Abstract
This paper argues that Descartes conceives of theoretical reason in terms derived from practical reason, particularly in the role he gives to the passions. That the passions serve — under “normal” circumstances — to preserve the union of mind and body is a well-known feature of Descartes's defense of our native make-up. But they are equally important in our more purely theoretical endeavors. Some passions, most notably “wonder,” provide a crucial source of motivation in the search after truth, and also serve to reinforce memory. Our cognitive successes and failure scan also be tracked by passions and trains of passions.
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Schmitter, A.M. Descartes and the Primacy of Practice: The Role of the Passions in the Search for Truth. Philosophical Studies 108, 99–108 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015764215206
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015764215206