Abstract
After briefly discussing the relevance of the notions ‘computation’ and ‘implementation’ for cognitive science, I summarize some of the problems that have been found in their most common interpretations. In particular, I argue that standard notions of computation together with a ‘state-to-state correspondence view of implementation’ cannot overcome difficulties posed by Putnam's Realization Theorem and that, therefore, a different approach to implementation is required. The notion ‘realization of a function’, developed out of physical theories, is then introduced as a replacement for the notional pair ‘computation-implementation’. After gradual refinement, taking practical constraints into account, this notion gives rise to the notion ‘digital system’ which singles out physical systems that could be actually used, and possibly even built.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Chalmers, D. J. (1996), ‘Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton?’, Synthese 108, pp. 310–333.
Chalmers, D. J. (1997), ‘A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition’ (unpublished manuscript)
Copeland, B. J. (1996), ‘What is Computation?’, Synthese 108, pp. 335–359.
Cummins, R. (1989), Meaning and Mental Representation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 196
Endicott, R. P. (1996), ‘Searle, Syntax, and Observer Relativity’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26, pp. 101–122.
Gandy, R. (1980), ‘Church's Thesis and Principles for Mechanism’, in J. Barwise, H. I. Keisler and K. Kunen, eds., Proceedings of the Kleene Symposium, New York: North-Holland Publishing Company.
Gödel, K. (1958), ‘Ñber eine bisher noch nicht benützte Erweiterung des finiten Standpunktes’, Dialectica 12, pp. 455–475.
Haugeland, J. (1982), ‘Analog and Analog’, Mind, Brain, and Function. Nornan: University of Oklahoma Press.
Haugeland, J. (1996), ‘What is Mind Design?’ Mind Design II. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Melnyk, A. (1996), ‘Searle's Abstract Argument Against Strong AI’, Synthese 108, pp. 391–419.
Putnam, H. (1967), ‘Psychological Predicates’, reprinted as ‘The Nature of Mental States’, The Nature of Mind. D. Rosenthal, ed. New York: Oxford University Press (1991).
Putnam, H. (1988), Representation and Reality, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Scheutz, M. (1997), ‘Facets of Implementation’ (unpublished manuscript).
Scheutz, M. (1998), ‘Do Walls Compute After All? - Challenging Copeland's Solution to Searle's Theorem Against Strong AI’, in Proceedings of the 9th Midwest AI and Cognitive Science Conference 1998, AAAI Press, pp. 43–49.
Searle, J. (1992), The Rediscovery of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Smith, B. C. (1996), The Origin of Objects, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Smith, B. C. (1998), The Age of Significance. Vol 1. (forthcoming)
Turing, A. M. (1936), ‘On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem'. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, Series 2, 42, pp. 230–265.
Van Gelder, T. J. (1998), ‘The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science’ (target article forthcoming in The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Scheutz, M. When Physical Systems Realize Functions.... Minds and Machines 9, 161–196 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008364332419
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008364332419