This article mounts a defence of Floridi's theory of strongly semantic information against recent independent objections from Fetzer and Dodig-Crnkovic. It is argued that Fetzer and Dodig-Crnkovic's objections result from an adherence to a redundant practice of analysis. This leads them to fail to accept an informational pluralism, as stipulated by what will be referred to as Shannon's Principle, and the non-reductionist stance. It is demonstrated that Fetzer and Dodig-Crnkovic fail to acknowledge that Floridi's theory of strongly semantic information captures one of our deepest and most compelling intuitions regarding informativeness as a basic notion. This modal intuition will be referred to as the contingency requirement on informativeness. It will be demonstrated that its clarification validates the theory of strongly semantic information as a novel, and non ad hoc solution to the Bar-Hillel-Carnap semantic paradox. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
CITATION STYLE
Sequoiah-Grayson, S. (2007). The metaphilosophy of information. Minds and Machines, 17(3), 331–344. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-007-9072-4
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.