Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate Plato’s conception of the whole in the Phaedrus and the theory of medical dialectic underlying this conception. Through this analysis Plato’s conception of kairos will also be adressed. It will be argued that the epistemological holism developed in the dialogue and the patient-typology emerging from it provides us with a way of perceiving individual situations of medical discourse and decision-making that makes it possible to bridge the gap between observations of a professional nature, i.e. of diagnostics and therapy—of whom to treat and in what magnitude—and individual patients’ perceptions of their situation. Besides, it will be argued that such a patient-typology represents a conceptual framework to assess and deal normatively with patients’ ailments and needs that is more robust than the current standards in use, i.e. the Subjective Standard, the Reasonable Person Standard and the Professional Practice Standard. Finally, it will be argued that the possession of kairos, which according to Plato is the hallmark of a true physician, represents a normative conception of time that today’s medicine is in need of revisiting.
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Notes
Phaedrus, 269d3–272b6.
Ferrari 1987, 5.
Phaedrus, 268a9–10.
Phaedrus, 227a4–6.
Phaedrus, 227d2–5.
Phaedrus, 230b3–13:“Upon my word, a delightful resting place, with this tall, spreading plane, and a lovely shade from the high branches of the agnous [tall tree like the willow]. Now that it's in full flower, it will make the place ever so fragrant. And what a lovely stream under the plane tree, and how cool to the feet! Judging by the statuettes and images I should say it's consecrated to Achelous and some of the nymphs. And then too, isn't the freshness of the air most welcome and pleasant, and the shrill summery music of the cicada choir! And as crowning delight the grass, thick enough on a gentle slope to rest your head on most comfortably. In fact, my dear Phaedrus, you have been the stranger's perfect guide”.
Ferrari 1987, 17. Ferrari refers to the following passage from chapter 1 of On Airs, Waters, Places (transl., J. Chadwick and W.N.Mann): "Whoever would study medicine aright must learn of the following subjects. First he must consider the effect of each of the seasons of the year and the differences between them. Secondly, he must study the warm and the cold winds, both those which are common to every country and those peculiar to a particular locality. Lastly, the effect of water on the health must not be forgotten […] When, therefore, a physician comes to a district previously unknown to him, he should consider both its situation and its aspect to the winds […] Similarly, the nature of the water supply must be considered; is it marshy and soft, hard as it is when it flows from high and rocky ground, or salty with a hardness which is permanent? Then think of the soil, whether it be bare and waterless or thickly covered with vegetation and well—watered; whether in a hollow and stifling, or exposed and cold. Lastly consider the life of the inhabitants themselves; are they heavy drinkers and eaters and consequently unable to stand fatigue or, being fond of work and exercise, eat wisely but drink sparely?”.
Phaedrus, 229c1–230b1.
Derrida (1972) 1989, p. 264.
For Phaedrus’ texts as a drug, see also Griswold 1986, p. 24 and p. 252 (n. 21).
Phaedrus, 248c3–e5.
Joly 1961, 451.
Phaedrus, 230e–234c.
Phaedrus, 234c–237b.
Phaedrus, 237b–241d.
Phaedrus, 243a–257b.
Phaedrus, 245c–246d. As this interlude contains definitions of "soul" and "living being" which are important to the interpretation of the Hippocratic passage later in the dialogue, the central part of this passage is quoted here: "Now our first step toward attaining the truth of the matter is to discern the nature of soul, divine and human[…]
[…]
All soul is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal[…]And now that we have seen that which is moved by itself is immortal, we shall feel no scruple in affirming that precisely that is the essence and definition[…]the nature of soul[…]
[…]And now we must essay to tell how it is that living beings are called mortal and immortal. All soul has the care of all that inanimate, and traverses the whole universe (panta de ouranon), though in ever-changing forms. Thus when it is perfect and winged it journeys on high and controls the whole world (panta ton kosmon), but one that has shed its wings sinks down until it can fasten on something solid, and settling there it takes to itself an earthy body which seems by reason of the soul's power to move itself. This composite structure of soul and body is called a living being".
Phaedrus, 246d–248c.
Phaedrus, 248c–249d.
Phaedrus, 249d–257b.
Phaedrus, 258e7–259d9.
Kucharski 1939.
In the extension of context to 259e, I agree with Edelstein 1931, 118–119.
Phaedrus, 259e5–7.
Phaedrus, 259e1–260a5.
Phaedrus, 260c7–d2.
Phaedrus, 262a10–b10.
Phaedrus, 260e3–6 and 262c1–3: “It would seem to follow, my friend, that the art of speech displayed by one who has gone chasing after beliefs, instead of knowing the truth, will be a comical sort of art, in fact no art at all”.
Phaedrus, 262c5–7.
Phaedrus, 263b7–10.
Phaedrus, 263a1–d3.
Phaedrus, 264c2–5. For a typological analysis of the use and signification of the notion of holon in the C.P., see Solbakk 1993: 102–106.
Phaedrus, 264e7–9.
Phaedrus, 265a2–3. The first speech may be said to have been a model exposition of the same plea put forward in the clearly defective speech delivered by Lysias, while the second speech was an example of 'true rhetoric'.
Phaedrus, 265d4–7: "The first [procedure] is that in which we bring a dispersed plurality under a single form, seeing it all together—the purpose being to define so—and—so, and thus to make plain whatever may be chosen as the topic for exposition".
Phaedrus, 265e1–4: "The reverse of the other [procedure], whereby we are enabled to divide into forms, following the objective articulation; we are not to attempt to hack off parts like a clumsy butcher, but to take example from our two recent speeches". See also, Phaedrus, 265e4–266b1.
Phaedrus, 266b9–10.
Phaedrus, 266b5–6. For an identical characteristic of medicine, see Gorgias, 450a1–2.
Phaedrus, 266c7–8.
Phaedrus, 266c8–10.
Phaedrus, 266d1–4: "What? Can there really be anything of value that admits of scientific acquisition despite the lack of that procedure? If so, you and I should certainly not disdain it, but should explain what this residium of rhetoric actually consists in".
Phaedrus, 266d7–267e4. The following names of contemporary rhetoricians are referred to: Lysias, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Theodorus of Byzant, Evenus of Paros, Tisias, Gorgias, Prodicus of Cos, Hippias of Elis, Polus and Protagoras of Abdera.
Phaedrus, 268a8–b8.
Phaedrus, 268b6–8.
Phaedrus, 268c2–5.
For an interesting discussion of the relation between different forms of medical knowledge and the problem of particulars, see Entralgo 1962, 196f. Entralgo's main references, however, are to the Republic, Statesman, Timaeus, and the Laws.
Phaedrus, 268c6–269a2.
Phaedrus, 268d4–7.
Phaedrus, 269a6–c6.
Phaedrus, 269c7–d2.
Phaedrus, 269d3–8.
Phaedrus, 269e1–270a9.
In the literature there seems to be a general consensus about treating the two passages as closely interrelated. See for example Pohlenz 1918, 405; Joly 1961, 80; Cambiano 1966, 292f; Vegetti 1969, 11f; Mannsperger 1969, p. 262f. For a detailed analysis and assessment of the plausibility of this “Zusammengehörigkeit”, see Hellwig 1977 188–190.
(Phaedrus, 269b7).
"Pre-Anaxagorian" is only used here to distinguish this passage from the succeeding one where the name of Pericles is attached to the name of Anaxagoras.
Phaedrus, 264c2–6. Kranz 1944, 196, seems to have overlooked this simile, because he argues that the context of the notion of to holon in the Hippocratic passage stretches back to 265, and this implies that he misses the point at which the somatic conception of to holon is introduced into the dialogue: "Seit 265 ist also das Thema das Verhältnis des Ganzen zu seinen natürlichen Teilen. Und in diesem Zusammenhang hören wir nun die entscheidenden Worte des Sokrates und des Phaedrus 270c".
Phaedrus, 269b3–c6.
This was the commonly accepted interpretation of the two notions until Edelstein presented his "methodological" interpretation in 1931. After Edelstein, Deichgräber 1933; Pohlenz 1938; Frenkian 1941; Festugiere 1948; Joly 1961 and Mansfeld 1980 have tried to resuscitate the pre-Edelsteinian position. For details of the different interpretations, see Solbakk 1993 170–193.
Longrigg 1963, 166.
Phaedrus, 270b1–c9.
That is, the alternative approach to the one adopted by Lysias and Thrasymachus. For this, see also Phaedrus, 269d8–10.
Phaedrus, 269e4–5.
Kranz 1944, 198.
Hellwig 1977, 186–187.
Phaedrus, 270b7–9.
Jones 1946, 17: "tou holou in the first sentence has aroused a storm of controversy".
Phaedrus, 270c1–4.
For a similar view ascribed to the good Greek physicians, see Charmides, 156c1–3: "[…]to think of curing the head alone aneu holou tou sômatos is the height of folly".
This in spite of Hellwig's reference to what she calls "[…]die Ausdehnung des holon—Begriffes auf den Kosmos" in Laws, 896af., 897af. and Timaeus, 34cf, as an attempt at showing the opposite. To this one could also add her intra-Phaedrian argument preceding the "Ausdehnungs"—references: "Wenn man den Dialog Phaedrus nicht roh in zwei Hälften zerschneiden will, so kann der kosmische Bezug der Seele im Unsterblichkeitsbeweis im Mythos des ersten Teils nur als Beleg dafür dienen, dass to holon im zweiten Teil[…]das Universum bedeuten muss" (Hellwig 1977, 202). This last point, I shall argue, may be dealt with very well without a cosmological interpretation of to holon! That is, the unity of the dialogue is not dependent on a cosmological interpretation of to holon; in fact it may be dealt with better within the context of an epistemic interpretation of this notion. For this, see later.
I owe this argument about generalizability and its substantiation to professor Norman Dahl, University of Minnesota.
For a "mixed" view, which tries to read epistemic as well as substantial connotations into this passage, see Ferrari 1987, 76 and 248: "[…]not only should they examine it as a whole with its own parts, but they should also treat it as itself part of a larger whole or system[…], that of 'overall system'".
Phaedrus, 265d3–4.
For this notion, see Vegetti 1969 15.
For the relation between the notion of holon and its parts and its epistemic attachment to the methodological procedures of dialectic, see above.
Phaedrus, 270b4–5.
For a discussion of this problem in relation to 270c1–2, see Hellwig 1977, 191.
For these two last points, see the proceeding analysis of collection (synagôgê) division (diairesis) and enumeration (arithmêsis)
Phaedrus, 270c3–4.
Phaedrus, 270c9–d1.
On this, I disagree with Edelstein 1931, 120–121, who seems to hold a corrective view: "Erst nachdem Phaidros die Richtigkeit der Methode nicht nur auf Grund der Autorität eines Menschen zugestanden hat, expliziert Sokrates, wie sie zu verstehen sei[…] Er velangte von Phaidros ausser Hippokrates noch eine andere Autorität, die richtige, durch Untersuchung gefundene Erkenntnis". Several authors have taken this reference to "alêthês logos" as a "transpositional" indication. For this, see for example Kucharski 1939, 323f; Vegetti 1969, 145 and Jouanna 1977, 26.
Considering that, at 269b1–c1, the name of Pericles is associated with the notion of "dialectic", and that at 269e5, Periclean rhetoric, as one representative of the great technai, is associated with the notion of physis, this withdrawal in favour of Hippocrates of Cos could be seen as a rather drastic measure.
"Totalisation" is used here instead of synagôgê, to emphasise the holon-oriented view of the synthetic procedure of synagôgê.
Whether this paradigmatic function ascribed to Hippocratic methodology has altered its authentic form, is a question which cannot be fully answered within the context of this paper, since it belongs to the area of Hippocratic scholarship. However, the complete lack of consensus in the literature, which has tried to use Phaedrus, 270c, as a key reference for identifying the genuine works (as well as the methodology) of Hippocrates of Cos, strongly favours a "transpositional" interpretation along the lines of Diès, Kucharski and Vegetti.
To this adds the introduction of synagôgê and diairesis at 265c8–266b10.
Phaedrus,270d2.
In fact, at 277b7–c7, the perspective is a mixed; since up to 277b10 the point of reference is technai in general, while the rest of the passage relates to the art of true rhetoric. The double perspective may be due to the function of this passage as a recapitulation (hupomnêsis) of the methodology which was revealed in the three preceding passages. For this, see 277b2–5: "[SOCRATES:] Now I think we have pretty well cleared up the question of art. PHAEDRUS: Yes, we did think so, but please remind me how we did it".
Phaedrus, 270d1–2.
Hellwig 1977, 207 seems right in assuming that the reference made to simple objects, in respect of which we desire to have scientific knowledge, is only made for methodological reasons and completeness, because: "Bei der Anwendung des Verfahrens auf Körper und Seele setzt Platon die Vielartigkeit des Körpers als bekannt voraus[…]und übernimmt diese Voraussetzung auch für die Seele, ohne die Zustimmung des Gesprächspartners einzuholen".
Protagoras, 329d5–330b2.
This also reveals the epistemic flexibility of the notion of to holon and therefore, one may also give an affirmative answer to Hellwig's question (1977, p. 204): "Was aber heisst […] 'polyeidês'? In mehrere Arten zerfallend—aus mehreren Teilen—aus mehreren Elementen bestehend?". Edelstein 1931, p. 130, seems to have overlooked this flexibility of the notions of to holon, eidos and polyeidês, when saying: "Hippokrates muss also untersucht haben, ob der Körper eine Einheit ist oder nicht, und dann je nachdem, wie er diese Frage beantwortete—darüber sagt der Phaidros nichts—weiter gefragt haben, was dieser einheitliche Körper leisten kann und wodurch er beeinflusst wird; oder wie seine Teile wirken und beeinflusst werden". Kranz 1944, 198, also views the notion of to holon in the Hippocratic passage as inflexible. However, by linking this notion to the level of "eidê" and "genê", he goes in the opposite direction of Edelstein; implying that "body" is not conceived of as "Einzelkörper", but as "Gattungsbegriff" and its parts as "Arten".
Phaedrus, 271a5–9. In spite of Plato's explicit reference to the analogous situation of medicine, Hellwig 1977, 205 writes: "Was aber heisst in der ersten Forderung 'polyeidês'? In mehrere Arten zerfallend—aus mehreren Teilen—aus mehreren Elementen bestehend? Es scheint geboten zu sein, die Lösung nur von den Voraussetzungen der platonischen Philosophie her zu suchen und die Medizin ausser Betracht zu lassen […]".
Hellwig 1977, 206.
Such a framework of the body is discussed by Kranz, in terms of the notion of "Konstitutionstypen": "Und die von so mancher jener Schriften vertretene Lehre von den Konstitutionstypen, diesen genê oder eidê des sôma, die 'in einer Schau zusammengefasst'—mit Platon zu reden—den menschlichen Körper ergeben, entspringt einer solchen Methode"; and Ferrari 1987, p. 80, in relation to the soul, talks in terms of 'general typology' "[…]he [i.e. the true orator] does not approach actual human behaviour as a mere congeries of individual symptoms about which he already knows all there is to know, but as something particular to which he must adapt his general typology".
This fact seems to refute Hellwig's second "Haupteinwand" against a logical or epistemic interpretation of to holon. For this, see, Hellwig 1977, 191–192: "Wenn 'to holon' das Ganze im Gegensatz zu seinen Teilen oder Arten bedeutete, so passte das nur auf den ersten Schritt der methodischen Erfassung des Objekts[…]Der zweite Schritt, die Feststellung der aktiven und reaktiven Möglichkeiten jedes Dinges, bzw. jedes seiner eidê, hat mit 'holon' als dem logischen Ganzen nichts mehr zu tun. Denn jetzt geht es um die inhaltliche Füllung der festgestellten eidê".
The expositions at 273d2–e4 and 277b7–c do not add anything new to the descriptions which are offered in the first two passages.
Phaedrus, 270d3–6.
At 271a11–13 a short version of this step is presented: “[…]he will describe what natural capacity it has to act upon what, and through what means, or by what it can be acted upon”.
Phaedrus, 270d7–10.
Phaedrus, 271b1–2. For the notion of "relational modality", see Vegetti 1969, 16.
Phaedrus, 271b2–3.
Phaedrus, 271b3–5. For a reiteration of this operative moment, see also Phaedrus, 277b10–c5:"[…]you must have a corresponding discernment of the physis of the soul, discover the eidos of speech appropriate to each nature, and order and arrange your discourse accordingly, addressing a variegated soul in a variegated style that ranges over the whole gamut of tones, and a simple soul in a simple style". .
At 271b1–2, the notion of genos is used.
Phaedrus, 271c13–d7. This fact also favours a synonymous interpretation of the notion of genos at 271b1–2 and the notion of eidos at 271c13–d7, both as meaning "type" or "kind". For eidos used synonymously with genos, cf.also Republic, 441c. .
This idea of a determinate number of types of souls is already familiar from the mythical interlude which deals with the fate of souls at 248c3–e5. It now seems that this demarcation of nine different types of souls at 248c3–e5 provides a background for the current discussion and this makes it clear that the unity of the dialogue can be understood without a cosmological interpretation of to holon.
Phaedrus, 271d7–272a9: “All this, the orator must fully understand, and next he must watch it actually occuring, exemplified in men’s conduct, and must cultivate a keenness of perception in following it, if he is going to get any advantage out of the previous instruction that he was given in the school. And when he is competent to say what type of man is susceptible to what kind of discourse; when further, he can, on catching sight of so—and–so, tell himself, ‘That is the man, that character now actually before me is the one I heard about in school, and in order to persuade him of so–and–so I have to apply these arguments in this fashion’: and when, on top of all this, he has grasped the right occasions (kairos) for speaking and for keeping quiet, and has come to recognize the right and the wrong time for the brachylogy, the pathetic passage, the exacerbation, and all the rest of his accomplishments—then and not till then has he well and truly achieved the art”.
For the reason why medicine is referred to here, see Cambiano's accurate observation, 1966, 297:"[…]una retorica che sia stata capace di intervenire nell 'esperienza in maniera appropriata, cioè in modo da operare secondo i presupposti della dialettica, non esiste ancora, secondo Platone. Esiste invece una medicina capace di saldare tali presupposti con i problemi singuli e specifici sollevati dai singoli pazienti da curare: di qui la sua assunzione, da parte di Platone, a modello per la costituzione di una vera retorica".
Phaedrus, 271d7–272a9.
Hellwig 1977, 230.
For this notion in Corpus Hippocraticum, see for example On Regimen in acute diseases, ch. XX and LXVII.
Phaedrus, 269e1–4.
Phaedrus, 270a9:"Pôs touto legeis;".
Phaedrus, 270b1–2.
Phaedrus, 270b3:"Pôs dê;".
Phaedrus, 270b4–9.
Phaedrus, 270b10f.
Gorgias, 501a1–3.
Edelstein 1931, p. 134.
For this point about the "physis"—specificity of each technê, see also Kranz's sharp observation, 1944, 195: "Weil wir von Anaxagoras wissen, dass er über meteôra und Kosmos gehandelt hat und sein Buch gemäss späterer Zitierweise Peri physeôs nennen, so ist man zunächst geneigt, auch hier physis als 'Natur' im Sinne von 'Inbegriff der Erscheinungen', 'Allnatur' zu fassen. Aber darüber sollen doch wahrlich nicht 'alle grossen technai handeln!".
Jouanna 1977, 18.
Edelstein 1931, 134: “Die beiden Worte bezeichnen also nicht naturphilosophische Spekulation, sie bezeichnen gründliche, allgemeine Untersuchung”; Cambiano 1966, 285: "loquacità e indagini celesti (meteôrologia) intorno alla natura"; Vegetti 1969, 12: “finezza di argomentazione ed elevate conoscenze sulla natura”.
For this, see for example, Phaedo, 70b–c (adolescheô); Parmenides, 135d (adoleschiasa); Cratylus, 401b (meteôrologoi kai adoleschai); Theaetetus, 175d2–4 (“[…] eiliggiôn te apo upsêlou kremastheis kai blepôn meteôros anôthen hupo aêtheias adêmonôn […]”, and Statesman, 299b7–8 ("[…] alla meteôrologon, adoleschên tina sophistên […]").
Roochnik 1996, 52.
Roochnik 1996, 52.
For a detailed description of this conception, i.e. the The Reasonable Person Standard, see Faden and Beauchamp 1986, 30–34. “This standard focuses on the information the’reasonable person’ needs to know about risks, alternatives, and consequences. The legal litmus test under this standard for determining the extent of disclosure is the’materiality’, or significance, of information to the decision making process of the patient. The patient, rather than the physician, is the judge of whether the information is material. Thus, the right to decide what information is pertinent is shifted away from the physician to the patient”. Historically, this standard was developed as an alternative to the Professional Practice Standard, which Faden and Beachamp 1986, 30 describe thus: “This first standard holds that both the duty to disclose and the criteria of adequate disclosure, its topics and scope, are determined by the customary practices of a professional community. Proponents of this standard argue that the physician is charged professionally with the responsibility of protecting the health of the patient and must use proper professional criteria for determining the information that should be disclosed and withheld”.
For these two standards, see previous footnote. For further details about the Subjective Standard, see Faden and Beauchamp 1986, 33–34.
Trédé 1992, p. 287.
Gorgias, 456a7–c1: “Ah, if only you knew all, Socrates, and realized that rhetoric includes practically all other faculties under her control. And I will give you good proof of this. I have often, along with my brother and with other physicians, visited one of their patients who refused to drink his medicine or submit to the surgeon’s knife or cautery, and when the doctor was unable to persuade them, I did so, by no other art but rhetoric. And I claim too that, if a rhetorician and a doctor visited any city you like to name and they had to contend in argument before the Assembly or any other gathering as to which of the two should be chosen as doctor, the doctor would be nowhere, but the man who could speak would be chosen, if he so wished”.
For this, see also Phaedrus, 268b6–8.
Phaedrus, 268a8–b8.
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Solbakk, J.H. The whole and the art of medical dialectic: a platonic account. Med Health Care and Philos 17, 39–52 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-013-9484-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-013-9484-2