Abstract
Pluralism is often put forth as a counter-position to reductionism. In this essay, I argue that reductionism and pluralism are in fact consistent. I propose that there are several potential goals for reductions and that the proper form of a reduction should be considered in tandem with the goal that it aims to achieve. This insight provides a basis for clarifying what version(s) of reductionism are currently defended, for explicating the notion of a “fundamental” level of explanation, and for showing how one can be both a reductionist and a pluralist.
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Steel, D. Can a reductionist be a pluralist?. Biology & Philosophy 19, 55–73 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:BIPH.0000013263.35121.5a
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:BIPH.0000013263.35121.5a