Semantic Content and Cognitive Sense

Abstract

We can characterize the disagreement between adherents of Russellstyle theories of meaning and those of Frege-style theories as follows:

RS theorists assume that a satisfactory theory of meaning can be built with the binary relation — e refers to r — whereas FS theorists maintain that a three-place relation — e through having sense s refers to r — is required.¹

It should be clear from this characterization that anything an RS theory can do can also be done by an FS theory, since the crucial notion of RS theories, the binary reference relation, is available in any FS theory; for we can define

$$e\,{\rm{refers*}}\,{\rm{to}}\,r{ = _{df}}\exists \,s(e\,{\rm{through}}\,s\,{\rm{refers}}\,{\rm{to}}\,r){.^2}$$

The question in the dispute between the two theories is then whether there are conditions of adequacy only FS theories can satisfy.