Izvorni znanstveni članak
Contextualism without incompleteness
Marina Sbisá
; University of Trieste
Sažetak
After summarizing the main intuitions and lines of reasoning at the basis of contextualism, I focus on the so-called Incompleteness Argument. I examine the discussion and rejection of this argument by Cappelen and Lepore (2005) and recognize that there are indeed some puzzling aspects to the intuition upon which the argument is based. After discussing why the incompleteness intuition seems to apply arbitrarily and be liable to infinite regress, and how it may have originated, I conclude that it is a misleading response to the situatedness of our speech and that it can be explained away without rejecting contextualism.
Ključne riječi
context; contextualism; semantic incompleteness; truth-conditions; truth-evaluation
Hrčak ID:
63468
URI
Datum izdavanja:
2.2.2009.
Posjeta: 669 *