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Metaphorical pluralism – not on the substantive level!

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Benny Shanon
Benny Shanon
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel 91905 msshanon@pluto.mscc.huji.ac.il
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Abstract

Koriat & Goldsmith (1996t) present two different programs for memory research. Different though they are on the methodological level, on the substantive level the two programs are based on the same view, according to which memory consists of represented information that is permanently stored in the mind (or brain). This view is, I think, wrong. One can support the methodological pluralism Koriat & Goldsmith advocate, but on the substantive level pluralism is not admissible.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , February 1998 , pp. 164 - 165
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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