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Abstract

In a way reminiscent of Hume's approach in the Treatise, a reviving moral sentimentalism can use the notion of empathy to ground both its normative account of moral obligation and its metaethical account of moral language. A virtuous person is empathically caring about others and expresses such feeling/motivation in her actions. But the judgment that something is right or good is also based in empathy, and the sentimentalist can espouse a form of moral realism by making use of a Kripkean reference-fixer theory of the role of feelings of approval and disapproval in moral judgment.

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Slote, M. Moral Sentimentalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7, 3–14 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ETTA.0000019982.56628.c3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ETTA.0000019982.56628.c3

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