Abstract
David Widerker, long an opponent of Harry Frankfurt’s attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), has recently come up with his own Frankfurt-style scenario which he claims might well be a counterexample to PAP. Carlos Moya has argued that this new scenario is not a counterexample to PAP, because in it the agent is not really blameworthy, since he lacks weak reasons-responsiveness (WRR), a property that John Fischer has argued is a necessary condition of practical rationality, and hence of moral responsibility. I argue that in Widerker’s scenario the agent is indeed blameworthy, even though he lacks WRR; and that therefore this scenario is a counterexample not only to PAP, but also to Fischer’s claim that WRR is necessary for blameworthiness.
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Notes
This is Widerker’s formulation in his “Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios” (2006, pp. 163–187, at p. 163).
Frankfurt (1969, pp. 829–839).
See Widerker and McKenna (2003).
Widerker (2006).
The concept of weak reasons-responsiveness was introduced by Fischer (1994, pp. 166–167).
Fischer (1994, pp. 166–167) argues for this principle. In Fischer and Ravizza (1998), WRR eventually gives way to what is called ‘moderate reasons-responsiveness’ (MRR) in accounting for moral responsibility. However, since MRR entails WRR, the principle that WRR is necessary for blameworthiness remains, and Moya’s argument is unaffected. See Moya (2007, p. 481, footnote 10). I will clarify WRR further, below.
This example is based on one given by Widerker (2006, p. 164), which in turn is based on examples in Frankfurt (1969).
Widerker (1995, pp. 247–261).
Widerker (2003). I think that this argument is best viewed as a spelling out, and indirect application, of PAP that is more persuasive than a mere statement, or direct application, of PAP.
See Widerker (2006, pp. 167–168), where he speaks of ‘actionally inaccessible’ events, or states of affairs.
Widerker (2006, pp. 169–170). Widerker calls this example ‘Brain-Malfunction-W’, and it is the second of two examples which are supposed to be counterexamples to PAP. He calls the first ‘Z-Persons’; I think that Moya’s comments on this example (p. 484) show that it does not succeed as it stands.
Widerker (2006, pp. 176–181).
Moya (2007, p. 481). See Fischer (1994, pp. 166–167). Why did Fischer define WRR in terms of the agent’s decision-making mechanism (or process), as opposed to defining it directly in terms of the agent himself? I think his main reason is that he holds that in Frankfurt-type scenarios, the agent (Jones) is blameworthy, even though no possible reason could lead to his deciding otherwise; but this is only because Jones’s being inclined to decide otherwise would lead the intervener (Black) actively to induce the decision, thereby changing the decision-making mechanism. So Jones, in the Frankfurt scenarios, does have WRR; for his actual decision-making mechanism, if it is not overridden by the Black-driven mechanism, is capable of leading Jones to decide otherwise. Thus, by building into WRR the requirement that the mechanism remain constant in the counterfactual case, he avoids having to view Frankfurt-style scenarios as counterexamples to PWRR. Fischer is aware that the individuation of decision-making mechanisms is problematic. He thinks that, despite the problems, the concept of WRR is useful. But I’m not so sure. See below, footnote 26. And see Ginet (2006, pp. 233–236).
The example and the principle that it supports are due to Fischer (1994, pp. 166–167); see Moya (2007, pp. 481–482). Fischer (e.g., 1994, p. 167) uses the term ‘guidance control’, rather than ‘rationality’, to refer to the necessary condition of responsibility that is missing in someone who lacks WRR. But Moya (2007, p. 482) talks instead of “a faulty mechanism that compromises the agent’s capacity for rational deliberation and decision-making.” In a related article, Moya says of someone who lacks WRR, “His practical rationality is … seriously impaired, and this … undermines an agent’s moral responsibility” (Moya 2003, pp. 109–120, at p. 118).
Moya (2007, p. 482).
Moya (2007, p. 483).
Moya has a subsidiary argument to the effect that the absence of N may leave Jones some morally significant alternative—some flicker of freedom—after all. For example, Jones might be able to adopt a more favorable attitude to moral reasons than he actually adopted, and so be less blameworthy. If so, then Widerker’s scenario does not succeed in ruling out every morally relevant alternative, and so is not a counterexample to PAP. And if not, then the intuition that Jones is not blameworthy is that much stronger (pp. 484–485). However, I think that Widerker’s concept of the absence of N is, or at least can be developed to be, adjustable; it can be tightened, so to speak, to rule out every possible morally significant alternative. As for the intuition that in that case, Jones is not blameworthy, I intend to show, in the next section, that detailed attention to Jones’s actual deliberation and decision-making serves to strengthen the initial intuition that Jones is indeed blameworthy, even though he has absolutely no morally significant alternative, and even though he lacks WRR.
Lack of WRR is said to show that the actual decision-making process—or ‘mechanism’ (Fischer), or ‘apparatus’ (Moya)—of the agent S is defective in such a way as to render S not morally blameworthy for his decision. But it is unclear to me whether the lack of WRR is supposed to constitute the defect in the mechanism that renders S not blameworthy, or only to indicate the relevant defect. In other words, it is unclear to me whether Fischer and Moya hold that lack of WRR per se is that in virtue of which S is not blameworthy for his decision, or whether they hold that lack of WRR is merely a symptom, or indication, of something else, and it is that something else—perhaps an underlying psychological or neurological condition—in virtue of which S is not blameworthy for his decision. I will argue that lack of WRR should not be regarded as that in virtue of which S’s decision is not rational and S not blameworthy for it, and furthermore, that insofar as it is a symptom of an underlying condition in virtue of which S’s decision is not rational and S not blameworthy for it, it is not a completely reliable symptom. That is, I want to argue that PWRR, on either construal, is false.
I think that I need not commit myself to any particular theory as to the precise relation between a person’s reasons and her decision, in virtue of which the person can be said to have decided for those reasons in a rational manner. I will simply try to describe Widerker’s case in such a way that intuitively, whatever relations between Jones’s reasons and his decision are necessary for rationality and responsibility did obtain.
An anonymous reviewer for Philosophical Studies questioned whether we are entitled to stipulate that Jones’s lack of WRR did not affect his actual deliberation and decision-making. I would say that if we knew of someone only that he lacked WRR, then we could justifiably assume (though not with certainty) that his actual decision was detached from his reasons (just as his counterfactual decisions would be detached from his respective counterfactual reasons). However, since Jones’s lack of WRR is due specifically to the absence of N—i.e., not a cause of the decision to break his promise, but only the absence of necessary conditions for any morally relevant alternative to that decision—it is possible, and so we may stipulate, that this condition is causally and explanatorily irrelevant to Jones’s deliberation, to his decision, and to the relation between his reasons and his decision.
Widerker, in his “A Defense of Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism,” emphasizes further that Jones exhibits sufficient practical rationality in his deliberation, leading up to the decision, to render him subject to blame; in particular, before making his decision, Jones is sufficiently differentially responsive to reasons that he believes that if he had certain stronger reasons for keeping his promise, he would decide to keep it.
Fischer (1994, pp. 173–174). See also Fischer and Ravizza (1998, pp. 48–49).
An anonymous referee pointed out that I, in effect, adopt an “actual sequence” account of moral responsibility, whereas Moya argues that what matters for responsibility is not merely the actual process leading to the decision, but also counterfactual facts about the agent’s decision-making mechanism. My insistence that Jones is blameworthy because the actual deliberative and decision-making process was completely normal is therefore, in this context, question-begging. But what I have tried to do is argue for an “actual sequence” perspective on the case at hand, by exhibiting Jones’s perfectly normal reasoning process and thereby eliciting the reader’s intuitive judgement that Jones is blameworthy, despite untoward counterfactual facts.
Smith presumably could have overcome his bigotry and come to lean toward apologizing, whereupon his phobia would have ensured that he decide not to apologize. Had this been the case, Smith would not have been (as) blameworthy. Thus Smith had a “flicker of freedom.” Therefore, this example is not an optimal counterexample to PAP. But it is not intended as such; rather it is intended only as a counterexample to PWRR.
Proponents of PWRR might claim that in the proposed counterexamples, the decision-making mechanisms are not being held constant in the counterfactual scenarios, so Jones and Smith do not necessarily lack WRR. This claim, though difficult to assess, might save PWRR from refutation by these examples, but it completely undermines Moya’s critique of Widerker’s argument against PAP; for if Jones, in Widerker’s example, does not lack WRR, then Moya is left without his express reason for denying that Jones is blameworthy despite the absence of morally significant alternatives.
I would like to thank David Widerker for many fruitful discussions of the issues dealt with in this paper. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer for Philosophical Studies for very insightful comments.
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Schnall, I.M. Weak reasons-responsiveness meets its match: in defense of David Widerker’s attack on PAP. Philos Stud 150, 271–283 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9408-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9408-4