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Rationality, Relativism, and Religion: A Reinterpretation of Peter Winch

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Abstract

Many point to Peter Winch’s discussion of rationality, relativism, and religion as a paradigmatic example of cultural relativism. In this paper, I argue that Winch’s relationship to relativism is widely misinterpreted in that, despite his pluralistic understanding of rationality, Winch does allow for universal features of culture in virtue of which cross-cultural understanding and even critique is possible. Nevertheless, I also argue that given the kind of cultural universals that Winch produces, he fails to avoid relativism. This is because in order to provide the standards without which relativism ensues, one requires a certain kind of criteria of rationality, namely, what I here call substantive universals, a kind of criteria which Winch rejects.

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Notes

  1. Winch (1989). The claim that this work gave rise to this debate is made by Bernstein (1976), p. 241, fn. 10. In my judgment, the most careful readings of Winch can be found in Derksen (1978) pp. 25–30, in Bernstein (1983) pp. 93–108; and in Phillips (2001), ch. 12. Two book–length treatments, both good, are: Lyas (1999) and Lerner (2002).

  2. Winch criticizes Apel on this point, in ‘Apel’s Transcendental Pragmatics,’ in Brown (1979), especially pp. 57–58. Apel responds to Winch in the same work, pp. 74–86, and again in ‘Universal Principles and Particular Decisions and Forms of Life,’ in Gaita (1990). For Habermas’ critical reading of Winch, see Habermas (1980). One should keep in mind that for Winch ‘language game’ refers not only to a kind of discourse but also to the social practice (a ‘form of life’) of which the discourse is a part. See Winch (1987).

  3. For the relation of language games to cultures, see Winch, ‘Language, Belief, and Relativism,’ Trying to Make Sense, especially p. 198.

  4. One or more of these criticisms can be found in each of the following: Steven Lukes, ‘Some Problems about Rationality,’ in Wilson, ed. (1970), Rationality, pp. 194–213; Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘The Idea of a Social Science,’ in Wilson, ed. (1970), Rationality, pp. 112–30; Jarvie (1970); Hollis (1972); Trigg (1973); Kekes (1973); Horton (1976); Dixon (1977); Hertzberg (1980); Beattie (1984); Brown (1988); Harris (1992). Some of these authors make further criticisms of Winch that I do not consider here.

  5. See, for example, Winch (1970 pp. 81–2, p. 100); Language, Belief, and Relativism,’ p. 194; and Winch’s ‘Comment,’ in Borger and Cioffi, eds., Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences, p. 255.

  6. Winch, ‘Comment,’ pp. 254–5. Winch explicitly distinguishes his arguments in ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’ from ‘the sort of relativism concerning truth’ in ‘Language, Belief, and Relativism,’ p. 195 (emphasis added).

  7. Similarly, the discovery of facts depends on the goals of an inquiry and the conceptual tools involved, but the existence of the facts does not. See Winch, ‘Darwin, Genesis, and Contradiction,’ p. 136.

  8. Letter to the author, July 7, 1993. The letter continues: ‘I am always relieved when someone realizes that my position is not a relativist one. It happens all too seldom. … On the other hand, I should be reluctant to accept the label “realist”. The root of the whole trouble is that these labels convey the false impression that they designate two genuinely distinct theories, whereas that is where the fundamental confusion lies. In Tractatus §5.641 Wittgenstein wrote: “solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism”. Substitute “relativism” for “solipsism” and I think this remains true.’

  9. Winch’s strongest statement of this position is the following. ‘Within [social practices such as] science and religion, actions can be logical or illogical.... But we cannot sensibly say that the practice of science itself or that of religion is either logical or illogical; both are non–logical’ (Winch 1989, pp. 100–1). Although Winch has distanced himself from the claim that social practices are autonomous wholes, he continues to argue that ‘the logico–conceptual difficulties which arise when ways of thinking which have their roots in different reaches of human life are brought to bear on each other cannot be resolved by any appeal to a formal system’ (Winch 1989, p. xvi).

  10. (Winch 1989, pp. 57, 134). In my opinion, this is the best way to understand Winch’s notorious comments that logical principles ‘arise out of’ or ‘depend on’ social relations (Winch 1989, pp. 100, 126).

  11. Evans–Pritchard (1965). Quoted in Winch (1970, p. 91).

  12. (Winch 1970, pp. 91–2). Phillips gives on overview of Winch’s response to three alleged contradictions in Zande practice (2001: 300–4).

  13. It is important to note that Winch does not argue, as some of his supporters and critics have claimed, that there are social practices in which contradiction is not significant. For an example of supporters who say that contradiction is just the philosopher’s hobgoblin, see Sharrock and Anderson (1985); for a critic, see Charles Taylor, ‘Rationality,’ in Hollis and Lukes, eds., Rationality and relativism, p. 91.

  14. Winch ‘Comment,’ p. 254.

  15. Winch, ‘Comment,’ p. 250.

  16. Winch (1989, p. 89). See also Winch (1989, pp. 45–51) and Winch (1970 pp. 96, 107–8).

  17. For example, Winch (1989, pp. 72, 78, 117).

  18. Winch, ‘Comment,’ p. 258, emphasis in the original (see also ‘Language, Belief, and Relativism,’ p. 207) and Winch (1972).

  19. Winch (1970 pp. 100–1). This criticism is specifically aimed at Alasdair MacIntyre.

  20. See the essays by Hollis and Lukes in footnote 7.

  21. For example, Winch writes that ‘the forms in which rationality expresses itself in the culture of a human society cannot be elucidated simply in terms of ... logical coherence.’ (Winch 1970, p. 93; emphasis in the original). Believing that he is reproaching Winch, Hollis says, ‘Rationality may refer to two different things. On the one hand a man’s beliefs and practices must be coherent.... On the other hand to show why a man’s actions are rational we must give his reasons for performing them. This involves an appeal to his culture’ (‘Witchcraft and Winchcraft,’ p. 100; emphasis in the original).

  22. I do not have the space here to assess the relative merits of these two positions, but it is worth noting that Hollis but not Winch is saddled with the task of tracing all cognitive claims to their ‘literal’ or empirical meaning. Hollis tries to do this with religious claims in ‘Reason and Ritual,’ in Wilson, ed. (1970), Rationality, pp. 221–39.

  23. Winch (1970, p. 83). Also ‘Comment,’ p. 240.

  24. Winch, ‘Apel’s Transcendental Pragmatics,’ p. 61.

  25. Winch, ‘Ethical Relativism,’ Trying to Make Sense, p. 189.

  26. On Martin Hollis’s construal, that there are shared percepts is logically necessary, but what they are is always logically contingent. See Hollis, ‘The Limits of Irrationality’ in Wilson, ed. (1970), Rationality, pp. 214–20, and ‘The Epistemological Unity of Mankind,’ in Brown, ed., Philosophical Disputes in the Social Sciences, pp. 225–32. In the language of this paper, ‘that there are shared percepts’ is a formal and not a substantive claim.

  27. Charles Hartshorne develops this understanding of metaphysics. See especially his ‘What Metaphysics Is’ and ‘Non–restrictive Existential Statements,’ (Hartshorne 1970a, pp. 19–42, 159–72).

  28. Winch, ‘Comment,’ p. 253.

  29. Hartshorne’s approach is an example of this, as is the revisionary or post–foundationalist metaphysics of John Post. See Post (1987), (1991), especially pp. 5–10, 33–36.

  30. For some suggestive thoughts on metaphysics as grammar, see Hartshorne (1970b). For more common ground between neoclassical metaphysics and Wittgenstein, see Hartshorne (1983).

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    Kevin Schilbrack

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Schilbrack, K. Rationality, Relativism, and Religion: A Reinterpretation of Peter Winch. SOPHIA 48, 399–412 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-009-0139-y

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