I investigate a form of argument which refers to Leibniz's law as its inference ticket (where 'Leibniz's law' is understood as the thesis that if x = y, then all properties of x are properties of y, and vice versa). Arguments of this form are often used to establish certain categorial distinctions, e.g., a distinction between kinds and properties, or a distinction between processes and events. I show that there can be deficient arguments of this form, and why. I then argue that the interesting philosophical cases of this argument form are unconvincing, since they cannot be seen as clear cases of its unproblematic variety. © The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2006.
CITATION STYLE
Schnieder, B. (2006). “By Leibniz’s law”: Remarks on a fallacy. Philosophical Quarterly, 56(222), 39–54. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00427.x
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