Skip to main content
Log in

Gendler on the Puzzle(s) of Imaginative Resistance

  • Published:
Acta Analytica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Gendler reformulated the so-called imaginability (or imaginative) puzzle in terms of authorial breakdown. The main idea behind this move was to isolate the essential features displayed by the alleged problematic cases and to specify a puzzle general enough to be applied to a variety of different types of imaginative resistance. I offer various criticisms of Gendler’s approach to imaginative resistance that also raises some more general points on the recent literature on the topic.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See (Gendler and Szabo 2006). For a survey of the recent literature on the topic, see (Liao and Gendler forthcoming).

  2. See (Walton 1994) and (Gendler and Szabo 2000). I take a ‘puzzle’ to be a kind of problem with a solution that addresses an unusual or unexpected phenomenon. A problem, in this essay, is defined as a theoretical conundrum that is not necessarily puzzling.

  3. A recent example of this tendency is Liao et al. (2014).

  4. See Stock (2013) for a survey of ways in which imagination and fictionality are connected.

  5. (Gendler and Szabo 2006: 159).

  6. (Gendler and Szabo 2006: 162).

  7. See Weatherson (2004) and Walton (2006) for a discussion of the differences between the various puzzles that philosophers have taken to emerge from the problematic cases taken into account.

  8. This point has been emphasised in various places, see for example Liao (2013). I will use the expressions ‘artistic category’ and ‘genre’ almost interchangeably, but I recognise that there may be subtle distinctions between the two.

  9. (Walton 1990: chapter 4). See also Lewis (1978/1983).

  10. (Walton 1990: 144-5). This approach is clearly reminiscent of David Lewis’s approach to counterfactuals in Lewis (1973).

  11. (Walton 1990: 146).

  12. See Sauchelli (2013: 241).

  13. See Lamarque (1990/96), for an early statement of these problems.

  14. In case possible worlds are considered as maximally consistent mereological sums closed under some spatio-temporal relation, as for instance Lewis’s modal realism,

  15. See Proudfoot (2006) for more details. Some philosophers have proposed to adopt an impossible worlds framework to deal with these and other cases. I will not explore this option here. See also Priest (1997) for discussion.

  16. I think that, if at all, ‘perceived immoralities’ are not the only cause of imaginative resistance.

  17. A similar point is made in Brock (2012).

  18. As I understand the notion of a counterpart of a moral claim, a counterpart B in @ of A in F involves at least a minimal variation in content of B with respect to A. The degree of such a variation is specified by a variety of factors.

References

  • Bonomi, A., & Zucchi, S. (2003). A pragmatic framework for truth in fiction. Dialectica, 57(2), 103–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brock, S. (2012). The puzzle of imaginative failure. The Philosophical Quarterly, 62(248), 443–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gendler, & Szabo, T. (2000). The puzzle of imaginative resistance. The Journal of Philosophy, 97(2), 55–81.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gendler, & Szabo, T. (2006). Imaginative resistance revisited. In S. Nichols (Ed.), The architecture of imagination (pp. 149–74). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Lamarque, P. (1990/96). Logic and criticism. In P. Lamarque (Ed.), Fictional points of view (pp. 55–70). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

  • Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1978/1983). Truth in fiction. In D. Lewis (Ed.), Philosophical papers (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Liao, S. (2013). Moral persuasion and the diversity of fictions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94(3), 269–289.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liao, S. & Gendler, Szabo, T. (Forthcoming). The Problem of Imaginative Resistance: An Overview. In J. Gibson & N. Carroll (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Literature. London and New York: Routledge.

  • Liao, S., Strohminger, N., & Sripada, C. S. (2014). Empirically investigating imaginative resistance. British Journal of Aesthetics, 54(3), 339–355.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Priest, G. (1997). Sylvan’s box: a short story and ten morals. Notre Dame J Form Log, 38, 573–81.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Proudfoot, D. (2006). Possible worlds semantics and fiction. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 35, 9–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sauchelli, A. (2013). The merited response argument and artistic categories. J Aesthet Art Crit, 71(3), 239–46.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stock, K. (2013). Imagining and fiction: some issues. Philos Compass, 8(10), 887–896.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walton, K. (1994). Morals in fiction and fictional morality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 68, 27–50.

  • Walton, K. (1990). Mimesis as make-believe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walton, K. (2006). On the So-called puzzle of imaginative resistance. In S. Nichols (Ed.), The architecture of imagination (pp. 137–48). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Weatherson, B. (2004). Morality, fiction, and possibility. Philos Imprint, 4(3), 1–27.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Andrea Sauchelli.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Sauchelli, A. Gendler on the Puzzle(s) of Imaginative Resistance. Acta Anal 31, 1–9 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-015-0258-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-015-0258-8

Keywords

Navigation