Abstract
The subject of this paper is sentimentalism. In broad terms this is the view that value concepts, moral concepts, practical reasons—some or all of these—can be analysed in terms of feeling, sentiment or emotion. More specifically, the paper discusses the following theses:
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(i)
there are reasons to feel (‘evaluative’ reasons) that are not reducible to practical or epistemic reasons
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(ii)
value is analysable in terms of these reasons to feel.
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(iii)
all practical reasons are in one way or another grounded in evaluative reasons.
(i) and (ii) are accepted while (iii) is rejected.
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Notes
This is the revised text of a lecture given at the Ethical Theory and Moral Practice conference in Amsterdam, March 2008. It outlines a fuller account of sentimentalism’s scope and limits that will be presented in John Skorupski, The Domain of Reasons, Part III, (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2010).
I defend this analysis of ‘good’ in Skorupski 2007
I assume that one cannot apprehend in imagination an emotion one has no capacity to experience. But if that is false imaginative apprehension is enough.
Skorupski 1999, part III.
References
Skorupski J (1999) Ethical explorations. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Skorupski J (2007) Buckpassing about goodness. In: Rønnow-Rasmussen T, Petersson B, Josefsson J, Egonsson D (eds) Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/SkorupskiJohn.pdf
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Skorupski, J. Sentimentalism: Its Scope and Limits. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 13, 125–136 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9210-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9210-6