There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent's intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first-order intentional states and the second-order judgments about them. Recognition of this fact thus represents a significant challenge to the rational agency view. © 2010 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC.
CITATION STYLE
Reed, B. (2010). Self-knowledge and rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(1), 164–181. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00314.x
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