Journal of the History of Philosophy

Book Reviews The Platonic Method: An Interpretation of the Dramatic-Philosophic Aspects of the Meno. By Jerome Eekstein. (New York: Greenwood Publishers, 1968. Pp. 133. $3.75) This volume includes a translation of the complete text of Plato's Meno. Professor Eckstein's detailed analysis of the Meno impresses me as an accurate and intelligent interpretation. It does justice to both the logic and the drama of the dialogue. Outstanding in this interpretation of the text is that the so-called "doctrine" of recollection and reminiscence as sources for a knowledge of geometry is a clever device for showing the absurdity of having knowledge without education. It seems to me that Eckstein might have observed a similar absurdity and dramatic irony in the suggestion at the end of the dialogue that virtue comes not from education but from "divine" inspiration , like the virtues of the diviners and poets. But Eckstein appears to be worried for fear Socrates may be taking this seriously, and he argues, on the basis of a sophistic and fallacious logic that such a doctrine would lead to the inference that vices (like those of the sons of Pericles) might not be learned but diabolically inspired. Is it not more compatible with the character of Socrates to believe that divine inspiration is as absurd a hypothesis as recollection? Debunking the "knowledge" of poets, including even Homer, was a favorite pastime of Socrates and was one of the traits that led to his execution. In any case, the real problem is to know the nature of virtue and knowledge; and this problem is left open. Turning to other dialogues, especially the Republic, Eckstein exhibits the "tensionality " in the mind of Plato, and in his own mind: Socraws and Plato clearly recognize the incompleteness of the discussion, and therefore the later modifications should not be taken as con~adictory. This is why in interpreting these segments of the Meno I take the liberty of saying that for Socrates the practice of virtue is "largely" or "considerably" outside the scopes of nurture's and nature's influence. Why does not Socrates state these qualifications in the Meno? I suppose because he is over-reacting to the excessive optimism of Meno and Anytus, who believe that virtue is easily taught and discerned. (p. 84) I venture to suggest that perhaps Eckstejn is under-reacting to the dramatic irony of some of the other dialogues, which he might well subject to the searching analysis that he here uses on the Meno. I see no reason for assuming (and Eckstein accepts the common assumption) that the Republic portrays a "utopian" society. Why not interpret it as a continuation of the problem of "the nature of civic virtue" as it is raised in the Meno? The central problem is how to make sure that the philosopher-king or supreme "guardian" has a knowledge of just administration. This ideally (abstractly) just state (questions of happiness are brushed aside) is not a "simple society of pigs" but a "luxurious," unhealthy society surrounded by enemies. The most ditiicult problem of justice is how to teach the "guardians" to be, like good watch-dogs, benevolent to fellow-citizens and "fierce" to strangers. Since such a virtue does not come naturally to human beings as it does to watch-dogs under training, the guardians are given an inhuman education (like that of any army). The chief of the guardians must have, in [200] BOOK REVIEWS 201 addition to the virtues of a watchdog, the difficult virtue of justice. What shall he study to learn the nature of this virtue7 Socrates replies, "mathematics." Is not this the same irony as in the Meno, with essentially the same problem "writ large"7 Plato is passionately committed to the ideal of knowledge, but he is dolefully and wisely conscious that the vital ability to produce a virtuous man or statesman is largely beyond the pale of knowledge; that is part of the main theme of his Republic, Statesman, and Meno. He agonizes about the general fate of worthwhile ideals. (p. 85) If Plato is thus passionately and dolefully committed to the ideal of knowledge, why does he dramatize the Socratic skepticism about...