Sellars’ Defense of Altruism

Abstract

While the recent attempts of Thomas Nagel and Alan Gewirth to forward the basically Kantian enterprise of showing that altruism is a rational requirement on action have been much discussed by moral philosophers, Wilfrid Sellars’ attempt to argue for a similar thesis has been largely ignored.¹ Whatever the reasons why philosophers have ignored his views, it is surely unfortunate. Sellars’ defense of this thesis is carried on with a full awareness of the difficulties of such an undertaking. More importantly, he develops his defense of altruism within the context of the comprehensive theory of practical reason he has developed over the years, and this theoretical background makes his views on ethics of special interest. Indeed, it is Sellars’ attempt to develop his ethical views within the context of this theory of practical reason that turns his writings on ethics into something of a dialectical thicket, and this might have deterred some from attending more closely to them.