relativism derives from an argument that has played a central role in the sceptical tradition. This is the argument from circularity and the regress of justifications which is commonly known as the problem of the criterion. As shown by the ancient Pyrrhonian sceptics, the attempt to justify an epistemic norm leads to an infinite regress of justifications which may only be terminated by circular appeal to the original norm itself or by dogmatic adoption of the norm without justification. Because no epistemic norm may be provided with an acceptable justification, no such norm may be better justified than any other. Thus, epistemic norms employed in one community are as well justified as the norms employed in any other community, even if the norms vary between the communities. Justification depends, upon, and varies with, the ultimately unjustified norms which happen to be accepted in particular communities.
In this way, an argument with sceptical lineage may be employed on behalf of epistemic relativism, despite the opposition between scepticism and relativism. While this may seem to be a mere curiosity, I wish to show that it has important implications for the treatment of relativism. For, to the extent that epistemic relativism depends upon a sceptical line of argument, anti-sceptical resources may be deployed against the relativist. It will be convenient to have a shorthand way of referring to the argument from the problem of the criterion to epistemic relativism. I will refer to it as the argument from the criterion.
I have attempted to motivate this approach to epistemic relativism in two previous publications. In Sankey (2010), I sought to show how an anti-sceptical strategy may be employed against the relativist. I presented a naturalistic response to relativism that draws upon Roderick Chisholm’s particularist response to the problem of the criterion. I then sought to establish the relevance of this strategy to contemporary epistemic relativism. In Sankey (2011), I demonstrated the widespread use of arguments that are either identical to or closely analogous to the problem of the criterion in recent discussions of epistemic relativism within the history and philosophy of science.
In this paper, I wish to explore the relationship between scepticism and epistemic relativism in further detail. I wish to argue, or at least to strongly suggest, that the argument from the problem of the criterion to epistemic relativism is one of the primary, perhaps even the most fundamental, arguments for epistemic relativism. Because of this, my proposal to respond to the epistemic relativist on the basis of a response to the problem of the criterion is not a response to one form of epistemic relativism among others. It is a response to epistemic relativism itself.
In Section 2, I provide an overview of epistemological scepticism. I contrast Pyrrhonian scepticism with other forms of scepticism, and present the problem of the criterion. I turn to epistemic relativism in Section 3. I contrast epistemic relativism with other forms of cognitive relativism. I then characterize epistemic relativism due to variation of epistemic norms, and contrast it with other forms of epistemic relativism. In Section 4, I turn to the argument for epistemic relativism. First, I present the argument for epistemic relativism based on the problem of the criterion. Then I consider an alternative argument for epistemic relativism, and suggest that it reduces to the argument from the criterion. In Section 5, I consider two further arguments for epistemic relativism, and suggest that while they are distinct arguments they are less fundamental than the argument from the criterion. Finally, in Section 6, I conclude with a brief sketch of the response to the epistemic relativist that I favour. I also indicate additional issues which remain to be addressed in further development of this position.
Section snippets
Scepticism
In this section, I will introduce the problem of the criterion, which is the basis of the sceptical argument that I take to underlie epistemic relativism. But first I will briefly distinguish two well-known varieties of scepticism, before turning to Pyrrhonian scepticism and the problem of the criterion.
Relativism
The defining characteristic of an epistemological sceptical position is that it rejects positive attribution of knowledge or justified belief. Either the sceptic denies that knowledge or justification is possible or suspends judgement with respect to the possibility of knowledge or justification. By contrast, the epistemic relativist is prepared to ascribe knowledge or justified belief to individuals or groups. We do have knowledge and justified belief. It is just that knowledge and
Relativism, norms and the problem of the criterion
In my view, the argument for epistemic relativism based on the problem of the criterion is one of the most fundamental arguments for epistemic relativism. I do not know how to show that this is the case. So instead I will attempt to strongly suggest that it is the case.
In this section, I will present the argument for epistemic relativism that is based on the problem of the criterion. I will then consider an alternative argument for epistemic relativism which derives from the underdetermination
Non-neutrality and the inescapability of perspective
I will now consider two arguments for epistemic relativism discussed by Harvey Siegel in his recent survey of the topic (Siegel, 2011). The first argument turns on the claim that there are no neutral standards on the basis of which a conflict between competing epistemic standards may be adjudicated. The second turns on the claim that we inevitably approach the world from perspectives that we are unable to transcend. I do not deny that these are important arguments for epistemic relativism. What
Conclusion
In this paper, I have considered the relationship between scepticism and epistemic relativism, and presented an argument for epistemic relativism that derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. I have attempted to show, or at least to strongly suggest, that the argument from the criterion is one of, if not the, most fundamental arguments for epistemic relativism.
In earlier work, I have presented an approach to the form of epistemic relativism that is based on the problem of the
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