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Relativism or Relationism? A Mannheimian Interpretation of Fleck’s Claims About Relativism

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Abstract

The paper explores the defence by the early sociologist of science Ludwik Fleck against the charge of relativism. It is shown that there are crucial and hitherto unnoticed similarities between Fleck’s strategy and the attempt by his contemporary Karl Mannheim to distinguish between an incoherent relativism and a consistent relationism. Both authors seek to revise epistemology fundamentally by reinterpreting the concept of objectivity in two ways: as inner- and inter-style objectivity. The argument for the latter concept shows the genuine political background and intent of Fleck’s sociology of science and its ambition to relieve the cultural struggles of his time.

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Notes

  1. See Rorty (1989, 21).

  2. See Goodman (1978, 94).

  3. See Kuhn (1970, 121).

  4. See e.g. Nagel (1997, 15).

  5. Toulmin (1972, 1.2) chooses Collingwood and Frege as representatives of relativism and absolutism; however, with an intention that differs from mine.

  6. See especially Fleck (1979). See for a summary of the reception of Fleck: Graf and Mutter (2000).

  7. See Mannheim (1952b). Here Mannheim sometimes uses “Denkstil” and sometimes Denkstil. See also: Egloff (2007, 88), Trenn (1979, xv). Pels claims that Mannheim used the term Denkstil already in the year 1921 (see Pels 1996, 37). Pels in this respect refers to Mannheim (1952d)—in this work Mannheim, however, just uses the term “style” as an example taken from aesthetics.

  8. Fleck (1986f, 41).

  9. In this respect Egloff is simply wrong in claiming that the first use of the term by Fleck was about one decade later than Mannheim’s first use (see Egloff 2007, 88). However, Egloff is right that Fleck's first thorough explication of the term is to be found in Fleck (1979).

  10. Fleck, however, definitely knew the work of other early sociologists of knowledge. See Fleck (1979, 46–50), Fleck (1986b, 80).

  11. Schütz (2007, 139).

  12. Pels (1996, 37).

  13. See Schnelle (1986, 7).

  14. See e.g. the recent discussion in Jung (2007, 199–202). Additionally, in the following I am not discussing the differences and similarities of the terms ‘Weltanschauung’ and ‘Denkstil’ in the vocabulary of both thinkers. For the purpose of this paper possible differences and similarities are of ancillary importance.

  15. In fact Fleck himself accuses those thinkers of the sociology of knowledge that he explicitly mentions to “exhibit an excessive respect, bordering on pious reverence, for scientific facts” (Fleck 1979, 47) and claims that “they think that our present-day scientific opinions are in complete contrast with all other ways of thinking” (Fleck 1979, 50). See also Fleck (1986b, 80).

  16. See Bloor (1991, 11).

  17. See in this respect for example Michael Mulkay’s and Mary Hesse's oversimplified description of Mannheim’s position (Mulkay 1979, 11; Hesse 1980, 31). First of all it has to be noted that Mannheim explicitly claims that there exists a certain Weltanschauung and a thought-style of the natural sciences and describes the social conditions of this thought-style (Mannheim 1946, 146–153). He maintains that “auch dieses Denken ist soziologisch gesehen nicht freischwebend, sind doch die Grundimpulse aus denen die exakte Forschung aufsteigt, an ein bestimmtes Stadium der sozialen Entwicklung und an bestimmte Grundkonstellationen gebunden, und auch weiterhin ragt das Bedürfnis des sozialen Körpers in die Fragestellungen und in die Forschungsrichtung der naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis hinein“ (Mannheim 1984, 66). Once, however, and this is the true aspect of the supposed strong difference between the Mannheimian project and the “Strong Programme”, the socially determined thought-style of the natural sciences is accepted, the contents of the natural sciences are not existentially determined (seinsgebunden). And secondly, Steve Fuller recently has argued that there was a development in Mannheim’s position concerning the applicability of the sociology of knowledge to the natural sciences and that the later Mannheim did not see any reason to exclude the natural sciences in principle (Fuller 2000, 230f.). See for a critical examination of the Strong-Programme-interpretation of Mannheim and David Bloor’s “Failure-of-Nerve-Thesis” (Bloor 1991, 11) also Kaiser (1998) and Pels (1996).

  18. See my Seidel (in print) for further analysis.

  19. In fact, as Peter Farago has recently argued, it is even more plausible to interpret David Bloor’s explicit relativistic programme on the lines of a Mannheimian relationism. See Farago (2002).

  20. Bloor distinguishes between a ‘Mannheimian’ and a ‘Wittgensteinian tradition’ in the sociology of knowledge (Bloor 1973) and sees himself in the latter one. David Bloor also explicitly classes Fleck with the supposed ‘Wittgensteinian tradition’ (see Bloor 1986, 396 Fn. 29) and tries to interpret his comparative epistemology in terms of the Strong Programme's interest-model (see e.g. Bloor 1986, 393) and symmetry postulate (see Bloor 1986, 395 Fn. 22). The claim of this paper is that Fleck, at least with respect to the question of relativism, stands in Bloor's ‘Mannheimian’ tradition.

  21. The phrase “in this sense” has to be emphasised in this context: this kind of rehabilitation is not a rehabilitation of relationism as an adequate position per se, but only a rehabilitation of Mannheim in the context of the recent interest in Fleck at some philosophy departments.

  22. See on “relationism/relationalism” concerning space and time: Friedman (1983, 62, chap. VI).

  23. See Lindemann (1986). See on the connections of Mannheim’s relationism to Cassirer and Simmel: Endreß (2000, 342), Jung (2007, 3.2).

  24. See Hofmann (1996, 224), Woldring (1987, 6).

  25. See Boghossian (2006, 73): “If a person, S's, epistemic judgments are to have any prospects of being true, we must not construe his utterances of the form ‘E justifies belief B’ as expressing the claim E justifies belief B but rather as expressing the claim: According to the epistemic system C, that I, S, accept, information E justifies belief B. (Epistemic relationism)”. The other parts of epistemic relativism are, according to Boghossian, epistemic non-absolutism and epistemic pluralism. Bohossian seems to be wholly unaware of the sociological discussion and the use of the term by Mannheim, Cassirer and Simmel.

  26. See e.g. Mannheim (1952a, 91, 117).

  27. See e.g. Fleck (1986a, 49): “Neither the ‚subject’ nor the ‚object’ receive a reality of their own; all existence is based on interaction and is relative.”, Fleck (1986a, 56), Fleck (1986b, 89).

  28. See e.g. Freudenthal and Löwy (1988), Graf and Mutter (2000), Löwy (1990).

  29. See the first of the quotes from Fleck above.

  30. See e.g. his early description of the reproach of self-refutation in Mannheim (1953, 27).

  31. See Mannheim (1952a, 104).

  32. The following interpretation of Mannheim’s idea can also be found in Endreß (2000, 340f.), Farago (2002, 180f.), Remmling (1975, 60), Scott (1998), Shmueli (1979, 111).

  33. Baum interprets these connections in terms of two equations: “social dependency + static view of truth = relativism, social dependency + dynamic view of truth = relationism”. See Baum (1977, 40). Interestingly, a very similar strategy against the argument from the self-refuting character of relativism can be found in Hesse (1980, 42) in defence of the Strong Programme.

  34. Mannheim (1946, 269); improved translation. See also Mannheim (1983 [1946]), Mannheim (1952a, 120).

  35. Mannheim (1952c, 194); improved translation. See also Mannheim (1946, 254). By “certain (qualitative) truths” Mannheim refers to beliefs in the Geisteswissenschaften.

  36. See also Mannheim (1952a, 93).

  37. See Mannheim (1952a).

  38. See Mannheim (1946, 244).

  39. It is exactly this argument that has recently been used by Wolfgang Welsch in his defence of relativism—of course, I am inclined to say, without any reference to Fleck or Mannheim. See Welsch (2000, 42f).

  40. See Fleck (1990a, 268).

  41. See also Fleck (1986c, 123f.): “Simplicius. Do you want, following the example of the sophists, to convince me that there exists no difference between truth and illusion? Sympathius. No, my dear friend, I am not as naïve as that. What I want to do is to say that scientific results and views are basically determined exclusively as single historical events at successive development stages of the scientific thought-style which is the outcome of the specific structure of the scientific thinking collective.”

  42. See Fleck (1979, 94f., 101).

  43. In fact, at this point Fleck even goes further than Mannheim in claiming that truth is completely determined within a thought-style whereas Mannheim just claims that one can arrive at clear results. Contrary to what is claimed by the “Strong Programme” it seems as if it is not Mannheim who still adheres to a ‘static, relatively straight-line development’-conception of truth (see Mulkay 1979, 11), but Ludwik Fleck, who seems to have a very static, deterministic conception of inner-thought-style-truth.

  44. See e.g. Fleck (1986b, 110f).

  45. See Fleck (1986b, 111).

  46. Just to give some examples: for ‚truth’ see: Fleck (1986b, 110); for ‘cognition’ see: Fleck (1979, 42f., 87, 1986e, 154); for ‘perception’ see: Fleck (1986d); for ‘knowledge’ see: Fleck (1979, 51).

  47. See Fleck (1986e, 153f).

  48. For Fleck’s use of the words ‘social’ and ‘sociological’ see Egloff (2007).

  49. See the close connection to Mannheim (1946, 29): “We will not succeed in attaining an adequate […] theory of knowledge as a whole as long as our epistemology fails, from the very beginning, to recognize the social character of knowing, and fails to regard individualized thinking only as an exceptional instance”. See also Mannheim (1952b, 137 Fn. 1).

  50. Fleck (1979, 100).

  51. Fleck (1990a, 268).

  52. This dynamic, Fleckian reinterpretation of the concept of truth is probably also what Schütz means when he writes: “unter diesem Blickwinkel ist […] bereits das Unterwegssein zur Wahrheit als Wahrheitsbezug verstehbar: wahr ist nun auch das, woraufhin die Bewegung der Wahrheitssuche sich richtet” (Schütz 2007, 155).

  53. For a recent discussion of how Mannheim tried to develop a methodology to understand and interpret foreign thought-styles see Srubar (2007, 84–86).

  54. See Mannheim’s example of the “urbanized peasant boy” who has the possibility to describe both viewpoints as partial: “A fully developed sociology of knowledge follows the same approach which we have illustrated above in the case of the peasant boy, except that it follows a deliberate method” (Mannheim 1946, 255).

  55. See also Mannheim (1946, 271): “The impetus to research in the sociology of knowledge may be so guided that it will not absolutize the concept of “existentiality” (Seinsverbundenheit); rather, it may be directed in such a fashion that precisely by discovering the element of existentiality in the views at hand, a first step will be taken towards the solution of the problem of existential determination (Seinsgebundenheit). As soon as I enclose a given angle of vision in a view which sets up itself as absolute, I neutralize its partial nature in a sense.” (improved translation).

  56. It is this comparative aspect of Mannheim’s relationism that was—according to Shmueli—mostly overlooked or underestimated. See Shmueli (1979, 115). See also the interpretation of Jung who extracts a reciprocal dependence of an agonal and a synthesising element in Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge and sees this dependence as the condition of the possibility of a comparison of conflicting positions (Jung 2007, 303).

  57. Mannheim (1952c, 224).

  58. See Mannheim (1946, 137, 1956a, 106). Mannheim borrowed this term from Alfred Weber. A short note on the translation of the term ‚sozial freischwebende Intelligenz’: the translation “socially unattached intelligentsia” in the translation of Ideologie und Utopie by Wirth and Shils is misleading since it suggests—contrary to what Mannheim explicitly thought (see Mannheim 1956a, 105f.)—that the members of the freischwebende Intelligenz are an exemption of Mannheim’s thesis of the essentially social determination of thought.

  59. Mannheim (1946, 137).

  60. See Mannheim (1956a, 104f). See also Hofmann (1996, 120).

  61. Mannheim (1956a), 106.

  62. See Nagel (1961, 501f).

  63. See the obvious connection to the reflexivity-principle of the Strong Programme: “It [the sociology of scientific knowledge] would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would have to be applicable to sociology itself. […] It is an obvious requirement of principle because otherwise sociology would be a standing refutation of its own thesis” (Bloor 1991, 7).

  64. See Mannheim (1946, 135). See also Scott (1998, 112).

  65. In Mannheim’s sense a real synthesis does not mean a ‘quantitative middle’ or ‘arithmetic average’ (Mannheim 1946, 137). It is Otto Neurath who caricatures Mannheim’s position in this way by claiming that a Mannheimian synthesis of e.g. the beliefs that 2 + 2 = 8 and that 2 + 2 = 4 would consist in the belief that 2 + 2 = 6 (Neurath 1982 [1930], 587). See on this issue also Scott (1998, 112).

  66. Mannheim (1956b, 192). Scott emphasises the similarities of Mannheim’s work on the free-floating intellectuals to Habermas’ idea of the ‘ideal speech situation’ (Scott 1998, 117). Also Baum (1977, 43) sees connections to Habermas, but tries to weaken the importance of the free-floating-intellectuals for Mannheim’s thought (Baum 1977, 65f.). Baum, however, speaks also of the importance of “dialogue” in Mannheim’s idea of a ‘truth beyond relativism’ (Baum 1977, 69f.). In my interpretation of Mannheim’s free-floating-intellectuals, it simply is Mannheim’s name for every group of people that fulfils the following condition: within the group there is—at least—the enhanced possibility of genuine discussion and dialogue.

  67. Mannheim (1946, 140). See also Ettrich (2007, 275).

  68. Also Baum (1977, 43) emphasises the ‘political elan’ of Mannheim’s dynamic concept of truth. In Baum’s words: “Knowledge is true (in the dynamic sense defined by Mannheim) when it moves history closer to emancipation and solidarity” (Baum 1977, 74). See also Hofmann (1996, 120), Maasen (1999, 20).

  69. Mannheim (1946, 270).

  70. See e.g. Fleck (1979, 36, 139, 1986b, Sec. II.

  71. During the preparation of this paper I became aware of the argumentation of Zittel in (2007). Although I wholeheartedly embraced Zittel’s analysis of Fleck’s position, and my own argumentation concerning Fleck is very close to it, I want to emphasise two important differences: the first difference is obvious and consists in Zittel’s unawareness of the Mannheimian argumentation. This is a stunning fact since Zittel himself uses the Mannheimian terminology to describe Fleck’s position: he claims that Fleck is not a relativist but a relationist (see Zittel 2007, 452), but unfortunately seems to overlook the possible connection to Fleck’s contemporary Mannheim at this point. The second difference concerns Fleck’s own talk of a synthesis. Zittel sees in Fleck’s work the vision of a ‘higher standpoint’ (übergeordneter Standpunkt) (see Zittel 2007, 441) and an ‘olympic position’ (Zittel 2007, 451) that conflicts with his own claims of semantic incommensurability (see Zittel 2007, 451). I fully agree that Fleck has a problem to reconcile his strong incommensurability claims with his hope for a synthesis (see Absman’s question 4 at the end of this paper); this is, in fact, why—as I said at the beginning of my paper—I see myself more on the side of Absman and not on the side of Relman. In my opinion, Zittel’s criticism in this respect is absolutely justified. I think, however, that an adequate interpretation of Fleck’s talk of a synthesis would be on the Mannheimian lines I have outlined above: the synthesis in Fleck’s sense is supposed to be not higher than or above the conflicting standpoints but between them. Contrary to what Zittel claims (see Zittel 2007, 451), for Fleck the standpoint from which a synthesis is supposed to be possible is still relative to the thought-styles of those who try to synthesise (see also my critic of Zittel’s talk of ‘Fleck’s establishment of a universalistic science’ in footnote 82). So, although I think the relationist is wrong in this respect, the correct interpretation of a real relationist cannot work with the opposition of an absolute and a relative synthesis, since his view does not admit for such an opposition.

  72. See e.g. Fleck (1979, 21, 22, 28, 38, 39, 41, 51, 80, 101, 1986b, 98, 106, 1986c, 127, 1990a, 272), [1937] 2007, 471). Fleck's contemporary Kurt Lewin already proposed a Vergleichende Wissenschaftslehre (see e.g. Lewin ([1921] 1981). See for a recent discussion on Fleck and Lewin: Köchy (2010). Also Bloor (1986) clearly sees that Fleck wants to develop a social and comparative epistemology. However, Bloor does not notice that the comparative aspect of Fleck's epistemology is supposed to ground a scientific epistemology and, in turn, a democratic society. Especially the first unawareness is surprising since in Bloor's attempt to interpret Fleck's comparative epistemology in terms of the Strong Programme, Fleck's programme well matches the scientism of the Strong Programme (see e.g.: Barnes et al. 1996, viii).

  73. See Zittel (2007, 440 Fn. 3).

  74. For Fleck’s strong opposition to metaphysics see Fleck (1990a, 267).

  75. See e.g. Fleck (1979, 50, 76, 1986b, 81, 85, 89, 106, 107, 1990b, 253) (unfortunately this difference gets lost in the translation of Fleck (1986b), where at the crucial points the translation simply is ‘epistemology’). Fleck also speaks of a ‘science of thought-styles’ in these contexts (see Fleck 1986b, 98, 111). See in this context Mannheim’s starting question in Mannheim (1952d, 34): “Is it possible to determine the global outlook of an epoch in an objective, scientific manner?” [my italics]. See also Mannheim’s answer to the criticism of Michael Polanyi: Mannheim charges Polanyi of an unscientific criticism against his views (Mannheim 1987).

  76. Fleck (1990b, 253).

  77. Fleck (1986b, 102).

  78. Fleck (1986b, 101).

  79. See Mannheim (1946, 270).

  80. Mannheim (1952c, 224).

  81. See Bloor (1991, 7) and footnote 63 above.

  82. It seems to me that it is this idea of reflexivity that Zittel (2007, 450ff) forgets about when he speaks of Fleck’s theory of thought-styles as an universalistic science. I think that Zittel’s own very convincing interpretation of Fleck’s attempt to establish a synthesis opens up the room for such a principle of reflexivity in Bloor’s sense: in Fleck’s terms a science is dependent on thought-styles. Fleck believes—possibly incoherent I would admit—in a synthesis from within the sociology of thought that—as a science—itself is bound on thought-styles. He does not think that an independent standpoint is needed in order to achieve such a synthesis.

  83. My translation is based on the German translation after consulting Claus Zittel and Sylwia Werner.

  84. See also Fleck (1990b, 250f).

  85. See Fleck (1986b, 112): “Once such a possibility has arisen, nothing and nobody will remove it for good”. In Fleck (1979, 51) he seems to be more cautious: “Thus, once the possibility of such comparative epistemology arises, it becomes a duty to carry it out” [my italics]. It is however possible to interpret “duty” here not in a normative sense but in the sense of “cognitive necessity” (see Wasserloos, 418).

  86. This especially becomes clear in Fleck (1990b, 251).

  87. See Fleck (1986e, 153) (see also Wasserloos 2007, 425). In Fleck (1986b, 112) Fleck speaks—in a more secular terminology—of the “cultural role” of comparative epistemology.

  88. Fleck (1986e, 157).

  89. Fleck (1986b, 112).

  90. Ibid.

  91. Fleck (1986a, 54).

  92. See Fleck (1986e, 153). This conviction in the affirmatory missionary character of natural science is a difference to Mannheim. First of all it has to be noted that Fleck as well as Mannheim have a very similar description of the goals of natural science: both claim that natural scientific thought aims at general acceptance (Fleck 1986b, 103; Mannheim 1984, 80). And Mannheim explicitly calls this goal “democratic” (Mannheim 1946, 149). However, whilst Fleck seems to embrace this goal throughout, Mannheim fears that this goal—set as absolute—has the tendency to lead to impersonal quantification and abstraction, and claims in a critical manner that “the same rationalism that results in the modern, exact sciences has its parallels in the new economic system” (Mannheim 1984, 81; my translation). Moreover, for Mannheim the goal of general validity consequently leads to an epistemology that aims at absolute validity (Mannheim 1946, 149).

  93. See also e.g. Fleck (1986a, 50).

  94. Fleck (1990b, 253).

  95. Simonds (1978, 8f).

  96. See Grünwald (1982 [1934], 752).

  97. Mannheim (1946, 270; improved translation).

  98. See von Schelting (1982 [1934], 844). This, of course, basically is the same, well-known critique of the notion of incommensurability by Davidson (1984) and Putnam (1981, 113–119).

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Acknowledgments

For valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I would like to thank Richard Schantz, audiences in Münster and Bochum, where parts of the paper were presented, and two anonymous referees of JGPS. I would also like to thank Sylwia Werner and Claus Zittel for helpfully answering crucial questions about the translation of Fleck’s polish original and Rudolf Owen Müllan for turning my English into proper English. Finally, I would like to thank the „Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft “ (DFG) for supporting my work within the framework of the research project “The problem of relativism in the sociology of (scientific) knowledge” (Scha 1476/1-1).

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  1. Universität Siegen, Fakultät I/Philosophie, 57068, Siegen, Germany

    Markus Seidel

  2. Westf. Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Zentrum f. Wissenschaftstheorie, 48143, Münster, Germany

    Markus Seidel

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Seidel, M. Relativism or Relationism? A Mannheimian Interpretation of Fleck’s Claims About Relativism. J Gen Philos Sci 42, 219–240 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9163-z

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