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Paradigm intention

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Abstract

Antony Duff's recent account of intended action has aroused considerable interest, particularly amongst English commentators, as an attempt to provide criteria that might be utilised by a judge or legislator. While Duff's analysis is instructive, and although it may be desirable to find conditions capturing the central notion of intention in action, this paper demonstrates that the specific conditions proposed by Duff are unsatisfactory. They require extensive modification in order to circumvent a number of difficulties presented here.

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Simester, A.P. Paradigm intention. Law Philos 11, 235–263 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01000644

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01000644

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