Abstract
The simplest and most convenient way to present the unificationist model of explanation is to state what the unificationist sees as the necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s being a scientific explanation. This exposition will also make it clear how the unificationist model relates to Hempel’s covering law model, as well as what distinguishes the two.
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References
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SCHWEDER, R. (2007). SOME NOTES ON UNIFICATIONISM AND PROBABILISTIC EXPLANATION. In: PERSSON, J., YLIKOSKI, P. (eds) RETHINKING EXPLANATION. BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, vol 252. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5581-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5581-2_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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