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The Irrelevance of the Subject: Against Subject-sensitive Invariantism

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Amherst, MA, 01003

    Jonathan Schaffer

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  1. Jonathan Schaffer
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Schaffer, J. The Irrelevance of the Subject: Against Subject-sensitive Invariantism. Philos Stud 127, 87–107 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-1731-9

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