Abstract
A number of authors have recently developed and defended various versions of ‘normative essentialism’ about the mental, i.e. the claim that propositional attitudes are constitutively or essentially governed by normative principles. I present two arguments to the effect that this claim cannot be right. First, if propositional attitudes were essentially normative, propositional attitude ascriptions would require non-normative justification, but since this is not a requirement of folk-psychology, propositional attitudes cannot be essentially normative. Second, if propositional attitudes were essentially normative, propositional attitude ascriptions could not support normative rationality judgments, which would remove the central appeal of normative essentialism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Although the two arguments will be phrased in terms of beliefs, I take the arguments to generalise to other propositional attitudes.
For an attack on linguistic normativity, see Hattiangadi (2007).
See for example Boghossian (2003).
It is highly doubtful whether there are mental phenomena beyond propositional attitudes that are in any way to be understood in normative terms. Sensations and some emotions, for instance, are not in any clear sense associated with normative correctness conditions or rational requirements. It is thus a bit of a misnomer to discuss the claim under investigation under the heading of ‘mental normativity’.
In order to avoid obvious counterexamples to this norm of correctness, it must be clarified what kind of ‘ought’ this norm supports. It does not say that for any proposition p, if p is true then one ought to believe that p. We do not have reason to form a belief about any old proposition just because the proposition happens to be true. In fact, there are many true propositions, such as the proposition stating the exact number of grass blades on my lawn, that it would be seriously irrational to apply too much effort in forming beliefs about. So the ought supported by the correctness norm should only be taken to mean that for any proposition p, one ought to believe that p only if p is true (Heal 1987; Boghossian 2003).
See for example Zangwill (2005a).
There is a growing literature on how to interpret such horizontal requirements holding between attitudes, bearing on whether such requirements are in the end normative or not (Broome 2005; Kolodny 2005). As I am approaching the issue from a somewhat different angle, I will not in this paper enter into these specific discussions, although my argument would support those who are suspicious of the normativity of such requirements.
See for example Broome (1999).
It is possible, of course, to identify objects independently of their essential properties. A referring phrase or expression can uniquely identify an object or even a kind of objects without mentioning any of the properties that are essential to those objects, ‘unfeathered bipeds’ uniquely picking out Humans being the classic example. But that would not be a matter of identifying those objects as Humans.
For an illuminating elaboration of this point, see Bealer (1987).
Zangwill (2005b).
The demand of specifying what non-normative properties the normative properties supervene on seems to imply that one must state sufficient conditions for the instantiation of the normative properties in question. To some, that may seem overly strong. Perhaps one is only required to recognise that there is a set of non-normative properties that is sufficient for the normative properties in question, and not required to state all but only some, or the most significant of these properties. Whether or not such a qualification is needed, however, does not appear to affect the overall argument.
Gibbard makes a similar point (2005, p. 341).
For an influential defence of this point, see Fine (1994).
For a defence of this point, see also Zangwill (2005c).
For an illuminating critique of this principle, see Fine (1994).
Zangwill admits that it is somewhat puzzling what those properties might be, and passes over that issue in ‘respectful silence’ (2005a, p. 7).
References
Bealer, G. (1987). The philosophical limits of scientific essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives, 1, 289–365.
Blackburn, S. (1993). Essays in quasi-realism. Oxford University Press.
Boghossian, P. (2003). The normativity of content. Philosophical Issues, 13, 31–45.
Brandom, R. (1994). Making it explicit. Harvard University Press.
Broome, J. (1999). Normative requirements. Ratio, 12, 398–419.
Broome, J. (2005). Does rationality give us reasons? Philosophical Issues, 15, 321–337.
Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and events. Clarendon Press.
Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Clarendon Press.
Fine, K. (1994). Essence and modality. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 1–16.
Fine, K. (1995). Senses of essence. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Modality, morality, and belief. Cambridge University Press.
Gibbard, A. (2005). Truth and correct belief. Philosophical Issues, 15, 338–350.
Hare, R. M. (1952). The language of morals. Oxford University Press.
Hattiangadi, A. (2007). Oughts and thoughts. Oxford University Press.
Heal, J. (1987). The disinterested search for truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1987–8, 97–108.
Kolodny, N. (2005). Why be rational. Mind, 114, 509–563.
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Blackwell Publishers.
Kripke, S. (1982). Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Blackwell Publishers.
Moore, G. E. (1922). The conception of intrinsic value. In Philosophical studies. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Morris, M. (1992). The good and the true. Oxford University Press.
Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of “Meaning”. In H. Putnam (Ed.), Mind, language, and reality. Philosophical Papers, Vol. II. Cambridge University Press.
Shah, N. (2003). How truth governs belief. The Philosophical Review, 112, 447–482.
Shah, N., & Velleman, D. (2005). Doxastic deliberation. The Philosophical Review, 114, 497–534.
Steglich-Petersen, A. (2006). No norm needed: On the aim of belief. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 499–516.
Wedgwood, R. (2002). The aim of belief. Philosophical Perspectives, 15, 267–297.
Wedgwood, R. (2005). How we know what ought to be. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106, 61–84.
Wedgwood, R. (2006). The normative force of reasoning. Noûs, 40, 660–686.
Wedgwood, R. (2007, forthcoming). The normativity of the intentional. In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (Eds.), The oxford handbook of the philosophy of mind, Clarendon Press.
Zangwill, N. (1998). Direction of fit and normative functionalism. Philosophical Studies, 91, 173–203.
Zangwill, N. (2005a). The normativity of the mental. Philosophical Explorations, 8, 1–20.
Zangwill, N. (2005b). Moral epistemology and the Because Constraint. In J. Dreier (Ed.), Contemporary debates in moral theory. Blackwell Publishers.
Zangwill, N. (2005c). Moore, morality, supervenience, essence, epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly, 42, 125–130.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Many thanks to Jane Heal, Simon Blackburn, DH Mellor, Jeppe Andersen, Veli Mitova, members of the Rural Sciences Club, and an anonymous reviewer for extremely helpful comments and criticism.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Steglich-Petersen, A. Against essential normativity of the mental. Philos Stud 140, 263–283 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9141-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9141-9