Abstract
I present the realist conception of logic supported by Oswaldo Chateaubriand which integrates ontological and epistemological aspects, opposing it to mathematical and linguistic conceptions. I give special attention to the peculiarities of his hierarchy of types in which some properties accumulate and others have a multiple degree. I explain such deviations of the traditional conception, showing the underlying purpose in each of these peculiarities. I compare the ideas of Chateaubriand to the similar ideas of Frege, Tarski and Gödel. I suggest a view of the logical properties in terms of the Aristotelian notion of focal meaning and I give a formal expression to the type of the entities in the hierarchy proposed by Chateaubriand.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Bellotti (2003, p. 402) calls attention to Tarski’s procedure according to which logical notions are characterized independently of the characterization of logical truth or even, unlike Chateaubriand, that logical notions are not used to characterize logical truth.
Curiously, the Universal property (Self-Identity) and the Self-Difference property (Self-Nonidentity) have a notable place in the Gödelian ontological argument for the existence of God; the Universal property is characterized in Gödelian argument as a positive property, while the Self-Difference property is characterized as a negative property (Wang 1996, p. 115).
References
Barnes J (1995) Metaphysics. In: Barnes J (ed) The Cambridge companion to Aristotle. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne
Bellotti L (2003) Tarski on logical notions. Synthese 135:401–413
Chateaubriand O (2001) Logic forms. Part I. Truth and description. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência/UNICAMP, Campinas
Chateaubriand O (2004) Logic and modality: reply to Frank Sautter. Manuscrito 27(1):105–114
Chateaubriand O (2005) Logic forms. Part II. Logic, language, and knowledge. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência/UNICAMP, Campinas
Everson S (1995) Psychology. In: Barnes J (ed) The Cambridge companion to Aristotle. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne
Frege G (1984) On concept and object. In: McGuinness B (ed) Collected papers on mathematics, logic, and philosophy. Basil Blackwell, Oxford
Hutchinson DS (1995) Ethics. In: Barnes J (ed) The Cambridge companion to Aristotle. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne
MacFarlane J G (2000) What does it mean to say that logic is formal? Dissertation, University of Pitttsburgh
Sautter FT (2004) Chateaubriand on the nature of logic. Manuscrito 27(1):95–104
Smith R (1995) Logic. In: Barnes J (ed) The Cambridge companion to Aristotle. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Tarski A (1986) What are logical notions? History and Philosophy of Logic 7:143–154
Wang H (1996) Logical journey: from Gödel to philosophy. The MIT Press, Cambridge
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Sautter, F.T. Chateaubriand’s Realist Conception of Logic. Axiomathes 20, 357–364 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-010-9109-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-010-9109-9