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On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth

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Abstract

The paper offers a new analysis of the difficulties involved in the construction of a general and substantive correspondence theory of truth and delineates a solution to these difficulties in the form of a new methodology. The central argument is inspired by Kant, and the proposed methodology is explained and justified both in general philosophical terms and by reference to a particular variant of Tarski's theory. The paper begins with general considerations on truth and correspondence and concludes with a brief outlook on the “family” of theories of truth generated by the new methodology.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, CA, 92093-0119, USA

    Gila Sher

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Sher, G. On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth. Synthese 117, 133–172 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005068021441

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