Abstract
A central problem in epistemology concerns the justification of beliefs about epistemic principles, i.e., principles stating which kinds of beliefs are justified and which not. It is generally regarded as circular to justify such beliefs empirically. However, some recent defenders of foundationalism have argued that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles empirically without incurring the charge of vicious circularity. The key to this position is a sharp distinction between first- and second-level justifiedness.
In this paper I first argue that such versions of foundationalism end up giving their approval to circular chains and are therefore unmotivated; if circular chains are acceptable, the classic regress argument for foundationalism does not go through. I then consider and reject two other ways in which the foundationalist might motivate his position. At the end of the paper I draw from this discussion a moral concerning the airns of epistemological theorizing.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Acock, M.: 1981, ‘Justification and Survival’, Philosophical Studies 39, 247–61.
Alston, W.: 1976, ‘Has Foundationalism Been Refuted’?, Philosophical Studies 29, 287–305.
Alston, W.: 1976, ‘Self-Warrant: A Neglected Form of Privileged Acess’, American Philosophical Quarterly 13, 257–72.
Alston, W.: 1976, ‘Two Types of Foundationalism’, The Journal of Philosophy 13, 165–85.
Alston, W.: 1980, ‘Level Confusions in Epistemology’, in P. French, T. Uehling, Jr., and H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy V: Studies in Epistemology, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 135–50.
Alston, W.: 1980, ‘Some Remarks on Chisholm's Epistemology’, Noûs 15, 165–86.
BonJour, L.: 1976, ‘The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge’, Philosophical Studies 30, 281–312.
BonJour, L.: 1978, ‘Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?’, American Philosophical Quarterly 15, 1–14.
BonJour, L.: 1980, ‘Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge’, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies V, 53–73.
Dauer, F.: 1980, ‘Hume's Skeptical Solution and the Causal Theory of Knowledge’, Philosophical Review 89, 357–78.
Foley, R.: 1978, ‘Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress’, American Philosophical Quarterly 15, 311–16.
Foley, R.: 1980, ‘Chisholm and Coherence’, Philosophical Studies 38, 53–63.
Friedman, M.: 1979, ‘Truth and Confirmation’, The Journal of Philosophy 76, 361–82.
Goldman, A. H.: 1981, ‘Epistemology and the Psychology of Perception’, American Philosophical Quarterly 18, 43–51.
Goldman, A. I.: 1979, ‘What Is Justified Belief?’ in G. S. Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 1–23.
Kenny, A.: 1967, Descartes, New York: Random House.
Lehrer, K.: 1981, ‘Self-Profile’, in R. Bogdan (ed.), Keith Lehrer, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 3–104.
Meyers, R. G.: 1981, ‘Sellars' Rejection of Foundations’, Philosophical Studies 39, 61–78.
Nathan, N. M. L.: 1980, Evidence and Assurance, Cambridge University Press.
Oakley, I. T.: 1976, ‘An Argument for Skepticism concerning Justified Belief’, American Philosophical Quarterly 13, 221–28.
Pastin, M.: 1977, ‘Review of K. Lehrer, Knowledge’, Noûs 11, 431–37.
Pollock, J.: 1979, ‘A Plethora of Epistemological Theories’, in Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge, pp. 93–113.
Post, J.: 1980, ‘Infinite Regresses of Justification and Explanation’, Philosophical Studies 38, pp. 31–52.
Schlesinger, G. N.: 1980, ‘Do We Have to Know Why We Are Justified in Our Beliefs?’, Mind 89, 370–90.
Schmitt, F.: 1981, ‘Justification as Reliable Indication or Reliable Process?’, Philosophical Studies 40, 409–17.
Sellars, W.: 1963, ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, in Science, Perception, and Reality, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 127–96.
Sellars, W.: 1975, ‘The Structure of Knowledge’, in H. Castañeda (ed.), Action, Knowledge and Reality, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, pp. 295–347.
Sellars, W.: 1979, ‘More on Givenness and Explanatory Coherence’, in Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge, 169–82.
Sosa, E.: 1980, ‘The Raft and the Pyramid’, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies V, pp. 3–25.
Sosa, E.: 1981, ‘The Foundations of Foundationalism’, Noûs 15, 547–64.
van Cleve, J.: 1979, ‘Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle’, Philosophical Review 88, 55–91.
Williams, M.: 1978, Groundless Belief, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
For comments on an earlier version of this paper, I am indebted to William Alston, Robert Audi, Hilary Kornblith, Sidney Morgenbesser, Margery Bedford Naylor and Frederick Schmitt. I have also profited from discussions with Alan Berger, Dan Hausman, Jonathan Malino, Ira Schnall, and David Wong.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Shatz, D. Foundationalism, coherentism, and the levels gambit. Synthese 55, 97–118 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485375
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485375