Abstract
Various reflections on the nature of consciousness, partly inspired by Alastair Hannay's views on the subject, are presented. In particular, its reality as a distinct non-physical existence is defended against such alternatives as have dominated philosophy for many years. The main difficulty in such a defense concerns the contingency it seems to imply as to the relations between consciousness and its expression in behaviour. But it only implies such contingency if some version of the Humean principle that there cannot be necessary connections between distinct existences is assumed. It is more promising to see this relation as the falsification of this Humean principle and thus avoid what seems the main recommendation of behaviourism, functionalism etc. Some final reflections on the nature of the physical suggest that something like consciousness may be the noumenal essence of the physical in general.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Armstrong, D. M., and Malcolm, Norman: 1984,Consciousness and Causality, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Ayer, A. J.: 1973,Probability and Evidence, MacMillan, London.
Bouwsma, K.: 1952, ‘Moore's Theory of Sense Data’, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.),The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, Tudor, New York, pp. 201–22.
Carruthers, Peter: 1992, ‘Consciousness and Concepts’,The Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume LXVI, 41–59.
Dennett, Daniel C.: 1991,Consciousness Explained, Little, Brown, Boston.
Hannay, Alastair: 1971,Mental Images — A Defence, Allen and Unwin, London.
Hannay, Alastair: 1990,Human Consciousness, Routledge, London.
Husserl, Edmund: 1969,Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.
Leahy, Michael P. T.: 1991,Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective, Routledge, London.
Mellor, D. H.: 1993, ‘The Presidential Address: Nothing Like Experience’,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LXXXXIII, 1–16.
Moore, G. E.: 1952, ‘A Reply to my Critics’, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.):The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, Tudor, New York, pp. 533–677.
Nagel, Thomas: 1974, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’,Philosophical Review LXXXIII, 435–50.
Price, H. H.: 1954,Perception, Methuen, London.
Quine, W. V. O.: 1953,From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Sprigge, T. L. S.: 1971, ‘Final Causes’,The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XLV, 149–70.
Sprigge, T. L. S.: 1982, ‘The Importance of Subjectivity’,Inquiry XXV, 143–63.
Sprigge, T. L. S.: 1983,The Vindication of Absolute Idealism, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.
Sprigge, T. L. S.: 1987–88, ‘Intrinsic Connectedness’,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series LXXXVII, 129–45.
Sprigge, T. L. S.: 1993,James and Bradley: American Truth and British Reality, Open Court, Illinois.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
I must express my warm thanks to Alastair Hannay and Dagfinn Føllesdal, and to the organisers of the conference in Oslo who arranged to celebrate their sixtieth birthdays, for having been invited to participate. As I was a graduate student with Alastair Hannay at University College, London, when A. J. Ayer was the head of the department, and am his almost exact contemporary, I have taken the opportunity for some reflections on the way philosophy of mind has gone over the intervening years. This article retains some of the informality of style which was appropriate for such an occasion.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Sprigge, T.L.S. Consciousness. Synthese 98, 73–93 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064026
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064026