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BRENT SILBY
Contents
Abstract
Chapter 1: Introduction
1. Preliminary Thoughts
2. The Language of Thought Hypothesis
3. The Map Alternative
4. Problems with Mentalese
1. Introduction
2. Language... what's it for?
3. Natural Language as the Language of Thought
4. What can we make of the evidence?
Chapter 4: The Last Stand... Don't Replace The Old Code Yet
1. The Review
2. The Conclusion
3. Expanding the mind beyond the confines of the biological brain
References / Acknowledgments
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 3
Abstract
Language of thought theories fall primarily into two views. The first view sees
the language of thought as an innate language known as mentalese, which is
hypothesized to operate at a level below conscious awareness while at the
same time operating at a higher level than the neural events in the brain. The
second view supposes that the language of thought is not innate. Rather, the
language of thought is natural language. So, as an English speaker, my
language of thought would be English.
Introduction
Language of thought theorists claim that the mind is a device that operates
according to strict rules concerning the manipulation of symbols. Such
theorists claim that the mind is some sort of digital processor that runs on the
highly parallel neural structure of the brain. This line of thinking draws an
analogy between the mind and digital computation, and offers significant
explanatory power. There is, however, some tension between two rival
language of thought theories. One theory claims that the best candidate for
the language of thought is an innate, behind-the-scenes language known as
mentalese. The other theory states that a person's language of thought is their
native natural language—for example, English for English speakers, French for
French speakers, or Japanese for Japanese speakers. Philosophers such as
Jerry Fodor (1975) and Steven Pinker (1994) support the existence of
mentalese. According to Pinker (1994), the common-sense view is that
thought is independent of natural language. On this view natural language
would not in itself shape the human mind in any fundamental way, although
the internal mentalese thoughts being represented by the natural language
sentences would. The alternative view, which can be found in the work of Sapir
and Whorf on linguistic determinism, and in Wittgenstein's work on meaning
and representation, suggests that our thoughts are constructed from sentences
of natural language. Sapir said:
This passage shows the strength of Sapir's conviction that thoughts are
dependent on natural language. The claim is not only that speech (natural
language) shapes our thoughts, but that our thoughts themselves are not
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 5
possible without natural language. Benjamin Whorf had similar beliefs. For
Whorf, our experience of the world is one that has been organized by the
linguistic systems at work in our minds. Through the use of language, the
world is organized into the concepts and ideas that are prevalent throughout
the linguistic community to which we belong. This line of thinking looks
plausible. After all, it certainly seems as if our thinking consists largely in
sentences of natural language. Whether we are thinking aloud or internally, the
process almost always seems to involve a voice—and this voice always talks in
a natural language. Of course, merely seeming as if something is the case is
not enough to show that something is the case. It is possible that the ideas of
Sapir and Whorf are placing too much significance on the role that natural
language plays in thought. Pinker's view may in fact be correct. Our thoughts
may exist independently from natural language. After all, people who are born
deaf and cannot speak can obviously think. And what about animals such as
dogs? They cannot speak, yet some would claim that their behaviour
demonstrates fairly well developed thought processes. Don't dogs have minds?
In "The Language Instinct", Steven Pinker argues that his "common-sense"
view of thought is correct. Indeed, he believes that he "can afford to be smug
about common sense being true." Pinker claims that linguistic determinism is a
"conventional absurdity" and that thought is different from natural language
(Pinker 1994: pg 67).
I will argue that theorists such as Pinker have been too hasty in
dismissing the crucial role natural language plays in thought processes. I will
argue that we must draw a line between creatures that use natural language,
and those that do not. If we can show that language users employ a different
type of thought process, it will be possible to account for animal minds and the
minds of humans who cannot speak, while still keeping the importance of
natural language intact. In my view, natural language is essential for human
thinking and for the structure of the human mind. The argument for this thesis
is roughly as follows:
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 6
6. We can locate natural language and there is good evidence to support its
role in thinking
This argument does not imply that animals and prelinguistic humans do
not think. I am attempting to account for fully developed human thought,
which seems to be far more sophisticated and flexible than the thoughts of
animals. I think that natural language serves the purpose of restructuring the
mind in such a way as to give humans a new way of thinking.
The most obvious way for a mentalese supporter to attack the above
argument is to deny premise 3 and part of premise 6. They could say that
natural language cannot be used to explain the syntactic structure required for
thinking and that there is insufficient evidence to support its role in thought. I
will show that the mentalese theorist cannot make this move. In chapter 3, I
will provide evidence that gives us good reason to suppose that natural
language is crucially involved in thinking. Most of this evidence is based upon
introspection, and although the mentalese theorist may deny the reliability of
such evidence, I will attempt to show that it should be taken seriously. When
we introspect, we discover that our thinking is carried out in sentences of
natural language, which manifest themselves as an internal monologue, or
inner speech. Now, the mentalese supporter may claim that the inner speech
we experience must be translated into mentalese in order for thinking to take
place, but my claim is that such a view leads to an unnecessarily messy and
complicated picture of the mind. Why should a mind have to devote so much
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 8
In the next section of chapter 3, I will look again at the productive and
systematic nature of human thinking. I will provide evidence that should lead
us to believe that human thoughts do not become productive and systematic
until natural language is acquired by the individual. There seems to be a
specific stage in development at which time an infant acquires the ability to
think symbolically. It is at this stage that the infant starts to assimilate natural
language and starts to think in a distinctly human fashion. This will lead to
chapter 4 in which I look at attempts to show that mentalese can explain
certain phenomena of thought that natural language cannot explain. For
example, a mentalese supporter may explain the familiar “tip-of-the-tongue”
sensation by saying that there is difficulty translating a mentalese thought into
natural language. The idea here is that when you experience the phenomenon,
you feel like you know what you want to say but cannot find the words to
express the thought. The thought itself is perfectly formed and encoded in
something other than natural language and that is why you feel like you know
what you want to say. Mentalese theorists claim that if thinking is done in
natural language, then there would not be any translation difficulties and so
the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon would not exist. I will show that the
mentalese theorists are mistaken and that such phenomena can be explained
in terms of natural language. It could, for example, be the case that we
experience the tip-of-the-tongue sensation when we simply cannot form a
thought. The feeling that we know what we want to say, but cannot find the
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 9
words, may be the illusory result of simply not being able to figure out what
we want to say.
The final part of chapter 4 will deal with the evidence from aphasia.
People who suffer from aphasia lose some (or all) of their natural language
ability. But despite their loss of language, aphasia sufferers exhibit intelligent,
distinctly human behaviour. This seems to show that human thought is possible
without natural language, and may point to the existence of mentalese. I will
look at the case of Brother John, a periodic aphasia sufferer, and will attempt
to explain his behaviour in terms of natural language. I will attempt to show
the possibility that his mind was operating on natural language structures
below the level of consciousness. So, even though Brother John was unable to
consciously comprehend or use language, his behaviour was still guided by
natural language structures that existed below his level of awareness. To back
up this claim, I will appeal to Chomsky's (1995) model of the human language
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 10
This thesis will not show that mentalese does not exist, but it will give us
reason to conclude that natural language is a more suitable candidate for the
language of thought. My conclusion will be that since mentalese and natural
language each have significant explanatory power, the issue should be decided
by looking for the simplest explanation. Mentalese is empirically difficult to
find, and if it exists the brain must expend a significant amount of resources
supporting both it and natural language. Because both these languages offer
the same explanatory power, it is easier and cheaper to suppose that natural
language is the language of thought. Once this possibility is accepted,
researchers can devote more time to discovering the extent to which natural
language shapes the mind and thought processes.
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 11
Thinking Sentences
1: Preliminary thoughts
A further goal of this chapter will be to consider three problems with the
idea that the language of thought is innate and exists behind-the-scenes.
These problems relate to: 1) The fact that we cannot locate mentalese, or the
brain mechanisms responsible for its implementation, while at the same time
we have natural language staring us in the face boasting its ability to account
for the features of human thought that we wish to explain. 2) The problem of
accounting for the meaning of mentalese sentences. 3) The problem of
accounting for the compatibility among the brain's distinct modules. Or, in
other words, how is it possible that the brain, which evolved a piece at a time,
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 12
The language of thought hypothesis claims that when a person has a thought
such as the thought “grass is green”, the content of that thought is
represented in that person's mind by a sentence. However, according to Jerry
Fodor (1975), this sentence is not a natural language sentence like English or
Japanese. It is a sentence of an entirely different language—the innate
language of thought. The name often given to this language of thought is
mentalese. An important feature of mentalese is that it is not a language that
we have to learn through experience—rather, we are born with it (Fodor 1975:
pg 70). Furthermore, even though we are not directly aware of the language, it
underlies all of our thought processes and has a similar structure to that of any
of the natural languages. This is to say that mentalese, like English or French,
is structured according to certain rules of syntax, which determine how
sentences are to be formed in order to give them a semantic (or meaningful)
content.
computer, input received from the outside world (from a video camera say) is
converted into strings of symbols, which represent the input data. These
symbols constitute the computer's internal language and carry meaning when
structured in certain ways. According to Fodor's language of thought
hypothesis, the same is true of the mind. Input from the environment is
converted into strings of mentalese symbols, which can then be operated upon
by processes in the brain. An innate set of rules determines how sentences are
to be structured, and how they are to be manipulated. So, the content of my
thought “grass is green” is written in my brain as a string of mentalese
symbols—or in other words, a mentalese sentence. Furthermore, the basic
symbols that make up the mentalese sentence “grass is green”, are like the
words of a natural language in that their meanings remain constant (Braddon-
Mitchell and Jackson 1996: pg 164). The mentalese symbol that stands for
“grass” will always stand for “grass”, while the mentalese symbol that stands
for “green” will always stand for “green”. Now, the symbols that comprise a
computer's language of thought are implemented upon the physical on/off
switches contained in its circuitry. The brain, on the other hand, does not
simply contain on/off switches and as such, mentalese (if it exists) must
somehow be implemented upon a different type of system. Discovering the
brain's symbol system is not a straight-forward task; but according to Fodor,
one thing is certain—the brain must contain, or at least instantiate a symbol
system.
There must be mental symbols because ... only symbols have syntax, and ...
the only available theory of mental processes ... needs the picture of the mind
as a syntax-driven machine (Fodor 1990a: pg 23).
Here, Fodor is claiming that mental processes must involve the manipulation of
symbols. For Fodor, a rational mental life is best explained in terms of symbol
manipulation according to a set of well defined rules. Alternatives, such as
associationism, do not explain our ability to reason. Associationism is a
habitual system rather than a rule following system. It sees our thoughts as
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 14
sentence “Tall and tree the was green,” is not. Of course, syntax is not all that
is required of mentalese sentences. Mentalese sentences, like natural language
sentences, must also have a semantic content. That is to say they have to be
meaningful. For example, consider the following English sentences...
And...
Now, although these two sentences are structured according to the same rules,
the first one has a meaningful content while the second one is meaningless.
This is to say that the two sentences have an identical syntactic structure, but
only the first sentence has a semantic content. This is because one of the
words used in the second sentence carried a meaning that did not belong in
the context of that sentence. The use of the word “noise” made the sentence
meaningless.
I think that Romeo loves both Juliet and his pet dog.
John knows that I think that Romeo loves both Juliet and his pet dog.
I might decide that these statements are not worth worrying about:
Nobody cares that John knows that I think that Romeo loves both Juliet and
his pet dog.
ON CHILDREN (see Crane 1995: pg 140 for a similar example). A mind that
contained a “road sign” system of representation like this would not exhibit the
productivity and systematicity of thought that our minds exhibit. Such a mind
would be rigid and inflexible, and could only entertain thoughts with very
specific contents. In other words, the mind could only think thoughts whose
contents were represented by various pictures in a strict system of signs. On
the other hand, a mind that operates according to a sentential system of
representation has the ability to construct novel thoughts. The rules of syntax
give minds the ability to generate a potentially infinite number of thoughts by
directing the combination and recombination of a finite set of words.
Fodor believes that many of our thoughts evolve through this kind of
systematic reasoning and compares the process to the inferences that occur
within computational devices (Fodor 1990a: pg 22). The idea here is that the
symbols contained in the first two sentences are operated upon by a formal
rule that gives rise to the third sentence. In logic, this rule is known as modus
ponens and takes the form:
If P, then Q.
P.
Therefore: Q.
According to the language of thought theorist, our thought processes can best
be explained by the existence of this sort of process; and furthermore, the fact
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 18
discover its position relative to other cities, I am also instantly aware of its
approximate size, its shape, the fact that it sits above sea-level, and so on and
so forth. All this information is connected and present in a very small portion of
a geographical map and is instantly available if required.
could scan the globe an infinite number of times and see these cities in an
infinite number of combinations. Furthermore, I could also carry out any one of
these scans in reverse.
The map story can also be used to account for the way in which thoughts
seem to evolve over time. This process can occur by blending two maps
together, or by updating an existing map as new information arrives. A useful
way to imagine this process is to imagine superimposing a meteorological map
over the top of a geographic map, and then continually updating the
meteorological map as new weather information arrives. A map that behaves
in this way would evolve according to new data and a set of rules that defines
how the new data should be incorporated into the existing map. Map M2 at
time T2 is a product that has arisen from map M1 + input data D1 at time T1
according to updating rules. Since this process is hypothesized to occur
according to specific formal rules, we can use it as a possible explanation for
our ability to reason. We could suppose that there are rules that correspond to
the formal rules of logic that we use to operate on sentential structures. So in
a map-like system of thought, there is a rule that is analogous to modus
ponens and is responsible for the appropriate transformations of mental maps.
without thinking about how much free space there is. This seems to be more
like the way we think.
Another problem with the map story is that it is difficult to see how a
map-like system could represent complex thoughts, or thoughts that contain a
negation. Consider, for example, the English sentence:
It is not raining.
How could one represent this sentence as a map? A weather map may depict
the fact that it is not raining by having no “rain” pictures over the city, but this
method would not capture the meaning of the English sentence “It is not
raining”. The map represents the absence of rain by the absence of a “rain”
symbol, but to carry the meaning “It is not raining”, the map must somehow
represent “rain” and attach a negation to that representation. I think that this
could only be achieved through the combination of a map and a sentence. A
map that does not contain any “rain” symbols is not representing the
proposition that “It is not raining”; it is merely representing a city with no
extra features. Nothing is included that tells us anything about rain.
The major objection to the map theory is that it fails to account for our
systems of belief and the fact that we often fail to connect our beliefs together
correctly. Consider the following example: Jane believes that Fred has two
children but does not have the belief that the number of Fred's children is the
smallest prime (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996: pg 191). According to the
map story, however, all the information relating to the number two is
connected, so Jane should believe that the number of Fred's children is the
smallest prime. Because of the connectedness of information in maps, the
map-story requires that if Jane believes that P, and if P implies Q, then Jane
believes that Q. Sentential systems of thought, on the other hand, do not have
this requirement and can account for Jane's not having the belief that the
number of Fred's children is the smallest prime. The sentence “Fred has two
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 22
children” can be written in Jane's head without the sentence “The number of
Fred's children is the smallest prime” also being in there (Braddon-Mitchell and
Jackson 1996: pg 193). Of course, with all the appropriate information, Jane
could easily generate a sentence, and hence a belief, about the number of
Fred's children being the smallest prime, but this does not have to happen.
Here's another example: Suppose Jane believes that Fred lives in Christchurch
city. Now, it happens to be the case that if Fred lives in Christchurch he will
have to travel north to visit Auckland city. If Jane represents her beliefs in a
map-like way she should believe that Fred must travel north to go to Auckland.
This is because all the appropriate information is contained in a mental map,
and is available simultaneously. But clearly this is not the way humans form
beliefs. It is possible that Jane could believe that Fred lives in Christchurch and
even believe that Auckland is north of Christchurch without ever forming the
belief that Fred must travel north to get to Auckland. Her beliefs offer the
possibility of making that inference, but the inference may never be made.
The first problem I shall address relates to the notion of syntax. This problem
is quite simple and can be expressed by one question. Where are the
mentalese words? When we think in sentences of natural language we can
point to words and see very clearly how these words connect to other words in
order to yield meaningful sentences. Mentalese words, on the other hand, are
not so easy to track down. For a start, they cannot be discovered through
introspection because mentalese is a “behind the scenes” language of thought.
When we introspect, the only language we are aware of is natural language.
The constant chatter of our internal monologue is with us virtually all the time,
and while we can certainly identify syntax within its sentence structures, this
internal speech is as removed from mentalese as the English words on my
computer screen are removed from the computer's internal programming
language. So, we cannot look for mentalese through introspection. Of course,
this fact should not bother a mentalese supporter. Mentalese, like many of the
brain's functions, is hidden from conscious awareness and the fact that we are
only consciously aware of natural language does not have any impact on the
existence (or not) of mentalese. In keeping with the computer analogy, we
have to remember that we cannot look at a word processor display screen in
order to discover a computer's internal language of thought. But, on the other
hand, we can look inside a computer's hardware to discover its binary
language of thought. We can do this by examining the multitude of physical
on/off switches contained within its circuitry. A digital computer's circuitry is a
structured system that has regularities. In other words, it is possible to point
to its internal states and identify the way in which syntax is implemented in
those states. The same does not seem to be true of the brain. The brain is a
messy collection of interconnected neurons that do not appear to have a
syntactic structure at all. The point I am trying to establish here is that so far it
has not been possible to identify a mechanism by which mentalese syntax is
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 24
implemented in the low level neural structure of the brain. It is worth noting
here that a mentalese supporter could reply to this objection by pointing out
that natural language cannot be specifically located in the neural structure of
the brain, but that it clearly exists. Their point would be that we should not
dismiss the existence of mentalese just because neuroscience cannot fully
describe its implementation in the brain. I think the mentalese supporter would
be right in making this comment. Mentalese, after all, is supposed to be a high
level language which is an abstraction away from the neurological events that
underpin its workings, while at the same time remaining somewhere at the
subpersonal level. So the question as to whether a mentalese implementation
mechanism exists should remain open until some evidence can be found to
give us a firm answer.
However, in the next chapter I will suggest that since we have evidence
for the existence of natural language, and since natural language can be used
to explain our thinking, it may not be necessary to evoke an “invisible”
mentalese. When we consider our introspective experience, it certainly seems
to be the case that our thinking is being done in natural language. It could be
that natural language offers us the simplest explanation of human thought. In
light of this possibility I think we should postpone our search for mentalese
and concentrate on discovering the way in which natural language is
implemented in the brain.
Let us suppose for now that syntactic structures do exist in the brain. The next
question we need to ask relates to the meaning of mentalese sentences.
Unfortunately this question leads to a problem. When we ask where the
meaning of a mentalese sentence comes from, we find that explanations are
either regressive or head in an unnecessary direction. This is to say that on the
one hand, an explanation of where mentalese gets its meaning might appeal to
some other language that itself needs to be explained, or on the other hand,
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 25
Perhaps mentalese sentences get their meaning from the way they are
used and understood by something else—something deeper. We could suggest
that spoken or written sentences of natural language get their meanings from
the way in which we use them, and the mentalese sentences that those
thoughts were originally formed in have their meanings in virtue of being used
and understood by some other system deep within the brain. This other
system may operate according to its own internal language; say “sub-
mentalese”. But this leads to a problem. That is, we must now discover where
the meaning of the sub-mentalese sentences lies. What part of the brain
understands sub-mentalese? It would be pointless to appeal to yet another
system that uses its own inner language such as “deep-mentalese”, because
that would simply push the problem down to another level. Continuing this
process would lead to a regress of systems and languages, and would not
answer any questions. If “deep-mentalese” has meaning, then why can it not
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 26
be the case that mentalese has meaning (Sterelny 1990: pg 32). Why can we
not simply state that mentalese is the most basic language, and that a
multitude of mentalese sentences constitutes thought and higher-level
meaning? Consider the way in which Fodor explains how mentalese symbols
are used. Fodor supposes that the “shape” of mentalese symbols determines
how they might causally interact with each other (Fodor 1987: pg 18). For
Fodor, the mind is a computational device and its syntactic operations can be
explained in the same way that a computer's internal operations should be
understood. Such operations consist in the transformations of strings of
symbols. The processes involved in manipulating symbols are concerned only
with the “shape” of the symbols, not the meaning. In effect, these processes
can be understood in much the same way as we understand how the shape of
a key determines which lock it will open (Fodor 1987: pg 19). A mentalese
symbol may only be operated upon by processes that can “latch on” to its
shape. According to this account there is no question as to what it is in the
brain that understands mentalese, or where the meaning of mentalese
sentences come from. Instead we view mental operation as a brute mechanical
process in which the problem of meaning does not exist. Viewing mental
operation in this way can get us passed the problem of meaning, but it leaves
open the following question: if Fodor is right, and if it is possible for us to
understand meaning and thought in terms of mentalese symbols being
operated upon by processes that can lock on to their shapes, then why can we
not simply explain thought in terms of natural language? Natural language
contains symbols that can be manipulated by mechanical processes, and if it is
possible to explain thought and meaning in terms of brute mechanical symbol
manipulation, then natural language should offer as much explanatory power
as mentalese.
certain specifications, and once it has been successfully built, it will carry out
its specified tasks with no intervention from the design team. Of course, the
design team will usually include a facility by which new hardware can be easily
added to the system just in-case future tasks require additional tools. This new
hardware will be designed by engineers who have knowledge of the original
system design so that the additional components can be integrated into the
system without the need of changing the original design specifications.
Computer engineers will ensure that the original system and its peripheral add-
ons all share the ability to communicate with each other through a common
language. In other words, the hardware will be compatible. This engineering
strategy works very well for computers, but the brain was not designed in this
way. In fact the brain was not designed at all and it certainly did not appear as
a complete unit. According to theorists such as Cosmides (1989), the modern
human brain had its origins as a much smaller device, which was a collection of
self contained modules, each responsible for its own specific task. For example,
there may have been a module that was dedicated to regulating cardiovascular
activity, while another module may have been dedicated to processing visual
stimuli. These modules were only able to carry out their specified tasks and
could not be utilized for any new tasks. As time passed, the process of natural
selection gave rise to new “purpose built” modules that were added to the
existing brain. These add-ons served new purposes and may have had the
ability to communicate information to other parts of the brain.
5: Where to next?
I have shown that the innate language of thought hypothesis has difficulties
that are not easily solved. Such difficulties occur when we attempt to locate
the syntax and semantics of thought. There seems to be no way of locating
mentalese (or its implementation) in the brain. On top of those difficulties, we
have the question of how the brain, which evolved gradually over millions of
years, could end up with a system-wide, innate operational language of
thought.
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 29
Having agreed with Fodor's claim that our thinking must involve
sentential operations I will, in the next chapter, consider the possibility that
natural language, rather than mentalese, is the language of thought. After
examining evidence for this possibility, I will move on, in chapter 4, to discuss
objections and arguments that have been put forward against the claim that
natural language is the language of thought.
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 30
1: Introduction
So, we cannot be entirely certain that people like Ildefonso do, in fact,
lack language. Their systems of signs may not conform to any of the standard
sign languages, but they seem to be languages nonetheless. These languages
involve a consistent syntax and can be learned by people who are exposed to
them.
Showing that natural language is the language of thought is a big topic and will
have to span two chapters. The goal of this chapter is to establish that thinking
is done in natural language. To start, I will spend some time highlighting a
distinction between the two roles that language plays—its role in
communication and its role in thinking. This will be followed by a three part
defense of the claim that thinking is done in natural language. First, I will
consider introspection, which provides us with very strong evidence in support
of the claim that natural language is crucial for thought. Second, I will consider
evidence from cases of psychological development in the absence of language.
In particular, I will focus on Helen Keller, whose disability meant that she could
not acquire language until she was about seven years old. The third part of my
defense will appeal to the nature of human thought. Evidence shows that
human thought has features that animal thoughts do not have. Furthermore,
these features can only be explained in terms of language. The work in this
chapter will lead to chapter 4, in which I elucidate and examine arguments
that have been put forward to show that thinking is independent of natural
language.
Peter Carruthers (1996) categorizes two distinct roles that language plays—the
communicative role and the cognitive role. This is a useful distinction because
it allows us to isolate the specific function of language that we wish to talk
about. Carruthers believes that the most important role language plays is its
cognitive role—that is, the function it plays in thought. As I will make clear in
this chapter, I agree with Carruthers that language plays an important role in
thinking, but at the same time, I do not think the cognitive role could exist
without the communicative role. This is to say that language cannot serve its
function as a cognitive device without simultaneously serving the function of a
communicative device. I will say more about this later, but first I will briefly
describe these two conceptions of the function of language.
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 33
This is the role that language plays in communication. To say that language
has a communicative function is to say that it has an interpersonal use.
Language is used for the transmission and reception of information among
individuals in the language using community. This activity allows groups of
language users to exchange thoughts and work collectively. It is important,
however, not to confuse the complex communication that language enables
with the basic signaling systems that are in use by other animals. Animals
have been communicating simple messages to each other for millions of years
but natural language is quite a recent development. It emerged sometime
within the last 2 million years. Before this time, the vocalizations of the
primates were nothing more than simple signaling devices, which were used to
mark territory, warn others of danger, attract mates, and so on. There was no
flexibility in the cries of the early hominids, and as such, novel events could
not be identified by new vocalizations or by constructing combinations of the
existing signals. Michael Corballis (1999) conjectures that the remnants of our
ancestral signaling systems still exist in our behaviour today. For Corballis,
laughing, screaming and crying are some examples of signals that may once
have been used to convey very specific information.
given rise to a cognitive function. Dennett claims that language may have
facilitated the communication between previously unconnected modules of the
brain thus enabling more complex thought processes. This effect occurred
when our ancestors accidentally started communicating to each other through
primitive grunts. If an individual needed help making a stone knife, he or she
would have uttered a sound signifying that assistance was required. The sound
may have been heard by someone else and, upon entering their brain,
triggered a “knife making” mechanism, which caused that person to carry out
knife making activities. If no-one else was around, the cry for help would only
have been heard by the individual who uttered it. The sound would enter that
human's own brain and trigger its own “knife making” mechanism. Dennett
suggests that as the ages passed, a neural link emerged that connected the
vocal production center directly to the auditory system. This gave rise to the
inner speech that we all experience, and was responsible for the exponential
increase in human cognitive capacities.
Peter Carruthers (1996: pg 192) thinks that Dennett's proposal does not
accurately capture the phenomenology of inner speech. He thinks that if our
inner speech were being used solely for the communication between the
brain's otherwise unconnected modules, our inner speech would simply consist
in something like a continual question and answer dialogue. Clearly, says
Carruthers, this is not the case. Despite this objection, I think Dennett's
suggestion is plausible. We often find our inner speech slipping out into the
world when we think out loud. This occurs especially when we are carrying out
complex tasks, or thinking through difficult problems. We guide ourselves
through certain tasks by means of an external (but more often internal)
monologue. My answer to Carruthers' objection is that questions are not all
that is required to illicit responses from other modules in the brain. A single
word can trigger a multitude of comments from within the brain giving rise to a
rich internal monologue.
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 37
The rest of this chapter will focus on the role that language plays in cognition.
I have already suggested that much of our thinking is carried out in natural
language. Moreover, I think that for modern humans, one of the crucial roles of
natural language is the role it plays as a medium for thinking. I will now launch
a defense of this idea.
The most immediate evidence that suggests a role for natural language in
thinking comes from introspection. When we turn our attention inwards, we
become aware that our thoughts are being formed in sentences of natural
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 38
Sometimes our inner speech slips out into the environment when we
think aloud. We see this in children who usually accompany their play with a
spoken monologue. Observations of children provides evidence that speaking is
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 39
not always for communication. Young children engage in what Jean Piaget
(1932) calls egocentric speech.
Egocentric functions are the more immature functions, and tend to dominate
the verbal productions of children 3-7 years of age, and, to a lesser extent,
children 7-12 years. In this form of speech, a child does not bother to know to
whom he is speaking nor whether he is being listened to. He talks either for
himself or for the pleasure of associating anyone who happens to be there with
the activity of the moment. This talk is egocentric, partly because the child
speaks only about himself, but chiefly because he does not attempt to place
himself at the point of view of his hearer. Anyone who happens to be there will
serve as an audience. (Piaget 1932: pg 9).
mentalese. Furthermore, if natural language was not being used for our
reasoning, and if mentalese processes were completely non-conscious, then
wouldn't we simply find ourselves carrying out actions that had been decided
by behind the scenes processes? Obviously, the simple answer to this last point
is that sometimes we do simply find ourselves carrying out actions that have
been deployed by non-conscious processes. Just go for a walk and you will
notice that a great deal of complex actions are being set in motion by non-
conscious activity. However, we have to remember that the existence of such
activity does not entail the existence of mentalese. Operations such as walking
may involve non-sentential mechanisms while our intellectual, or reasoning
abilities involve natural language. Situations in which we find ourselves
carrying out intelligent, reasoned activities without any awareness of the
reasoning involved may involve natural language structures that are either not
present in consciousness, or are not stored in memory.
especially when we consider the possibility that the entire process could be
carried out in either mentalese or natural language without the need of any
translation. Furthermore, consider the speed at which we apprehend the
utterances of others. If the speech of others needed to be translated into
mentalese before being understood, we might expect some delays to occur
when parsing certain long sentences. But there are no such delays. We
understand spoken sentences of our native language in real time—as we hear
them. We also seem to be able to speak our thoughts aloud as we think them;
and of course we appear to understand our own thoughts as we speak them
(internally or externally) with no delays. If thinking was done in mentalese and
then translated into natural language to be either heard as an internal
monologue or spoken aloud, before being translated back into mentalese to be
examined and understood by other parts of the brain, we would expect delays
to occur in thinking. But our thinking seems to occur in real time without any
lag behind.
too deeply into their physical origins. In this way, we can speak of a system
wide language of thought without having to worry about the physical
implementation problems. This would leave us with the question as to whether
mentalese or natural language is the language of thought and bring us back to
the evidence of introspection, which leads us to believe that we think in natural
language.
There are further reasons for believing that natural language plays a vital
role in human thinking. Examples of humans who have been deprived of
language offer us compelling evidence to support the claim that thinking is
done in natural language.
There are many documented cases of children who have been denied access to
language. Malson refers to these children as "wolf children", and lists 53
recorded cases (pg 81-82 of his 1964). In most of these cases the
psychological development of the child is severely impaired; and furthermore,
in extreme cases the child's behaviour indicates thought processes that are no
more sophisticated than those of non-linguistic animals (see Malson 1964 for
several specific examples). Interestingly, however, these children often start to
develop normally after they have been exposed to language. For example; a
child named Genie was discovered in the 1970's when she was 13 years old. At
that time she had a mental age of about 2 years and could not speak. She had
spent her entire life locked in a small room with minimal human contact. In
fact, the only time she ever saw another human was when her father or
brother brought her food—and they never spoke to her. Despite her
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 44
Helen Keller lost her sight and hearing between the ages of 1 and 2
years. Being both blind and deaf, Keller was not able to acquire language in the
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 45
normal fashion. She remained a languageless being until the age of 7, at which
time she was taught to use a language of touch. This was achieved by her
teacher repetitively exposing Keller to an object (water, for example), and then
spelling the name of the object by tracing symbols onto her hand. Eventually
Keller managed to master her language of touch and went on to write books
about her experiences both before and after learning language. One of the
points that becomes clear in Keller's writings is her belief that language plays
an essential role in her thinking. She seems to believe that she did not exist as
a thinking being before becoming a language user.
Before my teacher came to me, I did not know that I am. I lived in a world
that was a no-world. I cannot hope to describe adequately that unconscious,
yet conscious time of nothingness. I did not know that I knew aught, or that I
lived or acted or desired. I had neither will nor intellect (Keller 1909: pg141).
speech", which took the form of a feeling of words being spelled out into her
hand. Thus, it seems that her private thinking was carried out in terms of her
language of touch. Indeed, Keller says that if she were to construct a person,
she would "put the brain and soul in his finger tips".
It is unfortunate that Keller does not describe the onset of her inner
speech. Our inner speech seems to develop over time as we progress through
our early childhood. It has its beginnings as an external monologue and
becomes internalized as time goes by. It would be interesting to find out if
Keller ever went through a developmental stage in which she physically traced
words onto her own hand before developing the ability to do it all internally. If
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 47
My reply to this is to emphasize the fact that Keller can recall absolutely
no experience of being a unified thinking thing before acquiring language. I
cannot remember events from the 15th of October 1977, but I can remember
other experiences that go all the way back to when I was about 3 years old.
Keller's experiences as a thinking thing only go back to her age of 7 years.
What took place before that she describes as a "nothingness". However, she
also describes her pre-linguistic behaviour as instinctual. I think Keller has
retained some sort of tactile memory of events that took place before
language, but she was not in control of those events. Describing her behaviour
as instinctual may be a result of remembering her pre-linguistic states in terms
of language. Perhaps as she moved around and lived in a reflexive, non
thinking way, languageless memories were formed. Accessing those memories
later (with the benefit of language) gives Keller the unique insight into knowing
what it is like to be running on “automatic pilot” with no thought guiding her
actions. So when Keller talks about a time of "nothingness", she is
remembering an absence of linguistic thought. This is not the same as my
failing to remember anything about my state in 1977.
Recall from Chapter 2 that our thoughts exhibit features of productivity and
systematicity. Briefly, to say that thought is productive is to say that by
applying certain rules to existing thoughts, a person can generate new
thoughts. To say that thought is systematic is to say that thoughts are
composed of symbols that can be systematically rearranged in order to form
new thoughts with different meanings. So, if a person can entertain a thought
of the form a loves b, then that person is also capable of thinking b loves a.
Fodor believes that these features of thought should be explained by appealing
to an innate language of thought, which he calls mentalese. This is because he
believes that only language can account for the productivity and systematicity
of thought. I agree with Fodor that language is the only way to explain the
nature of our thoughts, but I do not agree that mentalese is the right language
to use. This is because our thoughts do not become productive and systematic
until we acquire a natural language. If Fodor's mentalese hypothesis was
correct, we would expect to find that the thoughts of pre-linguistic humans
share the productive and systematic properties of fully developed human
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 50
thought. Indeed, one of the reasons for positing mentalese rather than natural
language as the language of thought was to account for the thoughts of infant
humans and non-human animals (Fodor 1975: pp 56-58). Fodor thinks that
productive and systematic thought is required for infants to learn natural
language through forming hypotheses about the meanings of words and then
testing those hypotheses. But experimental evidence shows that animal and
infant human thoughts are not productive or systematic (Garfield 1997: pg
429). This is not to say that animals and infants do not think; it is simply to
say that their thoughts are different. It could be that natural language provides
a new way of thinking for humans once they reach a certain stage of
development (Harman 1973). Jean Piaget's work with human children shows
that there is a specific stage in development at which time children acquire a
symbolic system of representation. This is important because (as we saw in
chapter 2) symbols are required to produce productive and systematic
thoughts. Piaget characterized four stages of cognitive development that all
children go through. The first of these stages—the sensory-motor stage—is of
relevance here.
During the sensory-motor stage, which lasts from birth until about the
age of 2, the infant's cognitive system starts off as being limited to motor
reflexes. The child's thoughts are primitive and consist in the simple
coordination of sensory information with bodily movements. According to
Piaget, as development continues, the child eventually makes its first big jump
in cognitive ability and acquires object permanence. This is the realization that
objects continue to exist even when they are moved out of sight. Piaget
observed that before reaching this stage of development, children act as if
objects do not exist when they are not being perceived (Piaget 1953: pg 211
and Piaget 1983: pg 104). A child may be very interested in looking at a toy,
but if the toy is then hidden behind a piece of paper (while the child watches),
the child will not move the paper to find the toy. However, once the object
permanence stage of development is reached (between 3 months and 1 year
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 51
according to recent research; see Baillargeon 1991), the child understands that
objects continue to exist and will seek out hidden objects. For Piaget, object
permanence is a crucial stage of development because it marks the beginning
of symbolic thought. It is at this time that infants can hold concepts in mind
and can start to consistently use specific words to represent specific objects.
This leads to an explosion of symbolic language usage and the subsequent
restructuring of thought processes that give rise to productive and systematic
thinking.
In this chapter I have provided reasons for supposing that thinking is done in
natural language. The evidence in support of the claim that thinking is done in
natural language came primarily from three sources—introspection,
psychological development, and the nature of our thoughts. In the case of
introspection, we find ourselves describing our thinking in terms of sentences
of natural language. If someone asks us what we are thinking, our expression
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 53
of the thought is the same as our inner experience of that thought. Whether
we are thinking internally or externally, the thinking always involves natural
language mechanisms. Helen Keller's introspective testimony also serves to
show us that thinking is done in natural language. Her psychological
development was severely impaired until she managed to acquire her language
of touch. Furthermore, she reported that before learning to use language, she
was not a thinking thing and experienced no will or intellect.
The evidence from the nature of our thoughts shows that the productive
and systematic aspects of our thinking require symbolic representations. Young
children do not have symbolic systems of representation and so do not have
productive and systematic thoughts. However, when infants acquire the ability
to symbolically represent things to themselves, they quickly learn language.
The syntactic rules of language then re-organizes their minds and gives rise to
productive and systematic thoughts. Experiments with artificial neural
networks show that this process works in practice. Networks with no
productive or systematic abilities have been designed to acquire language. As
these networks acquire a language, their operational processes become
increasingly productive and systematic—just like a human mind.
Although this chapter has provided good reasons for believing that
natural language is the language of thought, the issue is not yet closed. In the
next chapter I will consider arguments that have been put forward to deny the
role natural language plays in thinking. Arguments against the role natural
language plays in thinking are intuitive and are designed to convince us that
mentalese is the required language of thought. It will be my task to show that
these arguments can be answered in a manner consistent with the hypothesis
that natural language is the language of thought.
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 54
2: Pinker's Resistance
One of the major themes in the early chapters of Steven Pinker's book "The
Language Instinct" is the battle between natural language and mentalese as
the language of thought. Pinker, as I stated earlier, champions the thesis that
mentalese is the language of thought and argues forcefully against the
hypothesis that natural language is the language of thought. In the following
passage, Pinker raises several problems for claim that thinking occurs in
natural language:
We have all had the experience of uttering or writing a sentence, then stopping
and realizing that it wasn't exactly what we meant to say. To have that feeling,
there has to be a “what we meant to say” that is different from what we said.
Sometimes it is not easy to find any words that properly convey a thought.
When we hear or read, we usually remember the gist, not the exact words, so
there has to be such a thing as a gist that is not the same as a bunch of
words. And if thoughts depend on words, how could a new word ever be
coined? (Pinker 1994: pg 57-58).
There are several good points contained in this passage, and collectively they
pose a threat to the idea that natural language is the language of thought.
Because of this threat, Pinker thinks that thinking cannot be done in natural
language and sentences of natural language must be translations of thoughts
that exist in some other medium, which is probably mentalese. Before
proceeding, I must note that Pinker's threat does nothing to show that thinking
must be carried out in mentalese. In the above passage, Pinker is attempting
to show us that thinking cannot be done in natural language. But even if he
succeeds in convincing us that this is true, the problems he points to cannot
convince us that thinking must therefore be carried out in mentalese. There
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 56
the form of mentalese) and there is a difficulty in translating the thought into
natural language. Pinker thinks that if thinking is done in natural language we
would not expect to have the feeling that there is a word we need to use in
order to express an independently existing thought, yet cannot find that word.
By the way, the object defined above was a sextant.
what we were going to say but then suddenly forgot. The frustrating feeling
that follows may be brought about by our efforts to retrieve the original
sentence. This may be similar to the tip-of-the-tongue sensation one
experiences when trying to remember the name of a familiar face. In such
cases one has forgotten the name of a familiar person, but also knows that in
the past the name was always instantly available. It is the effort to remember
the person's name that gives rise to the phenomenon. Another possibility is
that these experiences may occur when one has a mental image that is not
easy to describe in words; like an image from a disjointed illogical dream. Or, it
could simply be the case that our supposed difficulty expressing a thought
occurs because we actually have no thought to express. We may want to have
an answer to a question or an opinion on a topic, but we don't, and we will not
admit to ourselves that we don't. So we try to form a thought—any thought—
that is relevant to the topic in question. Our failure to form such a thought
results in the annoying tip-of-the-tongue experience. Possibilities such as these
show us that the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon does not give us sufficient
reason to deny that thinking is done in natural language. It certainly gives us
no reason to suppose that mentalese is a required medium of thought.
not what I wanted to say shows that there must have been a thought that I did
want to say, and that thought was independent of my natural language
utterance.
Sigmund Freud tried to explain our slips of the tongue by suggesting that
they are caused by our unconscious thoughts and desires. For Freud, our
unconscious intentions, or wishes, somehow manage to push themselves to
the surface to be revealed in normal conversation (Freud 1940: pg 284). I do
not want to debate the plausibility of Freudian psychology, but I do think his
account of the slip-of-the-tongue can help show that the phenomenon can be
explained in terms of natural language, without the need of evoking
mentalese. Notice that in most instances of slips of the tongue, the accidental
word is related to the sentence. Freud explained this by saying that the person
is unconsciously thinking a related thought. In light of this suggestion, I think
it is possible to explain the above case by suggesting that the thought I
expressed was incorrect and I became aware of my inaccurate thought
moments after I expressed it. It is possible that my thought “that woman's
hair isn't really that light”, which is what I wanted to say, was somehow
accompanied by, or caused by the related thought “that woman's hair is really
dark”, which is also what I wanted to say. Somehow these thoughts merged
during deployment and gave rise to the incorrect statement “that woman's hair
isn't really that dark”. Then, as I heard my expression, I noticed that it did not
match the features contained in my visual field and so I issued a correction. It
may be the case that instances of slips of the tongue point to multiple streams
of thought, most of which remain outside of consciousness. But it is important
to realize that the existence of non-conscious thinking does not entail the
existence of mentalese. As I will suggest later, it is possible that our non-
conscious thinking also involves natural language structures (see the section
on Brother John).
will now move on to the next part of Pinker's attack against natural language
as the language of thought.
(2) We usually remember the gist of what is said and not the exact words.
For Pinker, the so-called “gist” of a statement differs from sentences of natural
language. This is because we usually do not remember the thoughts of other
people exactly as they communicate them to us—rather, we remember roughly
what they said, or the “gist” of what they said. Does this show that the “gist”
of a thought is stored as a hidden sentence of mentalese? Or is there some
other way to explain the “gist” of what we hear and read?
It is true that we usually do not remember what other people have told
us in exactly the same words that they have used, but this does not refute that
claim that thinking is done in natural language. Pinker says that the gist of
what is said must be something different from a bunch of words, but I do not
agree. I think it is possible that the gist of a sentence is a sentence itself. If I
think about the gist of a natural language sentence I have heard, the thinking
of that gist is done in natural language. It may not be the same sentence that
I originally heard, but it is still a sentence (perhaps with a slightly altered
meaning). It could be that as I hear the utterances of other people, my mind
alters the utterances in order to store them in the most efficient way possible.
The result of this would be the formation of slightly different sentences that
constitute roughly the same idea as the original sentences.
ability shows that our thoughts have a meaning independent of our natural
language formulations of them. However, there is a problem associated with
this line of reasoning (Cole 1999). Saying that two different natural language
sentences have the same meaning in virtue of there being an underlying gist
to them, leads to a regress. This occurs when we attempt to account for the
meaning of the gist. We may be led to believe that the gist is a mentalese
sentence, but then we have to explain the likeness in meaning between these
gists and their natural language counterparts. How should we explain that?
Perhaps we could say that they both have the same “vibe”; but then a regress
ensues when we try to account for that vibe. We can avoid these problems by
not thinking of the gist as a mysterious, hidden mentalese encoding of a
natural language sentence. Instead, the gist of a sentence could more
accurately be thought of as a different sentence that we store in an attempt to
remember a thought in the most efficient way possible.
(3) If thoughts depend on words, how could a new word ever be coined?
Pinker seems to think that new words are invented in order to express new
thoughts that are formed in mentalese. He thinks that if thought was
dependent on words of natural language, then new words would never appear
because there would be no new thoughts that needed to be expressed with
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 63
new words. All of our thoughts would already be formed in words and so new
words would not be necessary.
Sometimes words and catch phrases are coined simply because of the
way they sound (Cole 1999). An example of such a phrase is Rock `n' Roll.
This catch phrase is only remotely descriptive of the way in which people
danced while listening to the contemporary music of the 1950's and 60's. The
reason it caught on was because of its use of alliteration. It sounds good and
its easy to say. It is difficult to see how a phrase like “rock `n' roll” could have
been coined if thinking was done in mentalese. Mentalese does not contain the
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 64
letter “R” and so there seems little reason for a mentalese sentence that
corresponds to “rock `n' roll” to form. Why would a mind put these two words
together? If natural language sentences are just a translation of mentalese
thoughts, we would not expect to find catch phrases that rely on alliteration.
As far as the mentalese thought would be concerned, the phrase ”rock `n' roll”
could mean “stone `n' tumble”, and it is hard to imagine that a mind would
think this thought when thinking about a musical genre. The only reason the
words “rock `n' roll” were put together was because of their appeal in natural
language.
Now that the preliminary objections have been addressed, I will move to
the next section in which I will consider Pinker's further objections.
Pinker offers further reasons that are supposed to convince us that thinking
cannot be done in natural language. These are (1) the problem of ambiguity,
(2) the problem of logical inexplicitness, (3) the fact that Einstein thought in
visual images rather than words, and (4) evidence from aphasia. I will tackle
these one at a time and will show that they offer no serious threat to natural
language theories of thought.
This problem points to the fact that many words have more than one meaning,
and sentences that contain such words are often ambiguous. An example that
is often cited is the sentence: Jane is at the bank. The ambiguity in this
sentence occurs because of the word “bank”. We could take this sentence to
mean one of two things—either Jane is at a financial institution, or Jane is at
the edge of a river. Pinker (1994: pg 79) lists several newspaper headlines that
happen to contain an ambiguous word, and claims that the thoughts
underlying these words were not ambiguous even though their natural
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 65
language counterparts are. He then suggests that since there can be more
than one thought corresponding to a specific sentence, thoughts cannot be
words (Pinker 1994: pg 79). So, on Pinker's account, if Jane is adding money
to her account, my thought that “Jane is at the bank” has a definite meaning,
which is determined by a mentalese sentence, and is distinct from my
ambiguous natural language utterance “Jane is at the bank”.
also be ambiguous for exactly the same reason. The only way a mentalese
theorist could deny this possibility would be to say that mentalese has a
separate word for each and every object and concept. So there is a mentalese
word that only means “financial institution” and a mentalese word that only
means “the edge of a river”. But we have to be skeptical of the idea that
mentalese can have, built into it, a word for every concept and object because
if it did, then it would seem that the ancient human mind contained concepts
such as “deep space travel”, “computer” or “radio waves” long before these
things were discovered or invented—surely this is implausible.
Here Pinker claims that natural languages such as English sometimes lack
logical explicitness. He shows this by drawing on an example from computer
scientist Drew McDermott:
Ralph is an elephant.
Elephants live in Africa.
Elephants have tusks.
Now, we can deduce from these simple statements that Ralph lives in Africa
and Ralph has tusks. We also realize that Ralph lives in the same Africa as the
other elephants, and that Ralph has his own tusks, which he does not share
with any other elephants. But, the problem is that there is nothing in the
natural language statements above to imply that all elephants don't share one
set of tusks. Nor is there anything in the natural language statements to imply
that all elephants live in the same Africa.
Worded in this way, these sentences are logically explicit and cannot be
confused. The point I am trying to make here is that an isolated thought such
as “elephants have tusks” is connected in some way to a background pool of
knowledge and beliefs, all of which involve natural language. Moreover, when I
think the thought “elephants have tusks”, the thought is logically explicit
because it induces a mental image of one or more elephants with tusks. As the
image is mentally scrutinized, the tusks are noticed and labeled in natural
language thus making the thought logically explicit. This is not to say that
sentences are always accompanied by images, but it does offer one way in
which a sentence can become logically explicit. In the section on Einstein
coming up, I will show that there is no problem with allowing that thoughts can
involve mental images with natural language sentences attached to them.
Having provided answers to the above problems, I will now consider the
case of Einstein and the case of Brother John. Both of these people provide us
with introspective testimony that could be construed as showing that thinking
is possible without natural language. It will be my task to offer an alternative
explanation of the evidence these cases provide.
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 69
Pinker (1994: pg 71) points out that Albert Einstein claimed to think in terms
of visual images. In fact, Einstein's theories of general and special relativity
have their origins in the manipulation of visual imagery. Einstein began his
theorizing by imagining what things would look like if he was traveling on a
beam of light. Pinker believes that Einstein's case offers us evidence that our
thinking can be carried out without natural language; but, as I will explain, I
do not think the evidence is as clear cut as he claims. Furthermore, I do not
see how Einstein's thoughts can strengthen Pinker's position. Pinker wants to
convince us that thinking is done in mentalese rather than natural language,
but the case of Einstein does not show this. If Einstein's thoughts were entirely
visual (non propositional), then mentalese would suffer as much a blow as
natural language would. Einstein's claim that his thinking involved visual
imagery does nothing to support the claim that thinking is carried out in a
hidden, innate language of thought—rather, it threatens the idea that thinking
involves sentential structures of any sort, including mentalese (Cole 1999).
One way to disarm the threat from Einstein's testimony is to allow that
his thinking involved visual imagery, but deny that his thoughts lacked
sentences of natural language. It is true that Einstein employed visual imagery
in his thought processes, but I have already agreed with Carruther's (1996)
suggestion that our thoughts can be a combination of words and images. I
think that Einstein's thoughts involved such a combination. If I am right,
Einstein's thought process was something like the following:
“If I were traveling at the speed of light, objects in front of me would look like
this [IMAGE], and objects behind me would look like this [IMAGE].”
or,
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 70
“If I drop a coin while descending in a glass elevator, from my point of view it
would look like [ANIMATED SEQUENCE OF IMAGES]. But from the point of view
of a stationary person standing outside the glass elevator it would look like
[ANIMATED SEQUENCE OF IMAGES].”
way to account for our ability to form thoughts about abstract concepts. Of
course, it could be argued that the mind might use a suitable sequence of
images to represent abstractions. But this would still require some sort of
sentential type structure in order to string the images together in the correct
way. I find it difficult to see how such a system would be distinct from natural
language. In fact, a structured system of images could be considered to be a
natural language much like the ancient Egyptian hieroglyphic languages. The
images would presumably represent spoken words, just as written words
represent spoken ones. If this were the case, we would probably maintain that
thinking was done in sentences of natural language.
Pinker (1994: pp 46-48 and 67) believes the psychological condition known as
aphasia is a threat to the notion that thinking is done in natural language.
People who suffer from aphasia have lost some (or sometimes all) of their
language abilities. Such people may once have been perfectly normal but then,
perhaps as the result of a stroke, hemorrhage or head injury, they find some
aspect of their language capacity impaired. There are varying degrees and
types of aphasia. In some cases, the subject may lose their capacity to speak,
while in other cases, such as instances of jargonaphasia, the subject's speech
may be intact but their utterances are senseless. Occasionally a sufferer's
ability to produce written sentences is the only feature of language affected.
Severe cases can see a patient's language faculty removed altogether, leaving
them unable to comprehend or utter sentences. Pinker thinks that the
existence of aphasia shows that thinking can occur in the absence of natural
language. This is because aphasia sufferers seem to retain much of their
intelligent human behaviour. Merlin Donald (1991) seems to agree. Donald
(1991: pg 82-86) points to the case of Brother John, who suffered periodic
aphasia, and claims that his condition shows the independence of non-
linguistic from linguistic thought. Brother John suffered from paroxysmal
aphasia and was studied by Lecours and Joanette (1980). Unlike the cases of
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 73
aphasia that were brought about as the result of a stroke or brain injury,
Brother John only suffered from temporary episodes, which seem to have been
related to focal seizures. During his aphasic spells, Brother John's language
processing ability was totally shut down. He lost his ability to speak and
understand language; and he even lost his inner speech—providing important
evidence for the connection of inner speech to the rest of the linguistic input/
output system. Yet, despite his lack of language, Brother John remained aware
of his disability and could later recall events that took place during his
seizures.
I hear noise. I hear people talking. I know it means something but I do not
understand. I try hard to understand in my inner self but I cannot (Brother
John recounting an aphasic episode. Quoted in Lecours and Joanette 1980: pg
9).
The interesting feature of Brother John's case was his apparent ability to cope
intelligently with his environment during his loss of language. Lecours and
Joanette document an event in which Brother John suffered an aphasic seizure,
which lasted several hours, while he was on vacation in Switzerland. With no
explicit language ability whatsoever, Brother John managed to find a hotel,
check into a room, have lunch and then go back to his room for a nap. He
accomplished the requisite communication through a series of careful mimes
and gestures. To book into the hotel, he pointed to his name on his passport so
that the receptionist could fill in the appropriate forms. He then found his way
to the hotel restaurant and ordered lunch by pointing to a random dish on the
menu (though, unfortunately he inadvertently ordered fish, which he was not
fond of). After lunch he returned to his room and slept through the rest of the
seizure.
and,
(2) his introspective recollections of his experience during the aphasic spells.
Now, the external observations of Brother John's behaviour show that he could
not (or would not) speak, and that he appeared unable to understand the
speech of others. Examining the observations made of Brother John is a useful
way of assessing the extent of his public language deficit. But observations
alone cannot tell us anything about what was going on in his mind, and so they
cannot be used to decide whether or not natural language was involved in his
thinking. Brother John's introspective testimony may be more authoritative
than external observations, but it too cannot be used to rule out the possibility
that natural language was involved in guiding his behaviour during his aphasic
episodes. Introspection can only tell Brother John about what he was conscious
of. The fact that he could not consciously use or understand natural language
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 75
does not show that natural language was not in use at a lower level, below his
awareness. So, although it is possible that Brother John's aphasic episodes
disabled every mental structure related to language, his introspective
testimony does not provide strong evidence to support this conclusion. It is
also possible that a system involved in vocal production and comprehension
had been “taken off-line” while the rest of the system was intact and
influencing his behaviour. Chomsky's (1995) model of the language faculty can
be used to support this second possibility. According to Chomsky, the language
system is comprised of at least three separable sub-systems. There are
performance systems, which include output production and input reception;
and there is a cognitive system, which is like a linguistic database that is
accessed by the input and output systems. Chomsky believes that cases in
which input or output systems have been impaired while the cognitive system
remains intact, reveal "the kind of modular structure expected in any complex
biological system" (Chomsky 1995: pg 12). It is plausible to explain Brother
John's behaviour in these terms. On Chomsky's model, Brother John's linguistic
database (the thinking part of his brain) was still at work, making inferences
and producing intelligent behaviour while his linguistic input/output module
was malfunctioning.
In this chapter I have highlighted and considered arguments that have been
put forward against the view that thinking is done in natural language. Some
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 76
Einstein's claim that his thinking involved image manipulation has been
used to show that thought is independent of natural language. However,
Einstein's testimony does not show that thinking must therefore be carried out
in mentalese. Nor does it show that thinking does not involve natural
language. At most Einstein's thoughts show that it is possible for image
manipulation to somehow be involved in thinking. I have therefore allowed that
thinking may sometimes involve visual imagery, but I maintain that natural
language is necessary for us to reason about visual images. Furthermore, I
have claimed that abstract concepts such as “might”, “cause” or “equal”,
cannot be thought about solely in visual terms and must therefore be thought
about in sentences of mentalese or natural language. It is reasonable to
believe that human thinking involves a combination of words and images, and
Einstein's thoughts must have involved such a combination.
Cases of aphasia have been used to show that thinking can occur without
language, but I have shown that the evidence does not give us sufficient
reason to accept that conclusion. In the case of Brother John, all we can be
certain of is the fact that he appeared to be unable to use or understand
language, while at the same time he retained his ability to cope with the
environment. Even Brother John's own testimony does not give us reason to
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 77
believe that thinking can occur without language. We can account for Brother
John's behaviour and his introspective reports by appealing to Chomsky's
model of the language system. Chomsky's model shows us the possibility that
linguistic structures can continue to work in the brain at an unconscious level
even during an aphasic episode.
I have shown that the arguments against a cognitive role for natural
language can be answered. The work in this chapter, coupled with the evidence
presented in chapter 3, give us good reason to accept that natural language is
the language of thought.
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 78
1: The Review
The goal of this project has been to establish that human thinking should be
understood as being constituted by processes involving sentences of natural
language. This chapter will consist in a review of the preceding chapters and
some speculation as to where further research might take us.
This thesis has taken the form of a debate between two types of
language of thought theories. On one side of the debate I looked at the
traditional language of thought theories of Fodor and Pinker, which require the
existence of an innate and hidden processing language known as mentalese.
On the other side of the debate I suggested that for reasons of economy, it is
easier to suppose that the natural language we speak is our language of
thought. Despite their differences, these two views agree on one thing—that is,
human thinking involves the manipulation of sentential structures and this
activity is specified by a finite collection of rules. In chapter 2, I outlined the
language of thought hypothesis. One of the main points of chapter 2 was to
show that the language of thought hypothesis can be used to explain the
productive and systematic nature of human thought. I then went on to show
that there are some problems with supposing that the language of thought is
innate and is hidden. These problems were not unanswerable by the mentalese
theorist, but they provided sufficient reason to take a look at the simpler
possibility that natural language might be the language of thought.
speech involved the imaginary sensations of words being spelled out into her
hand, and this became the way in which she entertained private thoughts.
Keller's testimony thus provides us with further reason to suppose that
thinking is done in natural language.
sentences of natural language. The idea behind this claim was that certain
ideas cannot be expressed entirely visually. Concepts such as “tomorrow”, “all”,
and “perhaps” are examples of ideas that cannot be described or understood in
visual imagery. This is because such concepts have no appearance and visual
imagery can (obviously) only represent the appearance of things.
2: The Conclusion
The work done in this thesis has served the dual purpose of: 1) establishing
that there is a language of thought, while 2) calling into question which
language the language of thought actually is. The debate between mentalese
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 82
and natural language is not an easy one to resolve. As this paper has shown,
any attempts to provide evidence that natural language is the language of
thought can be answered by the mentalese theorist in a very simple way. All
they have to do is reiterate their claim that mentalese does its work behind the
scenes and provides a foundation upon which natural language can operate.
Mentalese supporters may state that because we are only aware of natural
language, it is natural for us to believe that natural language is the language of
thought. But they would also remind us that this does not show that mentalese
does not exist. I think the mentalese supporter would be correct in making this
claim, but remember also that they cannot show us that mentalese does exist.
Any attempt by the mentalese theorist to provide reasons for which we must
believe that thinking is done in mentalese rather than natural language can be
answered, thus keeping alive the possibility that natural language is the
language of thought. So, the tension arises because we have two candidates
for the language of thought, both of which offer significant explanatory power.
I have decided that the solution to the tension between these rivaling theories
involves an appeal to economy—namely, go for the simplest solution. Now,
mentalese is hidden and its origins are extremely difficult to discover. Natural
language, on the other hand, is observable and its origins can be discovered. If
we decide that mentalese is the language of thought, our picture of the mind is
one which involves the mind expending resources on supporting and
translating between two languages—mentalese and natural language. But both
of these languages can explain human thinking. For reasons of simplicity I
have been lead to the conclusion that natural language is the best candidate
for the language of thought. I have not shown that there is no mentalese, but I
have provided good reasons for considering the possibility that natural
language is the language of thought. The conclusion I draw from the above
thesis is that we should put aside the mentalese theories and concentrate on
furthering our knowledge of natural language and its influence on the structure
of the mind.
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 83
take would involve an analysis of the extent to which the Self is dependent
upon language. Preliminary questions might determine whether or not
conscious experience is possible in the absence of language, and these
questions could provoke further questions about the nature of the Self. Then
further thought about the possible expansion of the mind into the environment
could include questions about how such an expansion might affect the Self and
consciousness. Does the self expand as the mind expands into the
environment? Are human conscious experiences altered as the mind expands?
The issues discussed in this, and subsequent projects may have profound
implications for the way we think about what it is to be human. For they show
us that we are far more than mere biological devices. We have been enhanced
through the installation of linguistic technology. This technology has
restructured our minds and augmented our innate capacities by providing a
mechanism through which we can assimilate the thoughts of others, and by
allowing us to integrate socially constructed software into our biologically
constructed programming. With language we can represent abstractions, think
about time, and engage in deductive reasoning. Such abilities escape the other
animals and sets us apart from them; for unlike the non-linguistic creatures, it
is with language that we think.
Revealing the Language of Thought Brent Silby 85
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Acknowledgements
First and foremost I wish to thank Derek Browne for supervising my efforts in
constructing this thesis. He kept me on track and provided valuable criticism
and encouragement. I would also like to thank the staff and graduate students
in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Canterbury. They have all
(directly and indirectly) influenced my thoughts—especially Vanessa Scholes
and Alex Wynne, with whom I shared an office and had many interesting
conversations. My partner, Pamela Jenks, deserves my deep gratitude. She has
been patient, kind, and supportive of my efforts.
1 This point was made by Oliver Sacks in his BBC television documentary "The
Mind Traveller" and there is evidence to support the existence of this system of
signs in the case of Ildefonso.
2 This was pointed out to me by my supervisor, Derek Browne.