Abstract
In this brief reply I argue that criticisms of the hiddenness argument recently published in this journal by Imran Aijaz and Markus Weidler are without force. As will be shown, their critique of my conceptual version of the argument misses the mark by missing crucial distinctions. Their critique of my analogical version of the argument misunderstands that argument and also misapplies the work of W. H. Vanstone. And their critique of my view that belief is necessary for a certain kind of relationship with God overlooks both some central features of that kind of relationship and some good reasons for not accepting acceptance or anything similarly nonbelieving as a substitute for belief in this context.
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References
Aijaz I. and Weidler M. (2007). Some critical reflections on the hiddenness argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 61: 1–23
Draper, P. (Ed.). (2007). God or blind nature? Philosophers debate the evidence. http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/debates/great-debate.html.
Schellenberg J.L. (2005). Prolegomena to a philosophy of religion. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Schellenberg J.L. (2007). The wisdom to doubt: A justification of religious skepticism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Schellenberg, J. L. The will to imagine: A justification of skeptical religion. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (forthcoming).
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Schellenberg, J.L. Reply to Aijaz and Weidler on Hiddenness. Int J Philos Relig 64, 135–140 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-008-9170-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-008-9170-0