Moral agency in other animals

46Citations
Citations of this article
41Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text

Abstract

Some philosophers have argued that moral agency is characteristic of humans alone and that its absence from other animals justifies granting higher moral status to humans. However, human beings do not have a monopoly on moral agency, which admits of varying degrees and does not require mastery of moral principles. The view that all and only humans possess moral agency indicates our underestimation of the mental lives of other animals. Since many other animals are moral agents (to varying degrees), they are also subject to (limited) moral obligations, examples of which are provided in this paper. But, while moral agency is sufficient for significant moral status, it is by no means necessary. © Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Shapiro, P. (2006). Moral agency in other animals. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 27(4), 357–373. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-006-9010-0

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free